



Daily Report

East Europe

FBIS-EEU-91-228
Tuesday
26 November 1991

Daily Report

East Europe

FBIS-EEU-91-228

CONTENTS

26 November 1991

NOTICE TO READERS: An * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

ALBANIA

Alia Fears Being Drawn Into SFRY Conflict [Hamburg DPA]	1
Foreign Ministry Statement Supports UN Forces [Tirana Radio]	1
Kosovo Prime Minister Bukoshi Departs After Visit [ATA]	1
Industrial Agreement Signed With Germany [ATA]	1
Pashko Speaks at Christian Democratic Forum [ATA]	1
Nano Speaks at Socialist Party Conference [ATA]	2
Radio-Television Law Approved, Summarized [ATA]	3

BULGARIA

Dimitrov Interviewed on Ties With Greece, NATO [BTA]	4
Military Delegation Reports on Visit to Turkey [BULGARSKA ARMIYA 20 Nov]	4
East Europe Cooperation, Trade Association Formed [BTA]	4
Moscow Mayor Popov Visits, Views Economic Reform [NOVINI 19 Nov]	5
Second Kozloduy Nuclear Reactor To Be Shut Down [Sofia Radio]	6
Registration of Presidential Candidates Begins [BTA]	6
Assembly Chairman Savov Opposes Banning BSP [NOVINI 20 Nov]	7
Dimitrov, TU Leaders Discuss Cooperation [Sofia Radio]	7
Dimitrov Outlines Privatization Plans [24 CHASA 18 Nov]	7
BSP, KNSB Oppose Property Confiscation [DUMA 20 Nov]	8
New Justice Minister Luchnikov Interviewed [Sofia TRUD 18 Nov]	9

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Havel 'Optimistic' About Acceptance of Proposals [CSTK]	10
40,000 Attend Pro-Havel Prague Rally 21 Nov [CSTK]	10
Calfa Voices Fears on Federation Breakup [CSTK]	10
Slovak Deputies Call For UN Observers [CSTK]	11
CNR Presidium Discusses Budget, State Setup [LIDOVE NOVINY 22 Nov]	11
Statistical Office Issues Oct Economic Figures [HOSPODARSKE NOVINY 18 Nov]	12
Unemployment Statistics for October 91 Reported [HOSPODARSKE NOVINY 19 Nov]	13
November Poll on State Arrangement Published [CESKE A MORAVSKOSLEZSKE ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY 22 Nov]	14

HUNGARY

Minister Denies SFRY, Chechen Arms Sales [MTI]	16
Letter of Intent Signed With Iran on Oil Supply [MTI]	16
Bod Views Importance of Iran Oil [Budapest Radio]	16
Outlines Details of Agreement [Budapest TV]	17
Gonczi Comments on Relations With UK [Budapest Radio]	17
Delegation Visits Slovakia, Discusses Bos Dam [NEPSZABADSAG 21 Nov]	19
Horn Visits Prague, Holds Party Talks [NEPSZABADSAG 22 Nov]	19
Free Democrats Elect Chairman; Parties React [Budapest Radio]	20
Horn, Konya View Election [Budapest Radio]	21
Socialist Deputy Chairman on Party Progress [MAGYAR HIRLAP 19 Nov]	21

POLAND

Walesa Asks Sejm to Reject Government Resignation [Warsaw Radio]	23
Government Submits Resignation [Warsaw TV]	23
Walesa Addresses Opening Session of Sejm 25 Nov [Warsaw Radio]	23
Session Elects Sejm Speaker [PAP]	26
Center Accord Parliament Members Form Club [RZECZPOSPOLITA 21 Nov]	27
Coalition Leaders Discuss Ministry Priorities [RZECZPOSPOLITA 22 Nov]	27
Rakowski Denies SDRP Spent Soviet Loan [TRYBUNA 23-24 Nov]	29
Democratic Left Leader on CPSU Loan Issue [GAZETA WYBORCZA 21 Nov]	31
Leaders Meet SDP's Engholm, Discuss EC Issues [Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU 22 Nov]	32

ROMANIA

Iliescu, Leaders Set Local Elections 9 Feb [Bucharest Radio]	33
Iliescu Discusses Roman, Stolojan, Moldovan Issue [Paris LE FIGARO 22 Nov]	33
Foreign Ministry Welcomes Hungarian Proposal [NEPSZABADSAG 21 Nov]	33
Senator Kiraly on Constitution, Minority Rights [MAGYAR HIRLAP 22 Nov]	34
PSDR Dissatisfied With New Constitution [ROMPRES]	35
PAC Leader Calls Referendum FSN 'Stratagem' [ROMPRES]	35
Interior Minister Views Ministry, Police Roles [TINERETUL LIBER 15 Nov]	35
Egypt, Others To Pay Debts With Consumer Goods [ROMPRES]	37
Market To Be 'Flooded' With Goods at Holidays [ROMPRES]	38
ROMANIA LIBERA Protests Mistreatment [23-24 Nov]	38

YUGOSLAVIA

International

Slovenia, Lithuania Establish Diplomatic Ties [TANJUG]	39
Slovenia's Peterle Views War, Ties With Hungary [MAI NAP 21 Nov]	39
Kosovo League Chairman Meets Austrian Ambassador [ATA]	39
Kosovo Representative Holds Talks [TANJUG]	39
Serbian Party Sends Letter to French Ambassador [TANJUG]	40

Federal

Presidency Statement on Cease-Fire Violations [TANJUG]	40
Kostic: Serbs, Croats Cannot Live Together [TANJUG]	41
General Negovanovic on Army's Presence in Macedonia [Belgrade TV]	41
Chambers Overcome Obstacles to Working Practices [TANJUG]	42

Slovenia

Kucan Comments on Republic's Recognition [MLADA FRONTA DNES 22 Nov]	42
Government Will Initiate Vote of Confidence [Ljubljana Radio]	43

Croatia

Tudjman Calls For Urgent Dispatch of UN Troops [AFP]	43
Politicians Criticize Tudjman Address [TANJUG]	44
Separovic Interviewed on Crisis, CSFR Ties	44
Part One [Prague Radio]	44
Part Two [Prague Radio]	45
Separovic Explains International Policy [RZECZPOSPOLITA 18 Nov]	46
Reaction to Party of Rights Leader Paraga's Arrest	47
Demonstrators Rally in Split [TANJUG]	47
Prosecutors Request Investigation [Zagreb TV]	47
Paraga Criticizes Tudjman [TANJUG]	47
Government Urges Unity Among 'Democratic Forces' [Zagreb TV]	48
Minister of Maritime Affairs Comments on Borders [VJESNIK 18 Nov]	48

Serbia

Kosutic Sees UN Force 'More Desirable' Than EC [TANJUG]	49
POLITIKA Views Markovic Resignation [TANJUG]	50
Decrees Approved To Restrict Interrepublic Trade [Belgrade Radio]	50
Opposition Leader Calls For Ending Hostilities [Belgrade TV]	51
Militia 'Harassed' Kosovars To Enlist [Zagreb Radio]	51

Bosnia-Herzegovina

Government Issues Statement on Croatian 'Community' [TANJUG]	51
Serbian Deputies Boycott Republic Assembly [TANJUG]	52
Banja Luka Krajina Wants UN Troops in Croatia [TANJUG]	52
Increased JNA Incidents in Mostar Area [VJESNIK 29 Oct]	52
Professor Interviewed on Serb-Muslim Relations [NIN 25 Oct]	53

Macedonia

Delegation To Boycott Federal Assembly Session [TANJUG]	56
Minister Denies Territorial Claims on Neighbors [TANJUG]	56

Alia Fears Being Drawn Into SFRY Conflict

LD2411145191 Hamburg DPA in German 1333 GMT
24 Nov 91

[Text] Dusseldorf (DPA)—Albanian President Ramiz Alia says Serbia is preparing for a war against neighboring nations. Albania is also threatened with being drawn into the Yugoslav conflict, Alia said during talks with Erich Riedl, parliamentary state secretary at the Federal Economics Ministry, in Tirana. The HANDELSBLATT (Dusseldorf) reports this in its 25 November edition. Serbian provocations against the Albanians in Kosovo have begun; however, the three million Albanians in Kosovo are not prepared to bow to the "Serbian yoke," Alia said. He sees a "very serious danger from Yugoslavia" for Albania, as well. Alia told Riedl he wanted Europe to solve this issue but at the same time criticized peace efforts by Lord Carrington, chairman of the EC conference on Yugoslavia. As Europe was not resolutely opposing Belgrade's aim of a "Serboslovakia," the European solution to the Yugoslav conflict amounts to a "time bomb." Alia called on the Federal Government to intervene in the Yugoslav conflict more than it already has. He is prepared to travel to Germany to discuss the Balkan crisis—which goes "far beyond Albania"—with Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher. In this he expressly rejected Serbian warnings of a "fourth reich" as propaganda. Rather increased German involvement in the Balkans was one of the main goals of German-Albanian cooperation, Alia told Riedl.

Foreign Ministry Statement Supports UN Forces

AU2511205891 Tirana Radio Tirana Network
in Albanian 1900 GMT 25 Nov 91

[Statement issued by the Foreign Ministry in Tirana on 25 November]

[Text] In connection with the United Nations' plan to send UN peace forces to Yugoslavia, Foreign Ministry spokesman Shaban Murati today issued the following declaration:

The crisis and bloody conflict in Yugoslavia has given rise to justified concern among international organizations and the entire world community. Under such circumstances, the United Nations' commitment and intervention are imperative to establish peace. The dispatch of the United Nations' blue helmets would serve this noble purpose. Albania supports the dispatch of these forces to Yugoslavia and their deployment on the borders of the constituent entities recognized by the existing SFRY Constitution. Bearing in mind that Kosovo, too, is de facto under Serbian military occupation and that Serbia is threatening to turn Kosovo into a new and dangerous arena of war, the dispatch of United Nations' peace forces to Kosovo, too, must be viewed as an inseparable element in the peace operation in Yugoslavia.

Kosovo Prime Minister Bukoshi Departs After Visit

AU2211132491 Tirana ATA in English 1013 GMT
22 Nov 91

[Text] Tirana, November 22 (ATA)—On November 21, the minister of foreign economic relations, Ylli Cabiri, received the prime minister of the Republic of Kosovo, Dr. Bujar Bukoshi. During the reception, which passed in a warm and fraternal atmosphere, Ylli Cabiri made an expose of the relations of cooperation of Albania with various countries, especially during the recent months, as well as the reform in trade. Likewise, they spoke of the possibilities of coordinating the economic cooperation, including the augmenting of information on the firms demanding cooperation in this field, the measures that have been adopted in Albania for the liberalization of foreign trade, which was evaluated as important for the investments, the coordination between the respective sectors of Albania and Kosovo etc.

On November 21, the premier of the Republic of Kosovo, Dr. Bujar Bukoshi left Albania.

Industrial Agreement Signed With Germany

AU2411204991 Tirana ATA in English 0910 GMT
24 Nov 91

[Text] Tirana, November 24 (ATA)—The protocol of the third session of the Albanian-German Joint Commission on economic, industrial and technical cooperation was signed in Tirana on November 23. The protocol envisages cooperation in various fields of economy, as in agriculture, food industry, light industry, in the extraction and processing of the raw materials, as well as in the development of tourism and infrastructure in general in Albania. Likewise this protocol envisages possibilities for the training and qualification of the Albanian specialists in various fields in the FR of Germany as well as the carrying out of this process also in our country through the organisation of the symposiums and specific seminars on various problems. Importance is devoted to the understanding in finding the common ways to carry out further investments, as well as in exploiting the possibilities created by international organisations as the PHARE [Economic Reconstruction Aid for Poland and Hungary] program etc.

For the Albanian side the protocol was signed by the minister for foreign economic relations, Ylli Cabiri, and for the German side by the parliamentary secretary of state for economy, Mr. Erich Riedl.

Pashko Speaks at Christian Democratic Forum

AU2511143991 Tirana ATA in English 0908 GMT
25 Nov 91

[Text] Tirana, November 25 (ATA)—The Forum of the Christian Democratic International which treated of the development of the democratic processes in the world was held in Rome on November 22-23.

The sittings of this forum, which were attended by distinguished political and state personalities, were presided over by Giulio Andreotti, Italian premier, and Senator Fanfani.

The Albanian Deputy Premier Gramoz Pashko, who was invited in this activity, took the floor in one of the sittings of the forum.

Mr. Pashko presented an overview of the current Albania, which is marching consistently towards complete democratization in every part of the country's life. But, he underlined, the Albanian democracy should be materially aided so that it develop further. We formed a free and democratic press, he stressed, but we do not have paper to print the newspapers. We granted the people the freedoms of belief but they do not have religious temples. Mr. Pashko appealed to the current democratic world to help the Albanian new democracy by all means, because the situation in Yugoslavia is also a serious threat to Albanian democracy.

Mr. Gramoz Pashko had some working meetings with the premiers of Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovenia, with the president of the Swiss Confederation, with the general secretary of the Italian Christian Democratic Party Arnaldo Fanfani, as well as with distinguished personalities of the present Italian political and state life. He was also received by Pope Paul II.

On November 24, Mr. Pashko left Rome for Vienna, invited by the minister of economy of Austria.

Nano Speaks at Socialist Party Conference

*AU2511215091 Tirana ATA in English 1858 GMT
25 Nov 91*

[Text] Tirana, November 25 (ATA)—On November 25, the First National Conference of the Socialist Party of Albania [SPA] held its proceedings in Tirana.

Attending the conference was also the president of the republic, Ramiz Alia. Present were also representatives of the Presidency of the People's Assembly, the government, representatives of political parties, social organizations, etc.

Present were also heads and representatives of the diplomatic corps accredited in Tirana.

The chairman of the Steering Committee of the Socialist Party of Albania, Comrade Fatos Nano, who submitted the report said among others that the mission of the First National Conference of the SPA is to analyze the formation and consolidation process of this party since its creation on June 12 1991, to adopt the fundamental programme, the social program and other documents defining the political physiognomy of our party as force of the European democratic left-wing. After speaking of the double mission of the 10th Congress of the PLA [Albanian Workers Party], which on the one side attained the completion of the mission of the PLA from the political and organisational point of view and closed

the complicated chapter of the state-party in the history of the postwar Albania and on the other side transformed itself into a constituent congress of a new party, with a sound socialist, democratic orientation, entirely different from the PLA and the communist parties, Comrade Fatos Nano said that the Socialist Party is not a continuation of the Party of Labour.

Speaking of the positive values of the period of the PLA, he laid the stress on the role of the CPA [Albanian Communist Party] for the organisation, leading and triumph of the National Liberation War, on the orientation and application of the profound democratic reforms in Albania, the inspiration of people's masses as decisive factor of fast healing of the war wounds, the final eradication of feudal remains and Albania's march on the road of European developments. The SPA upholds that to the responsibility of the leadership of the PLA for the shortcomings, mistakes and failures as a result of adopting and implementing the Soviet model of socialism are also added the mistakes and failures as a result of searching for and following the "original" roads for socialism.

The Socialist Party, said Comrade Fatos Nano, fully dissociates itself from the PLA as a state-party, from its policy and mistakes and those of Enver Hoxha. He criticised the cult of Enver Hoxha who ruled not only the party but all the areas of the country's life, his ideas in whose foundations were the theoretical-Stalinian concepts applied with accentuated extremism.

Speaking of the current democratic developments, Fatos Nano said that the Socialist Party has demanded and demands from the Stability Government to devote priority to the economic stability of the country in the dialectical stability-reform connection.

The Socialist Party of Albania has supported by all means the heroic struggle of our Albanian brothers in Kosovo and other regions of Yugoslavia against Serb-Slav chauvinistic yoke. It has recognized the Republic of Kosovo and has supported all the political and national actions of the Albanian political parties operating in Kosovo and throughout Yugoslavia, said Comrade Fatos Nano further on.

We also demand that in compliance with the Helsinki Act treat of and solve the Cam question, too. We are for friendship, mutual cooperation with Greece, but demand that the state and political forces in Greece treat of realistically the Cam issue and stir up the constructive dialogue on the road of CSCE principles.

The Albanian Socialists do not reconcile with the concepts and adventurous stands for the complete reorganization of the Balkans. The current conflicts, outcome of historic dramas, should be solved in a democratic way, by means of dialogue and tolerance on the basis of new concept, the CSCE processes have given to the state borders.

In the end Fatos Nano said that our party intends to become a member of Socialist International with full rights and to coordinate its activity with all the parties members of this powerful international organism.

The delegates endorsed the Fundamental Program, the Social Program of the Socialist Party and three resolutions: "On the Stand of the Socialist Party Towards the PLA and Enver Hoxha;" "On National Conciliation and Unity;" "On the Application of the Economic Reform."

Radio-Television Law Approved, Summarized

*AU2411205591 Tirana ATA in English 1825 GMT
24 Nov 91*

[Text] Tirana, November 24 (ATA)—The law "On the Status of the Albanian Radio-TV" [RTV] passed by the People's Assembly and approved by the president the republic, Ramiz Alia, is composed of 16 articles.

Among others this law lays the stress on the fact that the Radio-TV is a state, all-national, central, information and cultural institution led by the national ideals and is (dependent) and controlled by the People's Assembly. The Albanian Radio-TV is a depoliticised institution, where the activity of political parties is prohibited. The law points out that the interference of various parties and organs in the activity of the RTV is prohibited.

In continuation the law says that the RTV is based on the principles of pluralist democracy, impartiality and objectivity. They safeguard and promote the national traditions and culture. The RTV should not serve impartially the interests of none of the parties, organisations or social associations.

The law "On the Status of the Albanian Radio-TV" points out that the RTV is directed by a steering council which is composed by renowned specialists from various fields of the country's life. The Steering Council is proposed by the Permanent Commission of Mass Media of the People's Assembly and is approved by the People's Assembly. The Steering Council is a decision-making organ which is renewed to one-half of its associate members once in two years.

In continuation the law defines concretely the tasks of the Steering Council of the Albanian Radio-TV as well as of its general director.

Other articles of this law underscore that the RTV is a juridical person represented by the general director, that it is a budgetary institution financed by the state and that the transformation of the RTV into a simply commercial centre is prohibited. The last article, the 16th, says that this law enters into force immediately.

Dimitrov Interviewed on Ties With Greece, NATO*AU2411185391 Sofia BTA in English 1713 GMT
24 Nov 91*

[Text] Athens, November 24 (BTA)—Today the prestigious "TO VIMA" Athens weekly runs an interview with Bulgaria's Prime Minister Filip Dimitrov. The almost two-page interview taken by the special correspondent of "TO VIMA," Mr. Nikos Marakis, dwells on the basic problems and prospects of Bulgaria's foreign and internal policy. The Athens weekly stresses that this is the first interview of the new Bulgarian prime minister for a foreign newspaper.

Mr. Filip Dimitrov said Greece was a country highly valued by Bulgaria. He described Bulgarian-Greek relations as "very good and promising." He expressed the opinion that the contradictions between Sofia and Athens in the past were very much the result of the tension between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO and said that with the disintegration of the Warsaw Treaty the 45-year preparations for a military clash with Turkey no longer make sense.

These thoughts of the Bulgarian prime minister are highlighted in a box summing up the interview. It also points out that today Bulgaria is seeking to guarantee her national security by promoting her contacts with NATO. The leader of the Bulgarian Government said that his cabinet is ready to act by political and diplomatic means and to undertake initiatives which would enhance security in the Balkans. This policy is described as the best solution in the present situation before the establishment of the new European security system. Mr. Filip Dimitrov expresses the desire of his cabinet for Bulgaria to participate in the process of Europe's unification and for her quick integration into the European structures.

In conclusion the Bulgarian prime minister stressed his resolution to continue the economic and social reforms in Bulgaria in compliance with the programme of the ruling coalition of the Union of Democratic Forces.

Military Delegation Reports on Visit to Turkey*AU2611093591 Sofia BULGARSKA ARMIYA
in Bulgarian 20 Nov 91 pp 1, 4*

[Interview with Lieutenant General Stoyan Topalov, first deputy head of the General Staff of the Bulgarian Army, by Lieutenant Colonel Vladi Vladkov; place and date not given: "Turkey Understands Our Concern"]

[Excerpts] As is known, a Bulgarian military delegation led by Lieutenant General Stoyan Topalov, deputy head of the Bulgarian Army General Staff, visited the Republic of Turkey from 12-15 November at the invitation of Army General Fikret Kupeli, deputy chief of the Turkish General Staff. On that occasion a representative of BULGARSKA ARMIYA met and talked with our delegation's leader.

[Vladkov] Lieutenant General, several days after returning from Turkey you have doubtless taken stock of your impressions from the visit. Can we now look more calmly in Turkey's direction?

[Topalov] Yes, I think so. You probably mean the Turkish troops in Eastern Thrace and the eventual danger for us from that direction. I would like to calm the readers and declare that we again put this issue to our host, Army General Kupeli. He said that the troops in that part of Turkey, which evoke our concern, have never been aimed against our country, their tasks are not related to Bulgaria. Nevertheless, on the basis of reciprocity he proposed to withdraw and decrease Armed Forces and weapons in a part of Thrace's border zone that will be determined later. I think that this proposal was made in response to our concern. It represents proof of the sincerity of his intentions. [passage omitted]

[Vladkov] Were there any other proposals from the Turkish side?

[Topalov] Before I answer this question, I would like to point out that we proposed to the Turkish Armed Forces a package of stabilizing measures and a cooperation plan for 1992. Even at the preliminary review of our proposals it became apparent that 90 percent of them could be accepted, and probably, during the forthcoming visit of the Turkish General Staff chief to Bulgaria, they could become reality, along with our proposal to conduct training inspections at the two countries' Air Force objects.

At a General Staff briefing, organized by Army General Kupeli, we were briefed on mutual relations between the General Staff and the Ministry of Defense, the structure and tasks of certain departments, the procedure of supplying the Armed Forces with materiel under market economy conditions, and the system of operational and combat training of the troops under conditions of new organizational structures. My host expressed the satisfaction of the Turkish General Staff on strengthening relations between the two armies and the coincidence of opinions on many issues. He said that the dialogue with our country will encounter difficulties and will require time. However, this will not decrease their determination to continue along this road not only with words but with specific deeds. [passage omitted]

East Europe Cooperation, Trade Association Formed*AU2211213291 Sofia BTA in English 2059 GMT
22 Nov 91*

[Text] Sofia, November 22 (BTA)—Six Bulgarian organizations, including Balkancar, Balkancarpodem, Electron, Metalkhim-Cherven Bryag, the Spartak Joint-Stock Company and the Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, have expressed their willingness to join the newly-founded economic association called East European Cooperation and Trade, it was said at today's press conference of the leaders of the new organization. The

association was established on the initiative of economic organizations from Russia, Bulgaria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Kazakhstan, Hungary and the Ukraine. According to them, it is not a successor to Comecon. However, it will aim at restoring the relations between the former socialist countries on a new basis.

The leaders of the new economic structure did not disclose where it would be seated. This problem, as well as other issues connected with the association's future activity, will be discussed at a consultative meeting to be held in the Black Sea town of Varna in January. So far, only two of the institutions of the new organization have been established: The International Bank in Budapest and the International Trade Exchange. The Central Auditing committee will probably be seated in Varna.

Approached by the BTA, the representatives of the new organization declined to comment on yesterday's announcement that the Comecon headquarters have fallen under the jurisdiction of the Moscow City Council and that the former Comecon countries have been paid the nominal sum of 8 million rubles.

Moscow Mayor Popov Visits, Views Economic Reform

AU2511215191 Sofia NOVINI in Bulgarian
19 Nov 91 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Moscow Mayor Gavriil Popov by Georgi Ganchev in Bulgaria; date not given: "Privatization Is the Most Difficult Issue"]

[Text] The Bulgarian city of Sandanski became the birthplace of the International Union of Economists. The new organization aims at assisting countries or separate companies and businessmen with economic plans, programs, specialists, and economic know-how. Gavriil Popov, Moscow's mayor, is the president of the organization. Senior Scientific Fellow Rumen Georgiev is one of his deputies. He is responsible for East Europe. The organization will be headquartered in Moscow.

Popov was in Bulgaria less than 24 hours. His schedule was exceptionally heavy. He was received by President Zhelev. Afterward he took part in establishing the International Union of Economists in Sandanski and had meetings with representatives of the "Europe" Social Democratic Club. Prior to his departure Popov talked with a representative of the NOVINI Editorial Board:

[Ganchev] What is your opinion about the future of the Union of Economists?

[Popov] In the past many organizations facilitated relations between countries, and not just the East European countries. Gradually, as a result of the changes that took place, relations were destroyed. We need those relations very much, at the present difficult stage at which we all are. Therefore I am convinced that our mutual contacts will be restored, albeit probably in a new form. The union we established in Sandanski will facilitate the

exchange of experience in resolving difficult problems. For example, we no longer have a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, but a Union of Sovereign States. Naturally, our discussion began with the economic reform crisis.

[Ganchev] Will CEMA be replaced by a new similar organization?

[Popov] CEMA was strongly related to the USSR economy. The military-industrial complex was the decisive factor. True, there was production of consumer goods, but it was very small. Furthermore, the USSR did not have another economic system except the bureaucratic one, and this was consistently used to influence the economies of the former socialist countries. I think that the end of this bureaucratic economy was marked by the fate of the August coup.

[Ganchev] Do you think that after the serious stagnation in recent years in economic relations between Bulgaria and the former USSR, it will be possible to restore and strengthen economic relations?

[Popov] I am convinced that the traditionally good relations between Bulgaria and the USSR will also be established between Bulgaria and the Union of Sovereign States, on the basis of past relations, existing contacts, and mutual benefit.

[Ganchev] What is the most difficult task of the mayor of Moscow?

[Popov] For me it is the privatization issue. Without privatization and the reasonable liberalization of prices there will be no economic change and revival.

[Ganchev] It appears that the establishment of the Union of Sovereign States and Yeltsin's recent decrees predetermine the fate of the central government....

[Popov] We are discussing the possibility of centralized management in certain areas—military affairs, foreign policy, and international economic relations. Of course, all this will depend on resolving the problems of the sovereign states. The present central government did not contribute to resolving the issues that interest everyone: the nationality issue and the economic reform. The old bureaucracy was preserved to a certain extent, although in a rather new form....

[Ganchev] What lessons could you learn from the East European states which are more advanced in their reform?

[Popov] The most important lesson is the following: No one has preliminary variants of the market socialist economy. Consequently, the basic thing is to prepare the people for the forthcoming difficulties and for the fact that there is no other way. It appears that for us it will be easier to follow the economic development of Japan after the war, or some other Asian countries.

Second Kozloduy Nuclear Reactor To Be Shut Down

AU2611111891 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network
 in Bulgarian 1000 GMT 26 Nov 91

[Text] The Council of Ministers decided to shut down the second reactor at the Kozloduy Nuclear Plant. In fact the government served as an arbitrator between the Committee on Using Nuclear Energy for Peaceful Goals, which insisted on shutting down the reactor, and the Committee on Power Supply, which proposed to continue the exploitation of the second reactor, pointing out that its resources have not been exhausted.

In principle, the shutdown was planned and incorporated in international agreements signed by Bulgaria. However, the opinion of the Committee on Power Supply experts was that one should wait until 15 December. Now, on the basis of the government's decision, the process of shutting down the reactor began at 0000 [2200 GMT 25 November]. By 1900 today the reactor will be fully shut down. The power supply system will be deprived of 220 megawatts, because recently the second reactor functioned only at 50 percent of its capacity.

Mr. Zhak Karakash, deputy chairman of the Committee on Power Supply, assured us that shutting down the second reactor at this moment will not be fatal, i.e., there will be no immediate need to introduce power supply restrictions. However, taking into consideration the fact that the Ukraine supplies only 50 percent of the electric power it promised, it must be understood that all existing reserves have been fully tapped. From now on, even during the first cold days, we can expect to return to the 3:1 scheme [three hours normal power supply followed by one hour of no power], because power consumption will immediately increase.

What is the situation now at the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant? We contacted Mr. Yordan Yordanov, head of the Nuclear Safety Department.

[Begin Yordanov recording] The first reactor has been shut down for reconstruction work. The second reactor is in the process of being shut down according to a special program. At present it functions at 30 percent of its capacity. By the end of the workday it will be shut down completely. The third and fourth reactors are functioning at full capacity. The fifth reactor has been reloaded and inspected by the Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. At present the last repair work is continuing. It is envisaged that it will be activated by the end of the year. The sixth reactor is functioning at present at 75 percent of its capacity. The last experiments related to increasing its capacity have been conducted and the approval of the control organs is anticipated to increase the capacity to 90 percent. [end recording]

Registration of Presidential Candidates Begins

AU2511190691 Sofia BTA in English 1603 GMT
 25 Nov 91

[Text] Sofia, November 25 (BTA)—The registration of the candidates who will run in the presidential elections started today. It should be completed in nine days, i.e. at 19:00 hrs. on December 3, 1991. Not a single candidate had been registered by the afternoon today.

The presidential elections will be direct and will be held on January 12, 1992.

The candidates will most probably wait until parliament finally passes the amendments to the Presidential Elections Act. The ballot-papers will be coloured. Parties can keep the same colours they used for their tickets in the October 13 parliamentary elections.

"Actually the president has been already elected. The winning ticket is the blue one," Mr. Yordan Vasilev, MP [member of parliament] of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS], told "TELEGRAF" today. Blue is the colour chosen to symbolize the SDS.

"Serious people already know the new president's name," today's "OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK" sums up the results of a public opinion poll held in connection with the presidential elections.

It is already known that the SDS is going to nominate the incumbent president, Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev. "It is perfectly natural for me to be the candidate of the SDS," Dr. Zhelev said in an interview with "DEMOKRATSIYA" last week. The SDS has not yet announced its nominee for the post of vice president. Ms. Blaga Dimitrova, a renowned poetess and former dissident, is often mentioned unofficially as a possible vice-presidential candidate.

The Bulgarian Socialist, formerly communist, Party [BSP] has not unveiled the name of its candidate. "The BSP has not decided yet whether to nominate a candidate of its own or, if deciding against it, who it would support," BSP leader Aleksandur Lilov told "OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK."

According to MP's of the BSP, the Socialists are inclined to support an independent presidential candidate. Some suppose that they are waiting for the decision the Bulgarian Democratic Centre, an organization which unites formations that split from the SDS. However, the Liberals' Party, which is affiliated to the Bulgarian Democratic Centre, has already declared it would back Dr. Zhelev's candidature.

A serious independent candidate is yet to appear. Mr. George Ganchev, a colourful personality and leader of the Bulgarian Business Bloc, had announced his intention to run for the Presidency before the date for the presidential elections was set. The other pretenders are Mr. Kiril Nikolov, leader of the non-influential Liberal Party (Pernik), Mr. Yolo Denev, leader of another small

party—the Bulgarian Democratic Party, Rev. Totyu Petrov of the Christian Democratic Party, and Mr. Dimitur Markovski of the Free Cooperative Party who is hardly known to the broad public.

Mr. Ginyo Ganev, ex-deputy chairman of parliament, ex-Prime Minister Dimitur Popov and Acad. Blagovest Sendov, who is not affiliated to any party, are mentioned as possible independent presidential candidates. None of them, however, has publicly confirmed or denied his intention to run in the presidential elections.

Assembly Chairman Savov Opposes Banning BSP

AU2611085591 Sofia NOVINI in Bulgarian
20 Nov 91 p 1

[Interview with Stefan Savov, National Assembly chairman, by Simeon Danevski; date and place not given: "We Need Now Civic Peace"]

[Text] [Savov] There is no reason to ban the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP]. I do not know what could prompt such a proposal, but it would obviously be illegal. In addition I firmly support the opinion that we now need a real civic and political peace. Bulgaria has all the necessary conditions for changing its political and economic system without any bloodshed. The Union of Democratic Forces is not interested in intensifying tension.

[Danevski] Is it difficult to be the chairman of a National Assembly that very seldom speaks with the language of understanding?

[Savov] It is not easy. I think that tension will gradually abate until a real pluralism emerges in the National Assembly in the name of better relations. One must not exaggerate the significance of the tension that emerged at the beginning of this National Assembly. This was a result of the inertia of the past and I think that it is already behind us. I am fully convinced that we will finally talk in a calm and wise manner.

[Danevski] The draft bill on the confiscation of the property of the BSP and of some other organizations could also intensify the tension....

[Savov] I think that we will overcome this tension. The BSP will have what a normal party needs to carry out its normal activity. The rest naturally will be returned to the state. However, the BSP will not be banned. This is unthinkable.

[Danevski] You began your activity with a firm hand and do not allow the Assembly members to talk too much.

[Savov] There is work to be done. However, there will be debates. Not a single law will be adopted with an automatic majority. There will be discussion in order to find the optimal version of the law.

Dimitrov, TU Leaders Discuss Cooperation

AU2511190891 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network
in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 25 Nov 91

[Text] The fate of the tripartite commission or a possible new form of social partnership between the government, the trade unions, and employers will be resolved after discussions at the Council of Ministers' session.

This became known after today's meeting between Prime Minister Filip Dimitrov and leaders of the Podkrepa Labor Confederation, Dr. Konstantin Trenchev, and of the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria, Professor Krustyo Petkov. Ivan Ivanov, chairman of the Chamber of Commerce, participated, as well as representatives of the student organizations and other trade union organizations.

At the meeting the opinion prevailed that cooperation must be decentralized, that is, it must be on a branch or company level. The mechanism of future cooperation will probably be resolved at the beginning of December at a new meeting between the government, trade unions, and employers.

Dimitrov Outlines Privatization Plans

AU2111162891 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian
18 Nov 91 p 6

[Interview with Prime Minister Filip Dimitrov by Venelina Gocheva; place and date not given: "Popov Left Behind Critical Issues of the Reform for Us"]

[Text] [Gocheva] Mr. Dimitrov, on taking up your post, at what stage did you find the economic reform that your predecessor Dimitur Popov began?

[Dimitrov] Some progress had been achieved, but I would not venture to say that the stage of stabilization was finally completed, for example. A sensible answer to your question would be that Mr. Popov's cabinet undoubtedly started the reform, but critical aspects of its implementation still have to be addressed. We are now attempting a task equivalent to turning fish soup into an aquarium with fish swimming around in it, but this is not so simple, because it has never been done before.

[Gocheva] You mention "critical aspects," which does not sound very optimistic.

[Dimitrov] The critical elements for all of us will primarily be privatization, changes in the banking system, restitution of property, and so on.

[Gocheva] Is it true that the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] is giving up its intention to restore property before carrying out privatization, because the funds needed to compensate the former owners will not be sufficient?

[Dimitrov] Restitution and privatization are inseparable from one another, and it will not be disastrous if we change the order in which they are carried out. This issue is not only to dispose of state property. Various models

for privatization exist in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, and we can benefit from their failures in carrying out the various steps, because we started late.

[Gocheva] What model will we follow in carrying out our own privatization?

[Dimitrov] The first thing is to clear the way a little for privatization, and we will do this by changing the conditions for investments. We need a banking system that will get things moving. We are seriously considering changes in investment conditions, which include not only foreign investments, but also the foreign securities and foreign exchange control law and matters also relating to property. When all this has been done, we will deal with the direct privatization act, i.e. the legislation defining the approaches to privatization and how it will be carried out.

The concept on privatization should not be regarded as something fixed for all time. We have no ready definition of a purely 19th century type, that is, of building socialism until 1960, and then dealing with communism 20 years later. The idea that everything is predetermined and clear is simply wishful thinking. What we have to do now is define each individual step to be able to make decisions on the next one.

[Gocheva] Will you look more favorably upon private business than Judge Popov did?

[Dimitrov] We will try to do what is right and proper. I am perfectly aware that the country's future lies in private business. I can tell you now that we are considering favorable changes in the taxation system, but this will happen at the right time.

[Gocheva] When will the right moment come for private businessmen, Mr. Dimitrov?

[Dimitrov] I hope to God it will be soon. I am waiting for it.

[Gocheva] Your parliamentary colleague Asen Michkovski described your government as "weak" on the very day that the cabinet was announced. What do you think?

[Dimitrov] I am under no illusion that we have formed a cabinet that is not to everyone's liking. The government represents a good balance between well-known and unknown ministers.

[Gocheva] You confused us a little with the definition of a "linear" cabinet. What does this mean?

[Dimitrov] I cannot remember exactly where I came across this definition, but I think that many colleagues are using it. The point is that the cabinet is not structured like a pyramid—there are no ministries for specific sectors with chiefs appointed from above who answer to a different superior. The prime minister simply has direct links with the members of the cabinet. The point of the open cabinet is that every minister is much more responsible for his own activities.

[Gocheva] Does this mean that the prime minister has more power?

[Dimitrov] I would not say that. The prime minister has more responsibility and cannot blame his deputies for mistakes. It seems to me that the individual minister now has more power.

[Gocheva] The Movement of Rights and Freedoms [DPS] believes that, apart from being a linear one, the cabinet is also open, and that under more favorable conditions DPS representatives may take ministerial posts. Is this true?

[Dimitrov] A living system is always an open one.

[Gocheva] The opposition is threatening you with a shadow cabinet.

[Dimitrov] This is no threat. I do not recall any case of a similar shadow cabinet being announced in past decades, except in the 1930-31 interval. This is a normal development. I expect Mr. Aleksandur Tomov's shadow cabinet to get down to work and to pester us in parliament with questions and proposals. I expect all the forms of opposition that are characteristic of a democratic state. You know, for example, that in England the Labor members very rarely applaud the Tories in parliament.

BSP, KNSB Oppose Property Confiscation

*AU2611085891 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian
20 Nov 91 p 1*

[Milena Khristova report: "Special Commission Is in Charge of Campaign Against Confiscation of Independent Trade Union Confederation's Property"]

[Text] A commission has been established in charge of counter-actions in case the bill on confiscation should extend to the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria [KNSB] with the consensus of parliament. This was announced by Diana Damyanova, deputy chairman of the confederation yesterday. She explained that she has confidence in the wisdom of the "people from the left and from the right" sitting in the National Assembly, who, according to her, would never accept such absurdities. The "Podkrepa" Labor Confederation will do everything necessary to impose its long-time ambition for a trade union monopoly, Mrs. Damyanova stated, but this would not be the end of the KNSB, she added.

She forecast that the KNSB is likely to share the views of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] parliamentarians on the question of property confiscation. So far the Podkrepa leadership has not consented to split the trade union property.

A team of legal experts is in charge of listing the KNSB property. According to Mrs. Damyanova, everything which belongs to the state has been restored. Controversial pieces of property exist, but their ownership could be clarified.

New Justice Minister Luchnikov Interviewed
AU2211154391 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian
18 Nov 91 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Justice Minister Svetoslav Luchnikov by Liliya Khristovska; place and date not given: "The Law Is Not an Auxiliary Tool and I Consider Political Dismissals Revolting"]

[Excerpts] The new minister of justice with disappointing openness totally put to rest rumors circulating in Bulgaria. He does not have dual citizenship (Soviet and Bulgarian) and comes from pure Bulgarian ancestry. He was born on 3 February 1922 in Ruse. He admitted that his grandfathers traded with Russia and visited it often, but never came back with heirs from there. Against the entry for the name "luchnik" in Nayden Gerov's language dictionary, it tells us that this is a person who hits the nail on the head. Given this explanation of his Bulgarian origins and name, we directed our first question to the minister.

[Khristovska] Did you have your sights on a ministerial post before you stepped into it?

[Luchnikov] I have never thought for a moment during my complicated life that that would happen. That is why I am getting used to the new cabinet quicker than I am the post of "minister."

[Khristovska] Nevertheless, you are a minister. Do you intend to change radically the activities of the Ministry of Justice?

[Luchnikov] In the ministry itself I am not for such extensive reforms. It is a traditional institution, with its own character, and it is not necessary to change this. As an extension of executive power, the Ministry of Justice has a special position. On the one hand, it has contacts with the legislative branch which supplies the terms of reference for creating the laws. On the other hand, it must provide conditions for the exercise of judicial power. [passage omitted]

[Khristovska] Will the Ministry of Justice become the governor of the judicial bench?

[Luchnikov] No. The Ministry will not be involved in striking off and dismissing judges. This is the job of the Supreme Judicial Council, but since it does not have any way of observing how judges "call the tune" in the courtroom, it will depend on reports from the inspectorate. Rather than dismissals we are planning retraining for the judges, much of which will be done by the Law Faculty. [passage omitted]

[Khristovska] Will there be new, modern, labor legislation that will create modern guarantees for workers?

[Luchnikov] We will propose new labor legislation. I would not say that this will be exactly a labor code. It can be called a law on labor relations. I would personally recommend to the specialists with whom I have already spoken to familiarize themselves with the German collection of decrees for labor and social guarantees for hired workers. We will also carefully study the present bill for amendments and addenda to the Labor Code, but legally we are not bound by it. We will work quickly, because the sad truth is that the present Labor Code already does not live up to the expectations of working people.

Havel 'Optimistic' About Acceptance of Proposals
LD2511181191 Prague CSTK in English 1701 GMT
 25 Nov 91

[Text] Prague Nov 25 (CSTK)—Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel today said he is optimistic about the chances of his suggested amendments of constitutional laws being passed, but does not know yet what he would do if they were rejected.

Speaking at a briefing, Havel said he intended the drafts as a "safeguard" in the event of a constitutional crisis.

In a televised speech on November 17, Havel announced he would submit to the federal parliament five drafts for amending constitutional laws, some of which would give him greater powers.

Havel justified his drafts as an effort to help the legislative bodies out of their current stalemate in the search for a new constitutional arrangement for coexistence between Czechs and Slovaks.

Havel has already submitted to the presidium of the federal parliament a bill on the procedure for adopting a new federal constitution and for calling a referendum.

In the latter, Havel proposes that the latest date for a referendum before elections be shortened from five to three months.

On September 24 Havel proposed in the federal parliament a referendum on whether Czechs and Slovaks want to live in a common state. On November 13 the parliament failed to agree on the wording of the question to be asked in the referendum.

This week, Havel will submit to the parliament draft bills on dissolving the parliament and on new federal legislative bodies: a one-chamber 200-seat Federal Assembly and a 30-seat Federal Council composed of deputies to the Czech and Slovak regional parliaments.

The fifth draft amending the electoral law will be submitted in December. A draft has also been worked out by the federal government, which Havel said is tailored to suit the present system of federal bodies, while his draft follows from the new structure he proposes.

Though he has not yet finished work on the draft, Havel said he is not assuming a winner-take-all system, but a combined one.

40,000 Attend Pro-Havel Prague Rally 21 Nov
AU2511132491 Prague CSTK in English 1758 GMT
 21 Nov 91

[Text] Prague Nov 21 (CSTK)—Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel said today he does not "want to engage in a war" against the country's federal and republic parliaments but wants them to "speedily reach agreement on the future shape of the Czechoslovak state or create the necessary prerequisites for such an agreement."

At a rally of about 40,000 people held in the center of Prague in support of Havel's recent legislative proposals, Havel said the parliaments have passed dozens of important laws. "For their work to have any sense, it is necessary that we know in what state the passed laws will be valid," Havel said.

Havel's proposals for the Federal Assembly (parliament) to adopt five new laws, including an amendment to the referendum law, are aimed at helping legislative bodies find a way out of the current impasse in the search for a new constitutional arrangement.

Havel said the task of the deputies, the federal and republic governments, as well as his own task is to fulfill their promises—to lay down the new constitutional foundations of Czechoslovakia as a democratic, just, and common state of all its citizens and a truly democratic federation of two equal republics.

A similar rally of some 1,500 people in support of Havel's proposals was held simultaneously in Slovakia's capital of Bratislava.

Calfa Voices Fears on Federation Breakup
LD2511222691 Prague CSTK in English 2142 GMT
 25 Nov 91

[Text] Prague Nov 25 (CSTK)—"If people think that half the (Czechoslovak) economy can function... with five and a half million people, they are very mistaken.... An independent Slovakia is the beginning of the end of Slovak independence," Federal Premier Marian Calfa said today.

Speaking to a gathering of Slovaks living in the Czech Republic, Calfa said he feared what impact the breakup of the current federation would have on Slovakia. The people who talk about Slovak secession should first of all inform the population of the consequences this step would have, he said.

Some 420,000 of the roughly 10.3 million people living in the Czech Republic declared themselves of Slovak nationality in the last census, conducted in March 1991.

Calfa also noted that Ukraine will soon be independent: "(It) has 450,000 men under arms and wants to have nuclear weapons. It is completely naive to think that Ukraine would let a state on its western border develop according to its own notions."

Martin Porubjak, chairman of the Civic Democratic Union-Public Against Violence (ODU-VPN) and first deputy premier of the Slovak Republic, told the audience that a large part of the people living in Slovakia believe that the common state is the guarantee of Slovakia's democratic development.

He appealed to the "democratic part of the Czech public" to be aware of their responsibility for the "democratic part of the Slovak public," and not to let themselves be provoked into a negative attitude towards Slovakia.

Slovak Deputies Call For UN Observers

AU2511145491 Prague CSTK in English 1621 GMT
22 Nov 91

[Text] Bratislava Nov 22 (CSTK)—More than 30 Slovak deputies to both the Czechoslovak and Slovak parliaments have signed a petition calling on the United Nations to send observers to Slovakia, representatives of the Slovak National Party (SNS) told journalists today.

The observers should ensure objective and unmanipulated information of the international community about the development of the political situation in Czechoslovakia, with emphasis on Slovakia, the petition said.

The deputies who signed the petition include those from the opposition SNS, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) and the Green Party, as well as from the Slovak Government Coalition Christian Democratic Movement (KDH).

Of the 300 deputies to the Czechoslovak parliament, 110 are Slovak nationals and there are 120 Slovak nationals in the 150-member Slovak National Council (parliament).

Initiators of the petition regard the Sunday proposals of Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel as Prague's latest attempt to suppress democracy under the pretext of protecting democracy.

The signatories of the petition justify their act by the continuing propaganda campaign which, they say "deforms Slovakia's image and can be described as deliberately organized attempt at a moral genocide of Slovaks in the eyes of the world public".

The SNS said it would make public a complete list of the signatories on November 25.

Added to the petition is a statement called "Thousand Words About Slovakia", saying that since Czechoslovakia's foundation 73 years ago, "Czech politicians have been striving to prevent Slovaks from becoming their equal partners".

At a SNS press conference today, Slovak Parliament Deputy Stefan Kvietik said an eloquent example of Czech politics is the approach to federal parliament chairman Alexander Dubcek's personality. He said the Czech side continuously abuses his moral credit, and appealed to Dubcek to return to Slovakia and "cease to be somebody's whipping boy".

The first deputy chairman of the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly (parliament), Zdenek Jicinsky, today told CSTK he considers the request by more than 30 Slovak deputies as "unsubstantiated if it is meant seriously".

"Taking into consideration all shortcomings of our democracy, exercise of the freedom of expression, including the freedom of the press, I do not think that there exists such a danger to which the authors of the appeal draw attention", Jicinsky said.

He said in his opinion there is no need for such measures.

On the subject of the proposals by Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel for resolving the political crisis in the country, Jicinsky said the parliament will discuss them. Two of them have already been submitted, he added.

The first deputy chairman of the Slovak National Council (parliament), Ivan Carnogursky, today issued a statement on the petition by more than 30 Slovak deputies, saying the Slovak parliament presidium "is the only body entitled to convey a Slovak stand to international organizations, including the United Nations".

The Slovak parliament presidium will meet on November 26.

Carnogursky said the petition continues to escalate nationality tension in the state and described it as a political ambition the aim of which is to draw public attention.

"I believe the Slovaks will not succumb to the policy of escalating tension and will show prudence in this situation", Carnogursky said in the statement.

CNR Presidium Discusses Budget, State Setup

AU2511140691 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY
in Czech 22 Nov 91 pp 1, 16

["rk"-signed report: "Federation for a Few Weeks? Plenary Meeting of the Czech National Council"]

[Text] Prague—[Czech] Prime Minister Petr Pithart yesterday recommended to the Czech National Council [CNR] Presidium to verify whether the Slovak Government's 19 November pro-federation statement enjoys support in the Slovak National Council [SNR]. The critical day by which the SNR's position must be known is 18 December, when a CNR plenary meeting will discuss the budget.

This was stated by the prime minister after a meeting of Czech Government ministers with the CNR Presidium yesterday morning, which dealt with the three finance ministers' talks in Bratislava. "If no guarantees for the preservation of the common state are provided, the Czech side will not be able to carry on the work on a budget that is based on the principle of civic solidarity." Otherwise, it could happen "that we buy the federation for a few weeks." According to [Czech] Minister of Finance Spacek, the Czech side has also drafted a confederative budget, under which the two republics would

contribute, according to the number of their inhabitants, to essential expenditures of the federation (defense, foreign affairs), which would have no economic powers. However, a budget deficit in one republic would create inflationary pressures in the other republic that would ultimately result in separate currencies and in the emergence of two independent states.

After a break in the meeting of the CNR Presidium, CNR Deputy Chairman Jan Kalvoda said that, in defiance of media claims, no agreement was reached in Bratislava because Minister Spacek merely mentioned there the preparation of one budget variant, which he made conditional on the CNR's consent.

The CNR's plenary meeting in the afternoon started with the approval of a change in its agenda. The assessment of the talks between the CNR and SNR Presidiums at Casta-Papiernicka that, according to the original agenda, was to be discussed at the next plenary meeting, was placed on the agenda of the current meeting. The meeting then discussed the Slovak proposal for amending Article 142 of the Constitutional Law on the Czechoslovak Federation; this amendment makes the validity of the new Federal Constitution conditional on its ratification by the two National Councils. After a heated debate, the CNR did not adopt any resolution on the amendment yesterday and postponed its passage to the next plenary meeting.

After the conclusion of the CNR meeting, the CNR Presidium met with members of the Czech Government to discuss problems of the constitutional arrangement.

Statistical Office Issues Oct Economic Figures

AU2011161291 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY
in Czech 18 Nov 91 pp 1, 3

["(vl)"]-signed report: "Recovery Still Not on the Horizon"

[Text] October was no more favorable for improvement in our national economy than any of the previous months. Industrial and civil engineering production were far below the comparable level in the same period last year, and unemployment rose somewhat once again; overall retail turnover expressed in current prices (that is, substantially higher prices) did not reach last year's level.

According to preliminary data published by the Federal Statistical Office at the end of last week, overall estimated industrial production in October was 31.8 percent lower than in the same month last year. In enterprises with more than 100 employees, production dropped 33.3 percent in October and 22.5 percent in the period from the beginning of the year until the end of October.

Rough and general data do not enable a more expert evaluation of what is happening behind the current economic processes and structural changes, but nevertheless it is impossible to overlook the fact that, in 18 statistically documented industrial sectors, only the fuel industry and

power-generating industry show a minimal drop in production—both 3.5 percent in ten months—while in other sectors this drop is 20, 30 or even 40 percent.

Among the enterprises with more than 100 employees, one of the more fortunate sectors is ferrous metallurgy in which production has dropped 17.9 percent since the beginning of the year. On the other hand, the clothing industry is facing serious problems (38.9 percent decline in production since the beginning of the year), as are the textile industry (33.3 percent) and leather processing industry (32.9 percent). Their problems stem mainly from lower demand on the domestic and foreign markets. Lower production in the engineering industry (a 26.3 percent decline in ten months compared with the same period last year) and in the electrical and electronic industry (a 36.8 percent decline) is linked, among other things, to the disintegration of traditional markets and also with the low ability of their products to compete.

Overall civil engineering production also declined in October. Compared with October last year, the decline was 34.8 percent, and compared with the same period last year, the decline over ten months reached 30.3 percent. However, the situation in civil engineering is very different than in industry. Smaller enterprises (up to 100 employees) and the nascent private sector are doing better and compensate, to a certain degree, for the decline in civil engineering production in large enterprises that, until now, were oriented only toward large investment projects.

In October—and also since the beginning of the year—the procurement of slaughter animals and other animal products dropped. This decline is particularly interesting from the procurement organizations' point of view, since goods are also getting to consumers via other nontraditional channels. For instance, between January and October this year, the overall sales of eggs dropped 7.1 percent compared with the same period last year, while procurement by procurement organizations declined 40.8 percent.

Overall retail trade sales in October are estimated at 30.4 billion korunas (in current prices), which means, compared to October last year, a 13.5 percent decline. This figure is estimated to have reached 296.1 billion korunas since the beginning of the year, that is, a 1.5 percent decline compared with last year. (In this case, the comparison with last year is somewhat distorted by extraordinarily high procurement at the end of 1990.) When recalculated to comparable prices, the physical volume of overall retail sales dropped 39.4 percent compared with last year. However, we can question this calculation because in the current conditions and with the existing opportunities, statistics fail to document some products, and it is absolutely impossible to statistically process data on goods that our people bought on trips abroad. In eight months alone (from January to August), our people bought and individually imported 77,563 passenger cars, while Mototechna sold 11,099 of them in the same period, that is, 22.5 percent less compared with the same period last year.

At the end of last month, there were 474,400 unemployed people seeking jobs, which is almost 6 percent of the total number of the available work force (3.9 percent in the Czech Republic and 10.3 percent in the Slovak Republic). However, the increase in the number of unemployed job seekers—28,200 in October—was lower than in recent months and appeared mostly in Slovak regions. (More detailed data, the usual table pertaining to the whole nation, will be published in HOSPODARSKE NOVINY 19 November).

The price development in October could be characterized as calm before the storm. From July to October, the overall consumer goods and services price index remained almost unchanged. In October, too, its movement was almost unnoticeable, but at the end of last month, some prices began to rise, and after 1 November, food prices in particular began to rise. The consumer-goods price index and the cost-of-living index in October still do not fully reflect the increase in electric power prices, which will be included in the November indices only. (Detailed information about the development of consumer prices and the cost of living was given in HOSPODARSKE NOVINY on Friday, 15 November.)

Further developments in prices can be partially estimated from the manufacturers' prices, which in industry and civil engineering remained on the level of the previous month. However, agricultural product prices, which rose only slightly from January to September this year, rose 11.5 percent in October—a 21.1 percent increase in crop prices and a 3.3 decline in animal produce prices. The increase was higher in the Czech Republic (14.4 percent) than in the Slovak Republic (6.5 percent).

To have a more complete picture about our economy last month, it would be necessary to have data on the financial sector and foreign trade, but this information will only become available later.

Unemployment Statistics for October 91 Reported
*AU2111212391 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY
in Czech 19 Nov 91 p 8*

[Unattributed report: "The Growth of Unemployment in the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic Is Slowing Down"]

[Text] The efforts of labor offices to implement an active employment policy had positive results in October, leading to a slower growth of unemployment and an increased number of job placements, but also to the elimination from the records of those applicants who do not want to work. The drain on financial resources also corresponded to this development.

The proportion of the cost of active measures in the total cost of employment policy increased from 1 percent in the first quarter of the year to 15 percent in the second quarter, 26 percent in the third quarter, and roughly 34 percent in the month of October. As a result, the growth in unemployment slowed further in the Czech Republic. There even was a drop in the absolute number of registered job seekers and, consequently, a drop in the rate of unemployment in 17 labor offices. The increasingly active policy implemented by the offices has also found expression in a steadily growing proportion of applicants who have been eliminated from the records, mostly because of their successful placement but also because of their lack of interest in working. (On 31 March, the ratio of eliminated and newly registered applicants was approximately 44 to 100, on 30 September approximately 67 to 100, and on 31 October 82.3 to 100. The October ratio between successfully placed applicants and newly registered applicants was about 57 percent). Since the beginning of the year, more than 135,000 applicants have been successfully placed in the Czech Republic.

Statistics also indicate slower growth of unemployment in Slovakia. The October increase, 7.8 percent, was the lowest this year in relative terms. Even in absolute terms, the October increase is further below this year's monthly average increase than the September increase. The number of newly registered job seekers slightly increased. The number of applicants eliminated from the records continued to increase (from 9,641 in August to 14,154 in September to 17,703 in October). The number of school graduates registered as job seekers declined slightly in October.

The number of job vacancies reported by employers declined again, following a permanent, moderate increase since April 1991. At the end of October, there were only 7,959 reported vacancies in the Slovak Republic, 74 percent of them for blue-collar workers. Labor offices were also implementing a more active policy. Since the beginning of the year, the number of created jobs of benefit to the community reached 29,765, which exceeds by almost four times the number of job vacancies reported to labor offices by employers.

The rate of unemployment reached 10.3 percent at the end of October. The highest rate of unemployment was in Cadca District (18.43 percent). An unemployment rate exceeding 10 percent was recorded in 21 districts of the Slovak Republic; in 9 of them the rate exceeded 14 percent.

Present trends indicate that further growth of unemployment must be realistically expected in the Slovak Republic. It is estimated that the number of unemployed will rise to more than 328,000 by the end of the year, which would represent an unemployment rate of roughly 13 percent.

Job Seekers and Job Vacancies as of 31 October 1991

Location	Unplaced Job Seekers		Recipients of Unemployment Benefits	Vacant Jobs
	30 September	31 October		
Prague	10,617	9,927	6,705	10,654
Central Bohemia	19,545	19,915	14,298	5,040
South Bohemia	14,161	14,739	11,100	2,494
West Bohemia	11,790	11,730	9,255	4,461
North Bohemia	22,269	23,858	16,184	5,806
East Bohemia	23,696	25,668	18,722	4,363
South Moravia	45,854	48,040	29,610	4,936
North Moravia	54,293	57,441	39,491	6,977
Czech Republic Total	202,225	211,318	145,365	44,733
Bratislava	16,444	17,727	14,777	1,658
West Slovakia	81,910	89,648	71,094	2,005
Central Slovakia	73,722	79,403	71,122	1,964
East Slovakia	71,941	76,302	58,696	2,332
Slovak Republic Total	244,017	263,080	215,689	7,959
CSFR Total	446,242	474,396	361,054	52,692

	Unemployment Benefits Paid Out	Rate of Unemployment
	Since the Beginning of the Year (in million korunas)	(in percent)
Prague	96.4	1.39
Central Bohemia	113.8	3.74
South Bohemia	86.0	4.15
West Bohemia	78.0	2.64
North Bohemia	132.1	3.89
East Bohemia	126.4	3.90
South Moravia	269.0	4.62
North Moravia	331.0	5.69
Czech Republic Total	1,232.6	3.94
Bratislava	105.3	5.94
West Slovakia	527.6	11.64
Central Slovakia	524.6	10.08
East Slovakia	504.8	10.92
Slovak Republic Total	1,662.3	10.30
CSFR Total	2,895.0	5.99

November Poll on State Arrangement Published
AU2611114391

[Editorial Report] Prague CESKE A MORAVSKOS-LEZSKE ZEMEDELSE NOVINY in Czech on 22 November on page 3 publishes a chart (three by four inches) on the results of a public opinion poll on the arrangement of relations between Czechs and Slovaks. According to an attached 250-word "sot"-signed report, the poll was carried out by the Prague-based Institute for Public Opinion Research in "early November." The results are based on replies by 1,306 CSFR citizens.

According to the ZEMEDELSE NOVINY chart, 33 percent of CSFR citizens (39 percent in the Czech Republic and 20 percent in the Slovak Republic) said that they preferred a "unitary state" (that is, a single state with a single government). Twenty-nine percent (30 percent in the Czech Republic and 26 percent in the Slovak Republic) preferred a "federation of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic"; 15 percent (20 percent in the Czech Republic and 6 percent in the Slovak Republic) a "union-type republic" (spolkova republika); 11 percent (4 percent in the Czech Republic and 27 percent in the Slovak Republic) a "confederation"; and 8 percent (5 percent in the Czech Republic and 14 percent in Slovakia) preferred "independent states." The remaining 4 percent (2 percent in the Czech Republic and 9 percent in the Slovak Republic) "did not know."

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

15

The chart also breaks down the Czech Republic figures for Bohemia and Moravia. It shows that a "unitary state" has the support of 42 percent of the of inhabitants of Bohemia and of 34 percent of the inhabitants of Moravia. The extent of support for the other forms of state arrangement is as follows: federation of the Czech

Republic and the Slovak Republic (31 percent in Bohemia and 30 percent in Moravia); union-type republic (14 percent in Bohemia and 29 percent in Moravia); confederation (4 percent in Bohemia and 5 percent in Moravia); independent states (8 percent in Bohemia and 2 percent in Moravia).

Minister Denies SFRY, Chechen Arms Sales*LD261111691 Budapest MTI in English 0906 GMT
26 Nov 91*

[Text] Budapest, November 26 (MTI)—“Hungary does not deliver weapons to Yugoslavia and has no knowledge of groups engaged in arms sales,” says Andras Galszecszy, minister without portfolio supervising the information and national security offices, in the Tuesday edition of the daily “NEPSZABADSAG” with regard to a recent TASS report that A. Shishani, board member of the Chechen party Islamic Road, stayed in Hungary from November 15-18. His task was to seek contact with the arms-selling groups which also deliver weapons to Yugoslavia, TASS said quoting “knowledgeable sources”.

“Such a visit by Mr Shishani would have been surprising all the more so as weapons are probably available at several places between the Caucasus and western border of the Soviet Union, all nearer to Chechen territory than Budapest,” Galszecszy says.

“Should the information have really leaked out from intelligence sources, the minister would be ‘happy’ if the Soviet authorities shared it with him in future, since the sharing of such information by the relevant services goes to strengthen stability and the struggle against terrorism. The Hungarian authorities received no information from Moscow about the alleged Shishani trip,” the newspaper says, quoting the Hungarian minister without portfolio.

Letter of Intent Signed With Iran on Oil Supply*LD2511190391 Budapest MTI in English 1652 GMT
25 Nov 91*

[Text] Budapest, November 25 (MTI-Econews)—Iranian Minister of Oil Gholam Reza Aqazadeh-Kho'i, in Budapest since Sunday, and Hungary's Industry and Trade Minister Peter Akos Bod signed a letter of intent here today on Teheran's supplying Hungary with 2 million tonnes of crude in 1992.

The deal can only be implemented if the logistics of piping the oil to Hungarian refineries can be sorted out.

During his stay here, Aqazadeh has had talks with Hungarian Prime Minister Jozsef Antall and Minister of International Economic Relations Bela Kadar, Hungarian chairman of the Hungarian-Iranian economic joint committee.

Oil industry circles told MTI that Hungary would be interested in importing Iranian oil via the Adria pipeline if service is resumed, and if an agreement can be reached with the Soviet Union on the exchange of Iranian raw material: any other solution—such as sending the Iranian oil to a foreign refinery for processing under commission, and then transporting it by ship or rail to Hungary—would make oil imports from Iran much more expensive.

Though crude is in plentiful supply on the world market at the moment, Hungary is still keen to purchase a significant quantity of the commodity from Iran, since that way, Hungarian industry could get access to further export possibilities to Iran.

Trade between Hungary and Iran is not without its problems.

One example is the contract Ikarus concluded with Tehran this spring for the delivery of 3,000 city buses to Iran.

The order is worth about 290 million dollars, but Iran has so far only opened 90 million US dollars, worth of Iranian l/cs [lines of credit], sufficient to cover only 1,000 vehicles.

A similar problem has beset Hungary's Transelektro: At the end of 1990, the company signed a contract for supplying Iran with cooling towers worth about 80 million dollars, but no Iranian bank guarantees have been issued for the delivery so far.

Despite the problems, though, Iran is still Hungary's most important partner as regards the developing countries: Hungarian exports to Iran were worth 89 million dollars in 1989, and 125 million dollars in 1990, with about 200 million dollars being expected this year.

The fate of part of a considerable Iranian oil consignment to Hungary this year remains in the balance.

Hungary's Mineralimpex signed a contract with Iran in April on the delivery of 1 million tonnes of oil to Hungary in 1991-1992.

The first, 250,000-tonne shipment arrived on schedule in July, but the second quarter-of-a-million tonnes has not got through as a result of the Adria pipeline drying up.

Another 250,000 tonnes is due to arrive in December.

Talks on how to tackle these deliveries are still going on.

The final, 250,000-tonne consignment is due to arrive in the first quarter of 1992.

Iranian-Hungarian oil industry cooperation—joint appearance on third markets, for instance, or refining Iranian oil in Hungary—is also on the agenda of talks the Iranian minister of oil is having in Hungary.

Bod Views Importance of Iran Oil*LD2411205191 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network
in Hungarian 1700 GMT 24 Nov 91*

[Interview with Peter Akos Bod, Hungarian minister of industry and trade, by correspondent Janos Hollos at Budapest airport on 24 November—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Announcer] Hungary has a vital need for so-called light oil, from which more gasoline than

heating oil can be produced. We cannot receive oil from the Middle East due to the stoppage of the Adriatic pipeline. What is more, Russian readiness for delivery is also uncertain. That is why the visit of the Iranian oil industry minister to Budapest is important. At the airport Janos Hollos interviewed Peter Akos Bod, minister of industry and trade, who received the Iranian minister.

[Bod] I hope very much that there will be no trouble with the Soviet deliveries. Up to now everything has been taking place according to plan. [passage omitted]

The white product content of the oil from the Middle East is better. Further, it is no secret that we would like to allocate products, too—that is, we are seeking a market which is solvent. Iran is a solvent market.

[Hollos] What exactly is our country's need for crude oil at the moment?

[Bod] It has significantly dropped compared with last year. Now we are producing almost 2 million tons of crude oil and importing some 5 million tons. [passage omitted] Perhaps it is not good news, but compared with the same time last year petrol and diesel oil consumption has dropped by 16 percent.

[Hollos] Further price rises are expected from 1 January. What is your guess? Will there be price rises and if so to what extent?

[Bod] My economic analyses do not include a significant price increase, at least not from the side of expenses. Parliament will establish the tax content, and as last year's tax content has sadly declined due to inflation....

[Hollos, interrupting] It proved to be too little.

[Bod] ... proved to be too little, it is rather possible that tax content will increase nominally. This may increase prices. However, I hope that this will not shake either the economy or the motorists.

Outlines Details of Agreement

LD2611033891 Budapest MTV Television Network
in Hungarian 1830 GMT 25 Nov 91

[Text] Iranian Oil Minister Gholam Reza Aqazadeh-Kho'i held talks this morning with Prime Minister Jozsef Antall, Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky and Bela Kadar, minister of international economic relations. The Iranian oil minister then signed an agreement with Peter Akos Bod, minister of industry and trade.

[Begin recording] [Bod] We have discussed several matters with the minister. There is a short-term one, which concerns the purchase of oil in 1992, and there is one which stretches into the year 2000, like the matter of the gas pipeline, and finally I was strongly promoting Hungarian industry products. [end recording]

[Announcer] According to the current agreement, Iran will export 2 million tonnes of crude oil to Hungary during the next two years and the Hungarian side, from

the year 2000, will buy 2-4 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually from the Islamic Republic of Iran through the gas pipeline to be built from there. We were conferring on Hungarian participation in the reconstruction of the Iranian oil industry and on increasing exports of Hungarian products to Iran, said the Iranian oil minister, who continued his journey to Vienna this afternoon.

[Begin recording] [Unidentified correspondent] Can we expect any problems regarding the oil supply in the near future?

[Bod] The biggest concern now, in the short term, naturally, is the closure of the Adria pipeline because we depend on only one pipeline, again. It causes significant problems because we have bought oil from Iran, and another oil purchase is under way, and it cannot get here. It was raised that we would get Iranian oil via the Soviet Union through a so-called exchange deal, or more precisely we would get Soviet oil and the Soviet Union would utilize Iranian oil.

[Correspondent] However, the oil supply for the winter is still doubtful, isn't it?

[Bod] Hungary's oil supply will not be in danger because, ultimately, we can also import oil products, but it is more expensive, of course. But I very much hope that the Adria pipeline will operate sooner or later. According to our knowledge, it has not been damaged significantly, the reason is only—if I may use this word—only political, war related. However, the operation of the pipeline is in the interest of everybody, not only Hungary and Czechoslovakia but of the people of Yugoslavia as well. [end recording]

Gonczi Comments on Relations With UK

LD2211170591 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network
in Hungarian 1730 GMT 21 Nov 91

[Excerpts] President Arpad Goncz, after ending his visit to London, traveled to Strasbourg. Before doing so, he replied to questions from Hungarian journalists, including Gabor Kereszti, the radio chronicler of the London negotiations. [passage omitted]

[Begin recording] [Gonczi] I think that the nature of the presidential visit shows an end to one stage of development. My impression is that we have reached a stage of friendship and closeness unprecedented in the history of Hungarian-British relations. This is shown by the atmosphere of our visit and the level on which we conducted talks. I went to London as the first head of state of the new Hungarian Republic.

We met the Queen. My wife and I were received for a private dinner by Prince Charles and Princess Diana, which was extraordinarily pleasant. Both talks and meetings proved that Britain likes us and is sympathetic toward Hungary. We asked the Queen to visit.

I am very glad that we were able to review with the British prime minister our common problems and questions raised at every discussion, including the issue of our associate membership in the EC and related discussions in connection with which we asked for British support for the security issues of the region and, within that, for Hungary's relationship with Yugoslavia. We asked for their ideas and for economic links. A strange situation exists whereby British advisors and enterprises know the Hungarian reality perhaps better than anybody else as they participate in the process of privatization. At the same time, British investments are still below our expectations.

A certain caution by bankers was possible to observe. The elimination of this is very important, especially now when throughout the world everybody is ready to view Hungary as a crisis zone because of the Yugoslav war. We had to convince our partners that the Magyars are not a crisis zone and the Hungarian border is a real demarcation line between war and peace. I think that we have succeeded, and if we can call this a result, then it is this which is perhaps the greatest tangible achievement. [passage omitted]

[Kereszti] Next month the EC member states will hold further consultations. Do you not fear that the interrelationship within the EC will deepen further and thus Hungary is moved even further from it?

[Goncz] The issue has been raised several times about whether the EC is to be deepened or widened. I think that the two are not so very different. In political terms, the difference is rather rooted in economics. The involvement of new members is, under any circumstances, more risky, and therefore it requires a political decision. As—and again this is only my impression—the negotiations are delegated to a lower level, this will become more of a technical nature and the behavior of the negotiating partners will be harder. On a higher level, a political resolution does exist, but the trickling of the political decision downward will take some time.

I did not see as unambiguous that they would primarily want to deepen first and then widen. On the contrary, at the political negotiations I observed unambiguously that they want to involve the central European states. I spoke very emphatically and consistently about Central European states, despite the fact that I did not wish for the three countries whose economic life and structure differ from each other to some extent be put in one basket. In other words, I emphasized the existence of our peculiarity and at the same time the same interest and need for cooperation between Europe and the central European region in general, regionalism, and Western European regions.

[Kereszti] Mr. President, were you asked about our internal politics, either from politicians or from journalists?

[Goncz] I received questions in connection with internal politics from the two opposition leaders, which was quite

understandable. The prime minister also touched on this during our conversation, although only fleetingly. Obviously this occurred because they are in constant contact with the Hungarian Government, in regular and close contact. Where the Hungarian internal political questions kept popping up all the time, and rather intensively, were the occasions when I met English journalists. Of course, the new sensation was the Zetenyi bill [on lifting the statutes on limitations], which they are very interested in. This is connected with Czechoslovakia and Poland. I cannot say that the questions directed to me in connection with this were particularly benevolent or understanding. They were formulated in extremely tough terms. In the majority of cases they were talking about a witch-hunt. It was very difficult for me to say that the danger of a witch-hunt does not threaten Hungary. They were not very willing to believe this. I felt the weight of this very strongly. It would not be good if confidence toward the political stability of Hungary is shaken because of such a thing. I tried to convince them that my turning to the Constitutional Court serves the purpose of securing an unequivocal legal and constitutional settlement. I think that this was an argument that made an impact.

[Kereszti] Mr. President, what sort of internal political situation do you expect after your return to Hungary, due to this affair?

[Goncz] I do not think that taking this to the Constitutional Court will create any special storm. [passage omitted] It is inevitable that this bill be put in front of the Constitutional Court, if for no other reason than the outrage it caused in the divided legal profession. As to its effect, I think it is probable that it will be settled soon. [passage omitted]

[Kereszti] You also met the two leaders of the British opposition. [passage omitted] Will the bilateral British-Hungarian relations change if the Labour Party wins the next elections?

[Goncz] The Labour Party showed a lot less interest toward East Europe than the governing party, which is understandable, since they [word indistinct]. I asked Mr. Kinnock to deal with the questions of central Europe a bit more intensively than previously. He was interested in the situation of the left-center in Hungary, especially the situation of the Social Democratic Party, which is in serious trouble. He also asked about the character of the Hungarian Socialist Party, the Free Democrats, and the Young Democrats. I could only suggest one thing: that they tighten their ties with the parties nearest to them in ideology. They should look upon this as a means to help the region. I felt willingness to help from them. [passage omitted] It is important that in a foreign political situation like this one we be able to consider these two other parties as our friends, as they also influence and shape the public opinion and behavior regarding the relations of England toward Central Europe. I consider this very significant. I feel that we have successfully created personal contacts that can be continued.

[Kereszti] Did we get any concrete promise that the British will help us in the EC?

[Goncz] We were given a concrete promise that they will help. [end recording]

Delegation Visits Slovakia, Discusses Bos Dam

AU2211130791 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG
in Hungarian 21 Nov 91 p 3

[Telephone interview with National Assembly representative Gyorgy Csoti by Andras Decsi in Bratislava on 20 November: "Bos Dam—Pozsony Does Not Say No to Negotiations"]

[Text] A delegation of the Hungarian Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee led by Gyorgy Csoti visited Pozsony [Bratislava] at the invitation of the Slovak parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee. On 20 November, we telephoned the deputy in Bratislava to get direct information on the negotiations.

[Csoti] With both Slovak National Council Chairman Miklosko and Prime Minister Carnogursky, we held negotiations in a constructive atmosphere. With Miklosko, we mainly talked about the Yugoslav crisis and its effect on our countries, the possibility and consequences of an embargo, and the Adria oil pipeline. Switching off this pipeline afflicted Czechoslovakia and Hungary equally. With Jan Carnogursky, we touched on bilateral issues such as the Bos Dam and the Hungarian minority living in Slovakia. I formed the impression that the Slovak Government circles are very much determined to complete the Bos power station in 1992. However, the Slovak side does not say no to negotiations and, for this very reason, Mr. Carnogursky will come to Budapest on 2 December for negotiations on this power station.

As for the situation of the Hungarian minority, both Miklosko and Carnogursky promised to settle the issues relating to the name plates of Hungarian villages in Slovakia. We could sense that our Slovak negotiating partners also had a constructive attitude in the matter of the national minority but this did not mean an identity of views.

[Desi] Did the issue of Slovak independence emerge during your negotiations?

[Csoti] This was the only issue on the agenda of our meeting with the Slovak Foreign Affairs Committee. Usually, there is a great debate on this issue between the Slovak parliamentary parties. We could sense this from the fact that the representatives of the various political tendencies much rather argued between themselves than with us during the aforementioned meeting. On this issue, Prime Minister Carnogursky told us that Slovakia's independence would have to be ensured within the framework of a loose confederation, because he did not consider complete separation desirable.

[Desi] You gave a rather long interview on the statements made by Prime Minister Calfa on the evening news program of Slovak Television on 19 November.

[Csoti] First of all, I would like to make it clear that I was not aware that the Hungarian mass media had misquoted Calfa's statement. In the interview you mentioned, all I said was that Hungary was not striving for any kind of border revision. Neither the Hungarian Government, nor the Hungarian parliamentary parties wish to interfere in the domestic matters of either Slovakia or the CSFR. If a fundamental change takes place at our northern neighbor's, then the Hungarian Government will study the new situation.

Horn Visits Prague, Holds Party Talks

AU2511120391 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG
in Hungarian 22 Nov 91 p 3

[Interview with Hungarian Socialist Party Chairman Gyula Horn by Tibor Kiss in Prague; date not given: "We Want Close Relations With the Left-Wing Forces in the Area"]

[Text] A delegation led by Gyula Horn held talks in Prague on 20 and 21 November. The delegation visited the National Assembly and the office of the president of the republic and held talks with representatives of various organizations. A podium discussion held in the Hungarian Cultural Institute in Prague, one in a series of lectures presenting the Hungarian political parties, also drew great interest. Gyula Horn was received by Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier. Our Prague correspondent asked Gyula Horn about his talks in Prague and his party's foreign contacts:

[Kis] The Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] has expressed greater interest in the Central European area. At the same time, it seems that, in its foreign contacts, the MSZP has given less attention to this region.

[Horn] We have been busy with the internal building of our party and domestic policy, and we have mainly concentrated on Western European social democrats in our foreign relations. We have not reduced the intensity of our western contacts, but the sphere of our activity will gradually grow larger, because we want to develop close relations with the new democratic left-wing forces in the area, namely with the social democratic parties.

[Kis] In what areas could the left-wing organizations of this region make a contribution?

[Horn] It has become clear that our problems are not only similar, but they are almost identical. Everywhere the situation is characterized by the same serious problems and tensions as in Hungary; therefore, an exchange of views about these problems would be extremely useful.

[Kis] Are the left-wing parties in Central Europe considering the creation of some sort of organized cooperation forum?

[Horn] Among other things, we are planning a conference on the issue of the change in the economic regimes, with the participation of these parties and the Western European social democrats, probably in February 1992. In our view, this is now the most important problem. We must add to this the fact that, so far, the Socialist International has not been very active in our region, whereas the Christian democratic, liberal, and other western parties are tremendously active. Willy Brandt and the other leaders of the Socialist International are aware of the situation and understand it, and they do not want to acquiesce. At its upcoming general meeting to be held in Chile, the Socialist International will focus on the issue of how to activate its efforts in Eastern-Central Europe.

[Kis] Rumor has it that this meeting will also deal with suspending the membership of the Hungarian Socialist Democratic Party [MSZDP] and with providing observer status to the MSZP.

[Horn] It is the business of the Socialist International to make any decisions regarding the MSZDP. This only affects us regarding the dilemma that has emerged on whether to simultaneously suspend one party's membership and provide observer status to the other party. Besides, according to the statute, there is no such status but, in practice, it means that the party in question is invited to the general meeting. The fact that at its congress next year the Socialist International will deal with the issue of accepting the MSZP in this organization is much more important.

Free Democrats Elect Chairman; Parties React

LD2411142791 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network
in Hungarian 1100 GMT 24 Nov 91

[Excerpts] [Announcer] [passage omitted] Correspondent Peter Marvanyi reports from the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] assembly:

[Marvanyi] The assembly continued with the composition of the list of Executive Council nominees this morning. This was a long and wrought process whose political background was imposed upon by the election of the chairman, i.e. those unwilling to work with Peter Tolgyessy, the new SZDSZ leader, crossed their names off the lists. What is certain is that the majority of those who have until now determined the profile of the SZDSZ will not, on the whole, participate in the new leadership, with the exception of a few individuals like: Gabriella Beki; Gyorgy Gado; Pal Juhasz; Mihaly Radai; and Imre Mecs and Alajos Dornbach, the two other nominees for the chairmanship. [passage omitted]

Understandably, both inside and outside the hall the talk is about the kind of party the SZDSZ will become. Some

believe that the main profile should be interest representation, while many agree with the new leader in believing that the uppermost task is to prevent the Hungarian Democratic Forum (?in conservation once and for all the present political structure). This is why they are glad to have a new leader of resolution and charisma. However, I also heard views according to which it is precisely the person of Peter Tolgyessy which makes the widening of a mass base for the party more difficult. What is certain is that from now on nobody can accuse the Free Democrats that it is an isolated company of intellectuals. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] Our correspondent interviewed Peter Tolgyessy, new chairman of the SZDSZ, prior to the session:

[Begin recording] [Tolgyessy] There is a need for the democratic renewal of the organization so that participation in decisionmaking can be more fulfilling. There is also a need for a more dynamic (?medium term) policy. In the form of the implementation of the program declaration, we would like to work out a new, brief political program.

[Marvanyi] Does it all mean that the SZDSZ will act as a tougher opposition?

[Tolgyessy] I would like an opposition role which is, at the same time, both harder and more able to compromise. Our membership has largely declined, and the range of intellectual and other supporters around us has also decreased. This is what we must restore, not necessarily with the old but with new ones. We should not be a party of elections but a party where personalities root the local SZDSZ organizations into local societies.

[Marvanyi] What will your relationship be with the ex-members of the Executive Council? Will the latter survive at all? After all, you wrote in your program that this body had not been functioning really successfully and that you would prefer to have vice chairmen and spokesmen?

[Tolgyessy] A rather significant change in the statute would be needed (?to change) the Executive Council. I very much (?had) hoped that continuity will be represented in the new Executive Council more than one might expect, although that too will appear in the persons of Imre Mecs, and, presumably, Otilia Solt and Gabriella Beki. All three are old members of the SZDSZ Executive Council. An institutional mode must also be found to enable those who have not accepted functions to participate in the SZDSZ decision-making processes and, if necessary, can make their criticism prevail. [end recording]

[Announcer] How has Peter Tolgyessy's election been received by the Federation of Young Democrats [FIDESZ] and by the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP]? I asked Tamas Deutsch, FIDESZ representative:

[Begin Deutsch recording] [passage omitted] Our requirement vis-a-vis him—as in the case of the chairmen of all parties—is the expectation that he will carry out a predictable policy as a party chairman and, as a consequence, the party he leads will be a predictable partner of FIDESZ. We very much hope that the SZDSZ will find itself again under the leadership of the new chairman. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] Laszlo Varga, KDNP vice chairman: To my knowledge, Peter Toelgyessy was your favorite choice out of the three nominees. So your expectations have been fulfilled.

[Varga] I feel that the six-party conference which the FIDESZ launched but which has come to an impasse can now be resumed. Perhaps Peter Toelgyessy will be a new enough SZDSZ chairman that a closer link between the government and the opposition will receive a greater impetus. This does not mean that the government must be supported in everything. It means one thing, namely that we can get closer to each other in the public's interest. This is necessary because our democracy is still in its infancy, and, thus, it is impossible to play a classically democratic opposition and government and to play a classical power game. I think not only the SZDSZ but also the country has gained, and we too can get closer, I think, at talks and can even support a joint program. [end recording]

[Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian at 1300 GMT on 24 November adds: "Hungarian Socialist Party Chairman Gyula Horn expressed the hope that the opposition parties will be able to cooperate more closely after the SZDSZ assembly and its election of the new leadership."]

Horn, Konya View Election

LD2411232791 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network
in Hungarian 1700 GMT 24 Nov 91

[Interview with Hungarian Socialist Party Chairman Gyula Horn and Imre Konya, Hungarian Democratic Forum member, with correspondent Peter Szoerenyi; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Szoerenyi] Is it possible that the standpoints of the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] and the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] will become closer?

[Horn] Certainly, the three opposition parties have to draw closer. We have already suggested this to the SZDSZ, and they agreed with it. It is my belief that Peter Toelgyessy will be a partner in this.

[Szoerenyi] On the other hand, Peter Toelgyessy was the politician who made the so-called "pact" with the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF]. So it may also be true that the SZDSZ will draw closer to the MDF.

[Horn] The fact that they made a pact in 1990 does not mean that, with the election of Peter Toelgyessy as chairman, a process to create a great coalition could begin. I do not believe this.

[Szoerenyi] Why?

[Horn] Because, in my personal view, there are such great differences—in fact, conflicts—in the political trends and ways of thinking of the MDF and the SZDSZ, that they can hardly result in an MDF-SZDSZ collaboration.

[Szoerenyi] MDF faction leader Imre Konya.

[Konya] I believe that his election is the logical consequence of the spectacular failure of the policy of rigid opposition. I trust that the rigid opposition that has hitherto been a characteristic of the opposition policy of the SZDSZ can decrease.

[Szoerenyi] Why can Peter Toelgyessy mean a change in this issue?

[Konya] Peter Toelgyessy entered the front line of national politics in a period when the SZDSZ announced the policy of radical system transformation, and when the opposition was united in the opposition roundtable for this purpose. This is why I consider his election a logical consequence at a time when the policy that is the opposite of this—not directed at a radical system transformation but at overthrowing the government—has failed.

Socialist Deputy Chairman on Party Progress

AU2111093291 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP
in Hungarian 19 Nov 91 p 9

[Interview with Imre Szekeres, deputy chairman of the Hungarian Socialist Party, by Pal Szombathy; place and date not given: "Spitefulness Should Stop"]

[Excerpts] The Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] held a national conference at the weekend. The MSZP assessed its political performance so far and, because the socialists had managed to identify their role, they would now like to strengthen their professional work to increase efficiency, based on the membership's opinion, Imre Szekeres told us. Imre Szekeres said that there were professional and political debates in his party, but there were no personal conflicts. [passage omitted]

[Szombathy] I have heard discussions claiming the existence of more than one tendency in the MSZP, while others deny this. What is your opinion?

[Szekeres] At the time of forming the MSZP, there were very many and frequently disagreeing platforms in keen competition with each other. Everyone had somewhat different views on the future. These sharp organizational contrasts have largely ceased in the past two years. This was not the result of unifying efforts; the existence of complicated spheres of interest within such a small

opposition party lost its importance. At the same time, I find the emerging sections very important; these are professional and political organizations of people who are in the same situation. The agrarian section, the laborer section, and the teachers' section are also very strong. There is tremendous energy hidden in these sections, because they provide a professional background and social links for the MSZP.

[Szombathy] Nevertheless, if you were to name intellectual-political groups, who would you mention?

[Szekeres] A tendency that is easy to trace emphasizes the need for social-democratic changes in the MSZP. More than one intellectual group represented this view. This process has actually been completed by now. There is also a group that I would call a popular-socialist group that reflects Hungarian specialities, namely that there is a problem with rural areas, and that this is not Western Europe; therefore, we need not follow the classical social democratic route.

[Szombathy] What is your opinion on the organization of the MSZP?

[Szekeres] It is adequate when I compare it to the other parties and also when I consider what happened here in politics. No one should think that people enjoy working in parties. There are two reasons. One is that it is a burden. Political activity requires time and energy at a time when one has to work hard for a living. The other is that there is a feeling of disappointment and a reserve over all parties: No one had really pictured the changes the way they happened, and I am not talking about politicians now. [passage omitted]

In the new structure, parties have at least three types of members: one who is politically active and accepts public appearances, another who helps and participates

in events, and the third who only pays the membership fee. In my view, the MSZP could well become a party of 80,000 in three or four years, and this would correspond to European proportions. [passage omitted]

[Szombathy] How do you assess the national party conference last weekend?

[Szekeres] The main purpose of the conference was an exchange of views between the party and its broad range of activists in the given political situation. The major opinion was that the MSZP had to deal with the real problems that affected people's everyday life. These areas are: How to help the needy, how they could organize the representation of their own economic interests, or how to support the already existing initiatives of citizens in towns and villages. It seems that, in the present political situation, we clearly have to show the social support and force that can be set against the current political animosity.

Very many issues emerged during the weekend, but two issues were particularly emphasized: One is the threatened position of women in the current social situation, and we have to stand up for the interests of women; the other is the fact that 700,000 to 1,000,000 young people will enter the labor market within 4 or 5 years, and we have to fight with all our might against the narrowing of their opportunities in life.

[Szombathy] What do you expect at the Socialist International meeting in Chile?

[Szekeres] We asked them not to mention us, because they deal with the Hungarian Social Democratic Party. However, I am certain that the MSZP will also be a full member at the 1992 congress. There are other cases in which it is the practice to have two parties from one country.

Walesa Asks Sejm to Reject Government Resignation

*LD2511154591 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network
in Polish 1450 GMT 25 Nov 91*

[Text] President Lech Walesa has sent a letter to newly-elected Sejm Speaker Wieslaw Chrzanowski, in which he appealed for the rejection of the resignation of Jan Krzysztof Bielecki's government. A new government needs time to be able to face a difficult matter of governing. Before a new government is appointed, one has to govern, Lech Walesa wrote to Speaker Chrzanowski.

Government Submits Resignation

*LD2511190691 Warsaw TVP Television Network
in Polish 1830 GMT 25 Nov 91*

[Text] The chairman of the Council of Ministers has sent the Sejm speaker a letter submitting the government's resignation.

Walesa Addresses Opening Session of Sejm 25 Nov

*LD2511103191 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network
in Polish 0803 GMT 25 Nov 91*

[Address by President Lech Walesa to the opening session of the Sejm in Warsaw—live]

[Text] Mr. Speaker, Ladies and Gentlemen: There are particular moments in the history of states and nations, crucial moments. Today is such a moment. We have been waiting so long, over half a century. The president elected in a free election is opening the first meeting of the Parliament elected in free elections. We have achieved what generations of Polish people fought for. Let us recall, on such a solemn day, those who in the years of national servitude made their various ways toward independence: the people of sword and pen, diplomats and conspirators, legion fighters and students of flying universities [as heard]—those who in September 1939 took up the fight against two powerful invaders and later carried it on in different fronts of World War II, and perished in trenches, on barricades and in camps, here in the occupied country and on inhuman land, heroic, facing hard but proud times. Those who—in the opposition benches as well as with arms—stood against the Yalta dictate and its alien and native executors that were forced on us. They were pushed to the margins of the nation's life by the power imposed upon us, unable to work for the state and the people, filling prison cells for long years. They were those who did not give in to the oppressors, who rebuilt the country, and who remained faithful to national tradition and the Polish identity.

The Polish identity was sustained by the home hearth, farmer's property, and the church, by workers' protests and the activities of a democratic opposition and the advocates for independence. June and December,

October and August are symbolic months in the Polish calendar. It is Solidarity and wind from the sea that have transformed the face of the nation. It is our peaceful revolution and the resistance against the martial law until the roundtable. These are important elements in the biography of a generation of Poles.

At the same time, this is a part of the biography of many of you deputies, ladies and gentlemen. Today, you create the colorful and complex Polish political scene. The time has come for the Polish heart to start beating again, said Jozef Pilsudski, the head of state, opening the Sejm in 1919. The Polish Constituent Assembly gave political shape to the emerging Second Republic. We are experiencing that feeling today. We are making the effort to give a new shape to the Third Republic.

Ladies and Gentlemen, the Polish political scene has changed and is still changing. The parliamentary elections are a lesson of democracy, a difficult lesson without textbooks and without teachers. For many years, we lived in a system built upon deceit, far from the democratic order and the system of values shaped by democracy and Polish tradition. Some terms were only an empty sound. Institutions like requisites and declarations were rustling paper. While building our Polish house, let us restore the true meaning of the words, and let us be faithful to our declarations.

We know where we are going. Without looking back let us remember where we came from. It is a tradition that gives us identity and distinguishes us from others. It is a tradition that helped us to survive years of partition, occupation, and slavery. When language and speech was our fatherland, the church was our national institution. It remains this, as Poland has grown up from the Christian ring, and its values have been deeply rooted in us for centuries, in our culture and in everyday life. These are our roots.

Ladies and Gentlemen, the Polish political scene has been filled with parties. Political elites have emerged. To many, this brings anxiety about the common lot, because every party appears to be convinced about the rightness of its own beacon, about the path they follow, and that, according to them, should be followed by all of society. They demand that state interests and the interests of the public, the lot of the national community, should be implemented according to their programs. The parties have the right to this. Democracy is, indeed, the right to one's own conviction. But from the multitude of equally important convictions we have to find the most important ones. Fighting for one's own convictions, while disregarding the convictions of others, means socially justified matters will be neglected. It awakens anxiety and causes apathy and discouragement. Our common goals have to become more important than party interests. Election arithmetic does not have to triumph with a variety of opinion, views, and assessments. Compromise can lead us to what should unite all of us. This is the foundation of parliamentary majority, the impermanency of the government and the stability of the state.

Discord divides us. During the period of construction that has come about we cannot take that path. The issues we face are too important. The force of the state's needs, which we have to consider, is such that we must unite on behalf of that construction, on behalf of the protection of the joint aims we want to realize. We must build a bridge jointly to cross to the other side as quickly and as safely as possible. Afterwards the time will come for a more subtle differentiation of our needs.

Ladies and Gentlemen, you are sitting on various benches. But from each one of them, the Polish eagle can be seen, the emblem of our state. Union for the implementation of joint issues, the construction of the state, will be the test of our patriotism. Let us give up our quarrels, let us talk about our own reasons, remember them, but listen to each other. Party options and their issues are certainly important, but let's remember that stubbornly sticking to them could divide us and, as a result, divide the nation. We cannot divide the nation and separate (ourselves) from it. Some matters must wait. Better they wait for better times, times when the state and society are in a better state.

In the last two years, many things have not worked out for us. The reasons for this were various. Certainly, some of them were the result of the fact that not everyone was aware of the need to restructure the state, the scale of that restructuring, and the pace of that work. Many even thought that even a partial refurbishment was enough. Today we see the bad results of that. The public expects constructive work from us, including those who did not go to the polling booths. Parliament ought also to remember them. Then your work will be supported by the public, and it will join in our efforts. We must start immediately. Delay in conciliation around the most important joint issues gives rise to many dangers.

Ladies and Gentlemen, we must jointly agree on the catalog of issues that are most important for the nation and state. Recent years and recent days have demonstrated that drafting a new constitution is an urgent problem.

A democratic, law-abiding state cannot be a mere declaration. The law must guard the good of all. While it must meet the interests of the majority, it cannot ignore the interests of the minority. We are all equal before the law, irrespective of convictions and of our place in society and the state. The law should be clear, comprehensible and stable, formulated with a perspective on time. It concerns both citizens' rights and duties. A citizen will respect the law and recognize both the state and the law as the common good. The Constitution is called the basic law because it defines basic principles of the political model of the state. I believe the house will share my view on the necessity for basing the Constitution upon a principle: Supreme power in the republic belongs to the nation. By that, we are going to confirm our affiliation in the family of free nations and democratic states. There is no democracy without respect for the natural rights of man.

Clearly and accurately defined citizens' rights and their constitutional guarantees are also issues that will unite the nation. I am convinced of that. We must elaborate an efficiently functioning system of state power, a system of distribution and balance, with clearly defined ranges of executive power. It should have the legal potential to effectively serve the nation.

I think that, before the new constitution is adopted, we will need a small constitution. It is impossible to continue to act on the strength of the basic law that originated in the Stalinist system.

Ladies and Gentlemen, economic recovery is the condition for all subsequent steps. Only a strong developing economy can create the framework for reform in other areas of our public and state life. The economic sphere is and will long remain the main subject of concern of all Poles, the main source of social tension. We cannot take offense at it. We cannot defer recurring issues and problems. Poland has already chosen the path, the path of a market economy. At the bottom, it is based on individual initiative and entrepreneurship, but at the top, it continues to be hampered severely, particularly by legal regulations from the budget, including credit. This must change. The fate of reform depends on setting in motion our initiative, loosening chains at the top, and activating too passive attitudes below. Our task for the coming years is for everyone to find their own place in the economy of the Third Republic.

How can we make Poland for the Poles? We must remember that there are less enterprising people among us, for whom we should create conditions for a proper life, as well as those who are excessively enterprising, who are the cause of consequences irritating to society. Some quite simply exceed the bounds of the law. This should be effectively ended so that Poland can become a country without scandal and corruption, so that an ethic of honest work is reinstated. There is strong pressure to act quickly, to take actions that yield immediate economic results. Things only appear like that. We often forget that rich countries worked for a long time for their prosperity. They did not achieve development without difficulty. It was paid for by sacrifice. Our dilemma is based on the fact that, while we yearn for economic success, we wish to immediately have access to all the social benefits of highly developed countries. Many of these states, however, are now considering whether they can afford to fulfill all the welfare functions. We will not simultaneously achieve the high standard of living of free market states while fulfilling all social promises, which until recently were nourished with communist propaganda.

We are in crisis. Recession is a daily topic in the press and at family homes. We are tired. Another generation of Poles is tightening the belt. It happens because we have been following a path that was not discovered before, and because the entire Communist bloc has collapsed. We must, above all, rely on our own abilities. Often we do not see our abilities. We do not appreciate them. We

have to shake off torpor and apathy. Without changing our attitudes and our mentality, we shall not leave the old system behind. Most of society lives in the countryside. Most of its inhabitants still work in agriculture. They are the salt of the Polish earth. While encouraging bread makers to take joint responsibility for our state, let us remember that the state also owes something to them. Our peaceful revolution freed the farmers from many humiliating experiences under the Communist system.

At the same time, an overhaul of the Polish house brings with it various difficulties. Some of them can be avoided, others can be resolved more rapidly and more efficiently. This is the common task of the government, the Parliament, and, above all, the peasant activists: to prove to farmers that the free market economy has been their great chance, that the democratic system is also their great good. They should guard it, they should participate in it and improve it when necessary. This is a great Polish cause, and the president, a farmer's son, will remember it and will always remind others.

How are we to strengthen Poland's place in the world and in Europe, where the West merges and unites and the East is searching for its political and national shape in pain and great uncertainty? How are we to make Poland attract trade partners, capital, and ordinary visitors from abroad? We have opened the door. That is not enough. That is just the beginning. As never before, friendly relations link the republic with the United States, France, Great Britain, Italy, Scandinavia and Japan, and not only with the great of this world but also with other states of various continents and various regions.

The last decade seemed to be stormy and bloody in our part of Europe. Could the Balkan drama be avoided? Did not Europe react too late and without consistency? The republic extends a friendly hand to all our neighbors. Our relations with Germany were consolidated in a treaty and will have to be filled with content. While remembering wrong, let us abandon prejudice and mistrust. With good will on both sides—I have no doubt about it—we will not have to wait long for the results of cooperation. We attach utmost importance to the further favorable development of relations with Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The Warsaw-Prague-Budapest triangle is not directed against anybody. I hope that, by further uniting forces and arguments, we will shorten the path of our countries to European institutions and to NATO. Our neighbors in the East have a friendly and open neighbor in the republic, as well as a neighbor wishing them well in their efforts to build democracy and independence. This applies to Kiev, Minsk, Vilnius and Moscow.

This is the permanent and declared policy of our state. Poland has no territorial claims whatsoever. Instead, we have numerous economic problems, often important to both sides. We have Poles scattered in the East. Their fate is close to us. So, there are many matters to be settled. I want to believe that they will be efficiently

resolved. Poland was among the first states to recognize the independence of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. In our history, we had a lot in common with the Baltic nations for good and for benefit. Once more, here, before the house, I want to welcome Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia to the family of free nations.

Ladies and Gentlemen, the program, a new beginning, formulated a year ago, gained the broad acceptance of the electorate, although it is not being implemented. In it, I put forward the idea of a social policy. In this interim period that we are experiencing, state intervention is necessary in employment matters. We must also remember the quite simply alarming physical condition of a considerable part of our society and the crisis in the health service. I think these concerns will be shared by deputies.

Most of those holding seats in the chamber have a Solidarity heritage. Some of those present also have the union mandate. Reform must change the economic and social structure of the third republic. Above all, the development of education and learning is essential for this. Without that, we shall be groping in the dark. Bearing in mind the financial situation, we must consider creating conditions for the survival of science. We must do everything to develop and change Polish education. To be educated is an honor, but it is also a service for the nation and state.

We often talk about our return to Europe. We were always in Europe, not only geographically. After Yalta, Europe was divided by an iron curtain, a wall, by barbed wire. The curtain has fallen, the wall has collapsed, nothing divides us, people and ideas are moving around. Let us remember that if Poland managed to draw the attention of the nation, that happened due to our culture. That culture always created values rising from the depths of the Mediterranean civilization, the Christian spiritual community, giving the world separate and unique values, our own Polish ones. We must, therefore, in moments as difficult as the present, sustain the efforts of the producers and employees of culture. We should undertake endeavors for culture to overcome the threat in the financial sphere. This will allow it to enrich the nation by its achievements and to testify to the world about the greatness of Poland.

Ladies and Gentlemen, the work of repairing the republic lies ahead of us. Its future shape depends on us. It will be an enormous and difficult effort, but at the same time a beautiful one, as is every great work of creation. Among the many works that you will undertake, the most valuable matter will be the creation of a constitution, a law that will decide the constitutional model of the Polish state. Many issues await to be resolved by the esteemed chamber, a magnitude of creation.

The public is tired, divided, and dissatisfied. The great victory came on an evolutionary path preceded by many compromises. Those are the costs of that style of

struggle. We have achieved the free third republic without a shot. Perhaps there was another path, perhaps there was a lower price—perhaps. In December 1970, I walked out of the Gdansk shipyard defeated, in between the tanks. I called out to the Lord then: How can we overthrow this system, this Army, without shedding Polish blood? Here today, as president of the Republic, I can say in a democratically elected Parliament: We have a free Poland. This freedom must be well managed to the benefit of all its citizens.

In conclusion, I request the esteemed chamber, bearing in mind the enormity of the tasks but also the great party division in Parliament, to first of all work toward the construction of coalitions and programs for Poland and only afterwards to dismantle structures. This will assure the stability of the state and the stability of government.

As the president of the Republic, I submit myself to democracy.

I wish for the Sejm that, in the future, it will gain the deserved name of a reformer, that it will become the Constituent Assembly of the Third Republic. God bless you.

Session Elects Sejm Speaker

LD2511233991 Warsaw PAP in English 2246 GMT
25 Nov 91

[Text] Warsaw, Nov. 25—The Parliament elected in Poland's first free elections of October 27 met at an inaugural sitting on Monday to choose Wieslaw Chrzanowski of the Christian National Union (ZChN) its speaker.

Senior speaker, Count Aleksander Malachowski, opened the sitting, stating that Poles had not fought, suffered and lost their lives for the homeland in vain and that Solidarity had not staged rebellion and defeated communist totalitarianism in vain.

Speaking on the "beautiful day of freedom," as he termed it, Malachowski, long-standing member of Solidarity, voiced hope that this would be the Sejm of the first term in a free Poland, in defiance of the previous terms of Parliament during the communist rule.

President Lech Walesa was next to take the floor, his address appealing for putting an end to party quarrels in view of the aggravating economic and social difficulties of the country. He asked deputies to urgently adopt a constitution to replace the binding one that dates back to the Stalinist era.

Next on the meeting's agenda was the ceremony of taking an oath by deputies and voting for Sejm speaker. As a result of the latter Chrzanowski was elected with 267 votes for, his rivals Olga Krzyzanowska of the Democratic Union (UD) received 129 votes while Jozef Zych of the Polish Peasant Party (PSL)—62 votes.

Late in the evening the Sejm elected its five deputy speakers: Henryk Bak of the Peasant Agreement (PL), Andrzej Kern of the Centre Alliance (PC), Jacek Kurczewski of the Liberal Democratic Congress (KLD), Dariusz Wojcik of the Confederation for Independent Poland (KPN) and Jozef Zych of the PSL.

These results show that the centre-rightist coalition of the ZChN, the PC, the KPN, the KLD and the PL is able to secure a majority in the new Parliament when it comes to voting, the fact being the more important when one takes into consideration President Walesa's unwillingness to designate the five's candidate Jan Olszewski for prime minister.

After his election Chrzanowski, taking account of the much fragmented character of the Sejm with numerous political parties having small representations, said: "I believe in good will and willingness to cooperate." He also admitted that his main duty was to see to it that democratic procedure was observed during the process of law-making.

"After last year's election of the president of the Republic of Poland, free elections to the Sejm and the Senate end the process of building supreme authorities of a reborn sovereign Polish state," the newly elected Sejm speaker told the parliament. "I am deeply convinced that we are willing to be and we will be the Sejm of all Poles," he added.

According to Chrzanowski the new Sejm's primary tasks will be to adopt a new constitution and make it possible for the government to operate under stable circumstances, that is to strengthen the executive power.

In reply to Chrzanowski's election Walesa addressed to him a letter in which he voiced his support for the cabinet of Prime Minister Jan Krzysztof Bielecki. Pointing to the fact that no party had won the elections, the president came out in favour of a compromise consisting in the continuation of the work of the present government.

"Before we formulate a programme enjoining the support of many political parties, let us work in peace and stability," Walesa wrote. He recalled that he had asked Bielecki not to submit his cabinets resignation and requested Chrzanowski to support his stand in the Parliament.

Asked to comment on the vote, Premier Bielecki told newsmen this afternoon that he was glad that the right person was elected Sejm speaker.

In turn presidential spokesman Andrzej Drzycimski pointed to the unstable character of the political set-up in the Sejm. "The stabilisation of this arrangement (the coalition of the five) is a very slow process. At present, issue number one is the effective functioning of the government," he said.

He hinted that "democracy might be supplemented by the president, who has a constitutional right to designate

premier." "Leaving the decision to be made by the Parliament, the president does not think it desirable that the government resign," he added.

The Sejm will resume its meeting on Tuesday afternoon.

Center Accord Parliament Members Form Club

AU2611102791 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA
in Polish 21 Nov 91 p 11

[Jerzy Pilczynski report: "Center Accord Club Backs 'Small Constitution'"]

[Text] A meeting of parliamentarians elected on the Center Citizens Accord slate was held at the Sejm on 20 November.

The meeting was devoted to the formation of a club. Deputy Marek Dziubek was elected club chairman. He was elected by 34 parliamentarians, with six voting against, and four abstentions. Senator Leszek Piotrowski was elected deputy chairman. Members of Parliament elected on citizens committee slates and "Patrimony" leader Roman Bartoszcze did not vote. They walked out of the meeting after it was decided that the club would be called the Center Accord Parliamentary Club. Slawomir Siwek said later that the walkout was not a protest and did not signify a split. The deputies have to consider what form their participation in the club should take. There is a possibility that they might form their own circle within the framework of the club.

Besides, the Center Accord Club is to have an open character. It is possible that deputies who obtained a seat as representatives of various small groupings might want to join it.

A second deputy chairman was not elected, because parliamentarians representing the citizens committee had not expressed their position. It is possible that the second deputy chairman would be someone from the citizens committees.

Matters relating to the commencement of Sejm work were discussed during the club meeting and a briefing on the course of coalition talks was also given.

Andrzej Urbanski later said that the Center Accord Club believes that the most important issue facing the Sejm is the adoption of a so-called small constitution, which would regulate relations between the Sejm and the Senate, and the government and the president. In 1919, this was accomplished in 24 hours. Speaking at the meeting, Jaroslaw Kaczynski said: "We do not have to beat that record, but we can do it quickly and effectively." Andrzej Urbanski stressed that 307 votes have to be gathered in the Sejm to secure its adoption. That is why the Center Accord is constantly appealing to the Democratic Union to become involved in work on the "small constitution."

Questions related to the formation of a government were also discussed at the meeting. Senator Jerzy Stepień

expressed the view that talks should be started with Mieczyslaw Wachowski. The president's decision to appoint a negotiator who holds the senior post of head of the president's office is a serious proposal and should be treated as such in the senator's opinion. Jaroslaw Kaczynski pledged to convey this view to the coalition partners. It did not, however, find support among the Center Accord deputies. Kaczynski himself later said, "What form the government should take is something that representatives of the parties should discuss with the president." He also strongly emphasized that Jan Olszewski is the candidate of "the five."

Marek Dziubek confirmed once again that Wieslaw Chrzanowski is the Center Accord's candidate for the office of Sejm marshal. A proposal regarding the post of Senate marshal will depend on the outcome of consultations with the Democratic Union.

Coalition Leaders Discuss Ministry Priorities

AU2611090391 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA
in Polish 22 Nov 91 pp 1-2

[Tomasz Roguski report: "What Ministers Will Be Doing"]

[Text] Representatives of the five parties that are holding talks on forming a government—the PC [Center Accord], the KLD [Liberal Democratic Congress], the KPN [Confederation for an Independent Poland], the PL [Peasant Alliance], and the ZChN [Christian-National Union]—maintain that the question of ministerial appointments has not arisen yet. They are all reluctant to discuss personnel issues, sensing that distribution of ministerial portfolios will no doubt present problems. So, we have tried to find out what their views are on the qualities that future ministers should possess and what issues they should deal with first of all.

The Confederation for an Independent Poland Has Specialists

"The government should, in contrast to the two previous governments, be able to make decisions," says Krzysztof Krol, the KPN's leader.

"The KPN has specialists to head some ministries: Defense, Justice, Communications, Environmental Protection, the Office of Sport and Tourism," said Krzysztof Krol. He believes that the KPN is better prepared to fill those posts than other groupings.

"The Ministry of National Defense should draw up a new defense doctrine and should reorganize the Army in accordance with it," says Krol. "The Polish Armed Forces are still the same as they were when they were backed by the Red Army. It is a very ossified setup and must be overhauled. Leszek Moczulski could become the minister of national defense, but he is not the only candidate for the post that the KPN has."

"The finance minister should be someone who is more interested in increasing the budget than dividing it up," says Krol. "The most important thing about the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the ability to realize objectives. Raising the standing of the state is not an adequate goal. Increasing exports to the USSR might be a goal, for example. Tangible successes could be obtained fastest in foreign policy, because one knows what the effects would be and one knows what is possible."

"It is also very easy to set a goal for the Ministry of Internal Affairs, namely, reducing the crime rate and uncovering corruption," said Krzysztof Krol. "It can be recalled that America's very democratic authorities did not sentence Al Capone for murder, but for tax evasion," he says.

The Liberals on the Economy

"The KLD will participate in the future government to a very limited degree," said Donald Tusk, chairman of the KLD Main Board. The Liberals are not interested in the Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, or the Ministry of Justice, and are only interested in those ministries that are concerned with the economy."

Donald Tusk did not want to say anything about any particular ministry, believing that to be premature and something that could be interpreted as meaning that the KLD wants to head a specific ministry.

"Although it seems incredible, the representatives of the five groupings have still not had a single discussion on the distribution of 'portfolios,'" he said.

Participation in the government by KLD members will depend on whether the new cabinet will implement an economic program that is close to the one that the KLD outlined in "An Opportunity for Poland." Talks among "the five" on economic issues have still not reached an advanced stage, but very significant differences have already emerged.

"A great deal will depend on what Jan Krzysztof Bielecki will personally decide. It is being suggested in some quarters that he should be made deputy prime minister with responsibility for economic matters," said Donald Tusk. If that were to happen, then the KLD's participation in the government would be different, that is, greater.

The PC: Our Prime Minister

Jacek Maziarski, chairman of the PC Main Board, also confirmed that the appointment of ministers had not been raised during talks between "the five" so far, "because it would immediately give rise to enormous difficulties."

He did, however, add that "we realize that by proposing a candidate for the post of prime minister, we will head fewer ministries."

The Peasant Party Wants a Report on the State of the Country

Gabriel Jankowski, chairman of Rural "Solidarity," believes that questions about the character and composition of the government are premature. "The five" are just at the stage of discussing an economic program.

"A report on the state of the country has to be commissioned," says Jankowski. The extent to which various areas of life are threatened also has to be set out. In Jankowski's opinion, the future government should have special powers or plenipotentiary powers, because "it cannot discuss every piece of legislation with the Sejm."

He believes that a strong ministry for the economy should be created to deal with economic policy and that the Finance Ministry cannot decide everything. "Economic policy cannot be reduced to monetary policy," he says.

Gabriel Jankowski maintains that the Agriculture Ministry is currently suited to a command economy. Its internal structure must be changed, because its function is different. The Agriculture Ministry should be more involved in coordinating foreign aid, creating an infrastructure for agriculture, and transforming the infrastructure that already exists.

"It is unacceptable for the minister in charge of the Foreign Ministry to say that will not deal with meat because he is not a butcher," says Gabriel Jankowski. The Foreign Ministry should be involved in developing economic life. Polish companies are too poor and cannot become acquainted with world markets by themselves. He said that the PL is going to propose a couple dozen candidates of its own for agricultural attache posts at Polish embassies. It also wants its specialists to be involved in talks on cooperation with the EC. He pointed out that 80 percent of the EC budget is spent on agriculture, and the European Community began with the drawing up of an agriculture policy.

Gabriel Jankowski's name was previously mentioned in connection with the post of agriculture minister or deputy prime minister. Jankowski himself declined to say whether it would be possible and realistic for him to assume one of those posts.

The ZChN: How Much Change and How Much Continuity

"We have some specialists within our own ranks," said Wieslaw Chrzanowski, ZChN president, "but party affiliation is not a basic requirement for holding office. What matters are personal ethical standards and expertise, although one does not have to be a college professor."

Wieslaw Chrzanowski is the minister of justice in the present government. "The five" have proposed him for the office of Sejm marshal. Asked what his possible successor should do, he said that he should, above all, complete the work on legal regulations that has already

been started. Some of the bills prepared by the government have already reached the Sejm, while others, such as the anti-corruption bill, have not. According to Wieslaw Chrzanowski, it is important to complete the formation of the judiciary and that includes matters such as extraordinary appeals procedures and a reform of criminal law. Changes to the prosecuting attorney's office are also required. Asked whether one of his present colleagues might succeed him, he said that he did not exclude such a possibility.

"One of the things that is important in the Ministry of Internal Affairs is resolving the question of people who cooperated with the Security Service," says Wieslaw Chrzanowski. "It is not a question of mass exposures, but of creating a procedure for vetting persons who are appointed to important state offices and of giving people an opportunity to defend themselves from unjust accusations."

The ZChN president highly appraised Krzysztof Skubiszewski, the current foreign minister, "although that does not mean that our views on certain matters do not differ," he added. "However, it would be strange for everyone to hold the same views on every subject."

"Changes in economic policy cannot lead to the return of hyperinflation," said Wieslaw Chrzanowski. In his opinion, the Finance Ministry cannot hold sway over all other economic ministries, including the Industry Ministry in particular.

"It is a question of negotiating how much continuity and how much change there should be," he says. "Besides, over the past few months the government has done a lot to change economic policy on, for example, the question of tariffs, more flexible exchange rates, and aid for state enterprises," said Wieslaw Chrzanowski. Like the other leaders of "the five," he did not want to discuss names.

Rakowski Denies SDRP Spent Soviet Loan

AU2611093691 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish
23-24 Nov 91 pp 1-2

[Interview with Mieczyslaw F. Rakowski, former Polish United Workers Party first secretary, by Dariusz Szymczycha; place and date not given: "The PZPR Loan—Motives and Circumstances"]

[Text] [Szymczycha] In the middle of November, the Polish media made a loud noise about a loan that you, as the last first secretary of the Polish United Workers Party [PZPR], received from the CPSU. You have been criticized for this. Would you care to say anything about it?

[Rakowski] Two years after we handed over power, the ruling elites are in a quandary. That is why the right wing has stepped up its calls for "decommunization." The more the PZPR recedes into history, the greater the "communist" threat seems to be.

The motives for this are similar to Stalin's obsession about an intensification of the class struggle—in other words, an imagined increased threat from forces he had already overthrown. The first weapon to be deployed in the "decommunization" campaign was the nomenklatura companies, but they were never discovered, so this propaganda instrument failed. After the election success of the Social Democratic Party of the Republic of Poland [SDRP], something new had to be found to discredit the left wing and provide a pretext for various demands, such as the calls by the Citizens Committees to make the SDRP illegal and deprive its Sejm deputies of their mandates. New ways to make past and present left-wing activists fight each other are being sought all the time to discredit them in the eyes of society. The latest ploy is the sudden materialization of files from CPSU safes.

I think there are enough party documents to fascinate people in various countries for many years to come. In Poland, a CPSU loan granted to the PZPR toward the end of its existence has suddenly been brought to light. I chaired the PZPR for a brief spell. I am surprised that such an ordinary and rather insignificant matter has been dragged out of the CPSU records. I am as much interested in Soviet secrets as anyone else, and I am sure the archives of the party that ruled a world empire for decades contains more fascinating things than this.

Those who discovered the CPSU loan are pretending to be naive. The CPSU Central Committee used all kinds of political, military, and financial instruments to pursue its world policies. There must be a lot of fascinating secrets there. If the secret drawers in Washington were suddenly to be opened, I am sure the contents would be just as fascinating. We know that the CPSU used money abroad in various ways to implement its goals. The PZPR used to take part in this. Already in 1956, the PO PROSTU journal wrote about various operations by Polish foreign trade agencies designed to convey funds to certain persons, who then transferred them to various parties and pro-Soviet movements. So, the fact that the CPSU used money as an instrument in its policies was revealed in Poland 40 years ago.

However, the loan from the CPSU was not such an instrument. I wish to make that very clear. It was not used to settle Soviet affairs in another country—in other words, in Poland. It was not used to finance "local allies of Moscow."

First, this was a loan, not a subsidy. It was granted on the basis of a signed agreement. The agreement clearly stated that the sum was to be repaid within one year. I personally guaranteed that the loan would be repaid, and I repaid it. After all, the PZPR had ceased to exist, so it could not possibly earn any income in the future. If the loan had been spent, one year later there would not have been any money with which to repay it.

Second, this loan was granted by the CPSU to a party that, although it had been officially allied to the CPSU for decades, was no longer in any way dependent on the

CPSU at the time of the loan. We had already surrendered our power, and perestroika has reached its apogee in the USSR. The contracting parties were not Stalin and Bierut, but politicians from a completely different era—Gorbachev and Rakowski.

The Polish press has simply revived old scenarios and superimposed them on today's reality. It has made it look as if the chief of an impoverished PZPR asked the chief of an allied but richer party for a loan.

Toward the end of 1989, the PZPR found itself in a state of advanced disintegration. Regular sources of income began to dry up, and more and more members refused to pay their membership dues. Because I was still convinced at this time that the PZPR would continue to exist after a mere alteration to its statute and program—this can be confirmed by reading my speeches—I considered it expedient to ask the CPSU general secretary for a loan, in order to have a cash reserve that would stave off the PZPR's bankruptcy, for difficult times had befallen the party. Therefore, I applied to the head of the ruling Soviet party and de facto chief of the Soviet state in the era of perestroika. A characteristic feature of our relationship was the fact that it was no longer possible to talk about any dependency of the PZPR upon the CPSU.

To secure this loan, I employed my personal relationship with Gorbachev, which was very good at this time, for Gorbachev had perceived the similarity of our views, aims, and ways of thinking. A climate of confidence was formed between the Soviet leader and me.

[Szymczycha] What were the exact circumstances surrounding the loan?

[Rakowski] I filed the application and waited two months for something to happen. Finally I received news that the loan would be paid to me personally. Toward the second week of January [1990], I received it, and the appropriate paper was signed. This occurred in Warsaw, not Moscow, as the press claims. That was a very hectic period. I held talks with over 1,000 people that month, and I succeeded in grasping the fact that the PZPR had no future and that the 11th Congress would apply the rubber stamp to its demise. And that is what happened. The PZPR was dissolved. The recipient of the loan ceased to exist.

[Szymczycha] Some former PZPR leaders claim they were never informed of the loan. Why?

[Rakowski] This was a time when everything was falling apart. Meetings of the leadership were merely formal affairs, the party's dissolution had been decided beforehand, and I was working very hard on a congress speech. I admit that I never thought about the loan, because my entire era was disintegrating before my very eyes, and with my participation. There were already calls to nationalize the PZPR's assets, and preparations to do so were being made. I did not obtain the loan in order to hand it over to the liquidators. So I waited for events to unfold and waited for the outcome of the PZPR congress.

Following the PZPR's self-dissolution and the SDRP's birth, the recipient of the loan ceased to exist. The loan had been granted to the first secretary of the PZPR on the assumption that that party would continue to exist; therefore, I had no authorization from the donor to bequeath it to the SDRP. In any case, it was not yet known how the CPSU would relate to the SDRP, and whether or not the SDRP would want to establish links with the CPSU, and to what extent. Therefore, the loan was spent neither by the PZPR, nor the SDRP, nor TRYBUNA.

After the congress, I became a private individual. I informed Moscow that the loan had not been touched and that all the money was still in my hands, ready to be returned.

The first installment was given to a Soviet delegation headed by Yanayev, at that time a secretary in the CPSU Central Committee, toward the middle of October in Warsaw. I received a formal acknowledgement in Russian early in November. The second installment was given to two envoys from the CPSU Central Committee Economic Department early in January 1991.

[Szymczycha] But the documents published in ROSSIYA only mention one installment.

[Rakowski] During my visit to Moscow in January 1991, the head of the Polish sector of the Economic Department told me that because the PZPR had repaid the loan without making use of it and had dissolved itself, Moscow wished to consider the entire loan null and void. I was told that the supporting documentation had been destroyed and was asked to destroy the documentation in Warsaw, which I did upon my return. Well, it transpires that one set of documents still exists. But the other set has not been conveyed to the press. Documents are being published that I do not have the slightest idea about, such as the one that claims that the loan was only postponed, not annulled.

A sharp political struggle is taking place in Moscow, and a war is being waged against Gorbachev. Therefore, various true and false documents are being published to make it look as if Gorbachev transferred money abroad while the citizens of the USSR lived in poverty.

[Szymczycha] What is it about this affair that upsets you the most?

[Rakowski] I was never highly regarded in Moscow during the decades of my political life. I was viewed as something of a rotten liberal, revisionist, sycophant, and man of the West—in short, a comrade with a low level of ideology. I was treated with distrust. Already in the 1980's, I was given to understand that if I joined the PZPR leadership, Moscow would not consider me a partner. And now part of the media is trying to turn me

into Moscow's chief ally in Warsaw. This is like something taken out of Mrozek [Polish novelist].

Democratic Left Leader on CPSU Loan Issue

AU2611091491 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA
in Polish 21 Nov 91 p 3

[Interview with Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, leader of the Alliance of the Democratic Left, by Ewa Milewicz; place and date not given: "Miller's Activity Is Burdening The Left Wing's Bank Account"]

[Text] A further meeting of the Supreme Council of the Social Democratic Party of the Republic of Poland [SDRP] has failed to resolve the issue of the loan granted by the CPSU to the Polish United Workers Party [PZPR] in January 1990. SDRP leader Aleksander Kwasniewski told GAZETA that Leszek Miller "involuntarily witnessed" the repayment of one installment of this loan, but Miller denies having had anything to do with it.

In the meantime, the Sejm deputies are to take their oath on Monday. If Miller also takes it, he will be protected by parliamentary immunity, and any legal action against him will only be possible if this immunity is lifted first.

GAZETA asked Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, leader of the Alliance of the Democratic Left, what he thinks:

[Milewicz] Do you think the SDRP has established what happened to the loan from Moscow?

[Cimoszewicz] No, unfortunately, the SDRP has not made a serious attempt to establish anything. What happened to the dollars from Moscow really is unclear.

[Milewicz] What exactly do you mean by "unclear"?

[Cimoszewicz] Mieczyslaw Rakowski [PZPR first secretary] said he would pay everything back, but the CPSU claims it only got back some of the money. So where is the rest? Apart from that, I do not believe Leszek Miller knew anything. Toward the end of the PZPR's life, he was Rakowski's closest colleague, so I cannot believe he merely witnessed the money being handed over to the Soviet Embassy or KGB, and that he did not know what was inside the envelope.

[Milewicz] Have you any evidence?

[Cimoszewicz] No, I am merely saying what I feel. However, this is the second time in recent months that L. Miller's activity has burdened the left wing's bank account.

[Milewicz] What happened the first time?

[Cimoszewicz] He travelled to the Crimea last summer. I do not think he was in league with Yanayev, but he took a free vacation.

[Milewicz] Free?

[Cimoszewicz] When one is officially invited to the Soviet Union, one does not pay for the trip out of one's own pocket

[Milewicz] Why are you telling me all this?

[Cimoszewicz] I have depended on people from the SDRP until now. They used to be my political allies. I was loyal toward them. But now I do not want to be jointly responsible for all these little schemes.

[Milewicz] Are you the only person in the Alliance of the Democratic Left parliamentary club who thinks this way?

[Cimoszewicz] No, many others do as well. They realize the situation inside the SDRP is slowly heading toward a drastic situation.

[Milewicz] Because of the Moscow money?

[Cimoszewicz] Not only because of that. Leszek Miller and Wieslaw Huszcza looked after the SDRP's finances. They handled enormous sums of money. Well, I do not know where this money has gone. The SDRP does not even have enough money to cover its election expenses.

[Milewicz] Do you belong to the SDRP?

[Cimoszewicz] No.

[Milewicz] Then how do you know all this?

[Cimoszewicz] An auditing commission was appointed inside the SDRP a few months ago to check that party's spending. However, it was unable to establish what happened to the PZPR's assets.

[Milewicz] Why not?

[Cimoszewicz] I assume that the fate of these assets was determined by a narrow group of people beyond anyone's control.

[Milewicz] You mentioned the possibility of a "drastic solution." What kind?

[Cimoszewicz] Many SDRP members are satisfied with Miller's explanation. They have been waiting for Rakowski to deliver his promised statement, and they are still waiting.

[Milewicz] If you dislike the SDRP, why do you belong to its parliamentary club?

[Cimoszewicz] I might resign from it.

[Milewicz] And where will you go?

[Cimoszewicz] Nowhere. I will remain a deputy.

[Milewicz] Will anyone resign with you?

[Cimoszewicz] I do not know.

Leaders Meet SDP's Engholm, Discuss EC Issues

AU2211162191 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
RUNDSCHAU in German 22 Nov 91 p 4

[Report by "eh": "Engholm Backs Poland's Wish For EC Membership"]

[Text] Warsaw, 21 Nov—Bjoern Engholm, chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Germany [SPD] and minister president of Schleswig Holstein, said in Warsaw on 20 November that he would like to see Poland as an EC member by the year 2000. During his visit to the Polish capital, Engholm, who was accompanied by SPD deputy and former GDR Foreign Minister Markus Meckel, met with President Lech Walesa, Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Democratic Union Chairman Tadeusz Mazowiecki, and the leaders of three Social Democratic splinter parties.

In connection with the upcoming association of Poland with the EC, the Polish prime minister said in his talks with Engholm that the present state of negotiations showed that in the case of German-Polish joint ventures, the EC would only grant subsidies for the German share in a given project. Engholm promised the prime minister that he would work to achieve equal treatment of the financially weaker partner.

Economic cooperation and investments in Poland were the focus of talks with President Lech Walesa. Engholm stressed the necessity for the Western countries to open their markets to East Europe. He said that the transfer of money is not sufficient; help for self-help is only possible

if Poland is given an opportunity to sell its products in the West. Engholm said that both politicians were also in agreement that bureaucratic obstacles in Poland must be overcome and the property issue resolved to facilitate German investment in Poland. Engholm's Polish interlocutors agreed when he suggested closer cooperation between the Baltic Sea states—there are 10 now—that should lead to establishing a Baltic Sea council that could continue the Hanse tradition and represent the interests of about 60 million people.

Some of his Polish interlocutors, including Foreign Minister Skubiszewski, expressed concern about the wave of xenophobia in Germany. This fact "cannot be denied in any way," said the SPD chairman.

Engholm also met with the eight new Sejm deputies of the German minority. He said that they spoke about their good cooperation with their Polish colleagues. Engholm said that the problems of the past had apparently been overcome.

Being the first high-ranking SPD politician to visit Poland after the change, Engholm did not seek to hold talks with representatives of Polish Social Democracy, the successor to the Polish United Workers Party (PZPR). Commenting on this decision, Engholm said: "We establish contacts with parties with absolutely guaranteed democratic standards and, if possible, a clear past." Answering questions from Polish reporters, he admitted, however, that SPD contacts with Polish communists had been too close in the past. He added, self-critically: "We realized a bit late what was going on in the Polish political scene."

Iliescu, Leaders Set Local Elections 9 Feb

*AU2511181691 Bucharest Radio Romania Network
in Romanian 1800 GMT 25 Nov 91*

[Text] Half an hour ago, consultations ended at Cotroceni Palace between Romania's President Ion Iliescu and representatives of the parliamentary political groupings. The consultations were attended by Prime Minister Theodor Stolojan and the presidents of the two chambers of Parliament, Messrs. Dan Martian and Alexandru Barladeanu.

During the talks, the date for local elections was fixed: 9 February 1992. Several measures were also taken regarding legislative and administrative problems that have to be solved by that date. The participants in the talks also discussed issues pertaining to the organization of the referendum on the constitution on 8 December 1991. President Ion Iliescu briefed those present on the results of his recent visit to France and on future foreign policy actions before the end of the year.

This afternoon, Romania's president promulgated the Law on Local Administration and the Law on the Organization of Local Elections.

Iliescu Discusses Roman, Stolojan, Moldovan Issue

*PM2511160091 Paris LE FIGARO in French
22 Nov 91 p 3*

[Interview with President Ion Iliescu by Vladimir Ivanov in Paris—date not given]

[Text] [Ivanov] Petre Roman resigned as prime minister two months ago. He makes no secret of his intention to play a national political role. What is the state of your relations with him?

[Iliescu] Romania needs to settle politically to some extent. It is true that disagreements exist between Petre Roman and me in the political sphere. However, we cannot talk of conflict.

[Ivanov] In what way does the new government formed by Theodor Stolojan differ from Petre Roman's government?

[Iliescu] The new prime minister is an expert on the economy, which was not true of Petre Roman. As an expert, Theodor Stolojan is more determined to introduce the economic reforms that the population was expecting and demanding.

[Ivanov] When he resigned, Petre Roman directly attacked certain prominent figures, namely Senate Chairman Alexandru Birladeanu and Virgil Magureanu, head of the Romanian Intelligence Service, accusing them of playing the former Securitate's game. Do you intend to take measures against them?

[Iliescu] No, not at all. I do not have the means of doing so. I am head of state, and my prerogatives do not enable me to do that.

[Ivanov] The question of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania recently resurfaced, with the demand for autonomy by the Hungarians in two Romanian counties. What is your position on that?

[Iliescu] That demand sparked off a vehement reply from the government, and even official Hungarian representatives described the people behind this affair as extremists. There can be no question of federalism in Romania. We are a united country, and so is Hungary; we will, therefore, leave things as they are. These tensions will disappear with the development of democracy in the country.

[Ivanov] Meanwhile, is the question of the reunification of Romania and the former Soviet Moldova becoming more urgent?

[Iliescu] You know, for this question to be raised, the Moldovan population would have to express a desire for it to be raised. However, that has not yet been done. In addition, the Moldovan authorities themselves have not raised this subject. We are, therefore, simply stepping up our cultural and economic relations, while not losing sight of the complexity of any change in the borders.

[Ivanov] Does the gradual disappearance of the USSR not favor such an eventuality?

[Iliescu] Yes, but it is still very complicated.

[Ivanov] With regard to the conflict in Yugoslavia, it was noted that the Croats were using Romanian-made munitions. Can you explain that?

[Iliescu] I know nothing about it, but I can assure you that Romania is strictly neutral in that conflict. If Romanian arms or munitions reached either camp it was certainly pure coincidence because Romania exported such things to all countries in the region in the past.

Foreign Ministry Welcomes Hungarian Proposal

*AU2211125291 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG
in Hungarian 21 Nov 91 pp 1, 3*

[Bucharest correspondent Peter Mag report: "Bucharest Shares the Hungarian Desire for Negotiations"]

[Text] "We regard it as a positive development that the Hungarian side has at long last submitted its own proposal for the bilateral agreement to be signed between Romania and Hungary"—Romanian State Secretary Theodor Melescanu declared in Bucharest on 20 November.

At a news conference held in the Romanian Foreign Ministry on 20 November, Theodor Melescanu told domestic and foreign journalists that the Romanian side

had received the Hungarian proposal on Hungarian-Romanian understanding, cooperation, and good-neighborhood agreement from the Hungarian Foreign Ministry on 15 November.

"This is the Hungarian side's answer to the Romanian proposal for a bilateral agreement that I had the pleasure to personally hand over to Hungarian Foreign State Secretary Ferenc Somogyi in Bucharest on 11 May this year"—Theodor Melescanu told the press. He also added the following: "We fully share the Hungarian side's desire to begin negotiations on formulating the text of the aforementioned agreement on any level as soon as possible. Naturally, as in every case of negotiations on such important documents, we will also need a minimum amount of time to study the proposals of our Hungarian colleagues."

Answering a question, Melescanu pointed out that, "The Hungarian proposal does not contain any element connected with the confirmation of the stipulations of the Helsinki Final Act referring to the recognition and inviolability of the existing borders between countries in Europe, probably because the Hungarian side took into consideration the fact that a similar stipulation is included in the Romanian draft agreement that, as I said before, I personally handed over to them on 11 May this year."

In connection with all this, our ambassador in Bucharest, Erno Rudas, told me that a Hungarian proposal for a bilateral agreement was first handed over to President Ion Iliescu by Deputy State Secretary Imre Szokai, together with other proposals for settling and improving Hungarian-Romanian relations, as early as in November 1990 when the Romanian president received Imre Szokai in Bucharest, and Erno Rudas was present at this meeting.

Another bit of information that affects Hungary is that, on 20 November, the Romanian Senate ratified the Romanian-Hungarian Open Skies Agreement signed in the spring of this year, and the Romanian press called this agreement an important factor in bilateral confidence building.

At its meeting on 20 November, the Stolojan government also discussed and adopted a declaration on national minorities. The press here in Bucharest only learned that the document would be made public "after the necessary additional amendments are concluded."

Senator Kiraly on Constitution, Minority Rights

*AU2511202991 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP
in Hungarian 22 Nov 91 pp 1-2*

[Interview with Senator Karoly Kiraly by Bucharest correspondent Tibor Bogdan on 21 November; place not given: "Karoly Kiraly Will Be Excluded From the Senate—Romanian Constitution, With Many Votes Against It"]

[Text] Following a debate that lasted more than 160 days, democratic Romania's democratic Constitution has finally been passed (as the Constitutional Assembly so often liked to stress). Does this adjective really apply to the new basic law? Perhaps this question is best answered by the fact that the main opposition parties—the Democratic Association of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR—in Hungarian, RMDSZ], most of the liberal representatives, the peasant party representatives, and the environmentalists—did not vote on the proposed text.

Nevertheless, the Hungarian community in Romania may suffer far-reaching consequences from the fact that the representatives of other national minorities—which have long-since fallen under the influence of the National Salvation Front—passed the new Constitution, even though it contains numerous terms that are legally restrictive, not only for the Hungarian community but for minorities in general.

Senator Karoly Kiraly, deputy chairman of the Senate, did not attend the parliamentary voting session on 21 November, and despite the internal legislative rule that had been approved a few days earlier, did not even express his vote in a letter. According to this rule, this will lead to his exclusion from the Senate.

Following Kiraly's interesting decision, our correspondent asked the senator for a brief interview. First of all, Kiraly wanted to make the following very clear:

[Kiraly] I think that, during the course of the past 20 years, I have proven that I will not compromise my principles under any kind of moral, political, or material pressure. That was why I resigned from all my posts in 1972, and that is why I now accept my exclusion from the Senate. In other words, history is repeating itself and, if you like, we can draw even more important conclusions from this. I believe that from the point of view of crushing national minority rights, this basic law is even worse than the communist Constitution passed in 1965. In fact, I would go even further: In the history of Romania, there has never been a constitution that reflected such a high level of nationalism and such a lack of tolerance. This Constitution does not mention the rights of national minorities. On the contrary, it gives an exact list of prohibitions.

[Bogdan] Why did you choose not to vote, rather than vote against the text?

[Kiraly] I think that this was a much more emphatic form of refusal. Indeed, the Constitution that has just been approved denies us of our fundamental national minority rights to such an extent that voting against it simply seemed too small a gesture to me.

Even the theses submitted for debate were legally restrictive. The proposals that were passed constituted a further limitation of national minority rights, and the text of the Constitution that was just voted upon actually goes as far as to qualify us as foreign citizens.

For example, at an administrative level, members of a national minority cannot use their mother tongue, even if they form an overwhelming majority in their area or if they constitute the population itself. Without exaggerating, I can state that we might easily end up in a situation where we only dare whisper in our native tongue, or where any minute, signs might appear, saying: "It Is Forbidden To Speak Hungarian!"

The new Constitution does not prohibit education in the mother tongue, nor does it determine the degree to which this education is allowed. It leaves all this up to the law, and we are all familiar with the fickleness of laws. Consequently, this Constitution could leave us at the mercy of any extremist force you care to mention.

[Bogdan] You really think that the situation of Hungarians in Romania is that hopeless?

[Kiraly] No, we should not be too pessimistic. We should not forget that, after all, the main opposition parties voted against the Constitution. The local and parliamentary elections are approaching, so we will have the opportunity to cooperate with Romania's democratic forces. Furthermore, in the end, it is a good thing that this Constitution can be interpreted in several ways. It all depends on who is reading it. For example, a democratic government could guarantee European-style national minority rights through this Constitution. If the country is governed by an extremely nationalist leadership, however, the text that has just been approved could even lead to genocide.

[Bogdan] You have actually excluded yourself from political power in Romania. How do you foresee your continued fight for national minority rights?

[Kiraly] Right now, I think that I will not run in the next elections. Furthermore, I still do not want to participate in the leading body of the UDMR unless it is totally renewed.

[Bogdan] So you choose the path of passive resistance?

[Kiraly] Maybe, with the qualification that I will never be completely passive. It all depends on how the situation develops. It is a fact that the Hungarian community in Romania has suffered an enormous mental shock through the passing of this Constitution. Let us wait until it has overcome this trauma, and then I will be able to make much clearer statements about the future.

PSDR Dissatisfied With New Constitution

AU2511210691 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
1954 GMT 25 Nov 91

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 25/11/1991—The Romanian Social Democratic Party [PSDR] sent a statement to ROMPRES expressing dissatisfaction at the way in which certain provisions in the constitution were formulated, namely those referring to the presidential republic, the attributions of the president of the republic, the principle of powers' separation in state, the appointment

of judges at the Supreme Court of Justice for an eight-year period, the creation of the Constitutional Court which, by taking over some attributions of the Supreme Court of Justice, violates the independence of judiciary power.

If the Romanian people that cannot be informed enough approves of it, the Romanian Social Democratic Party, a convinced advocate of the state of law, will observe it.

PAC Leader Calls Referendum FSN 'Stratagem'

AU2511195491 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
1832 GMT 25 Nov 91

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 25/11/1991—"A contestable constitution is better than no constitution at all," Nicolae Manolescu, the chairman of the Civic Alliance Party [PAC] said in a Monday, November 25 news conference.

Referring to the decision taken by Parliament that a referendum be held on the constitution on December 8, Mr. Manolescu considered "the period to be inadmissibly short." In terms of law, the holding of this referendum is not necessary, as the constitution was elaborated by the Constituent Assembly, the creation of which was established by the May 20, 1990 elections. Politically speaking, this referendum is a stratagem by which the National Salvation Front [FSN] can strengthen its position," added Mr. Manolescu.

Referring to the "insufficiencies of the text" of the constitution passed by Parliament, the chairman of the Civic Alliance Party opined that "it vested too much power in the office of president and in the government," that "the principle is not expressed of the separation of powers in the state, which makes the judicial power subordinated to the other two."

Interior Minister Views Ministry, Police Roles

AU2011081691 Bucharest TINERETUL LIBER
in Romanian 15 Nov 91 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Interior Minister Victor Babiuc by Stefan Mitroi; place and date not given: "I Do Not Feel the Same as the Person Who Was Minister of the Interior Before the Revolution"]

[Text] [Mitroi] Mr. Babiuc, did you ever imagine that one day you would be interior minister?

[Babiuc] No. It would have been a bad dream, and I would have rejected it vehemently if anyone had suggested it before the revolution. Just to show you how I see things in connection with this office, I will tell you a small story. About 10 days ago, I held a meeting with police commanders throughout the country. Among the issues discussed during that meeting was the issue of a certain complex that policemen feel, which I told them I had noticed both from the outside before coming to work here and also from the inside since I have become minister. I reproached them for having this complex and

asked them to get rid of it, because they are not the same as the militia employees before the revolution, just as I cannot be considered the same as Postelnicu [minister of interior in Ceausescu's time]. Thus, as I was saying, had they suggested to me that I take the office of interior minister before the revolution, I am sure I would have refused.

[Mitroi] I think it would have been impossible because, as far as I know, you were not a party member.

[Babiuc] It would have been impossible, but I just mentioned it hypothetically, through the impossible. And I told them: When Clemenceau became interior minister he said: "Je suis le premier flic du pays." [I am the first cop of the country.] I also feel today that I am the first policeman of the country, but I do not have any complex about it, since—and I want to repeat it—I do not feel the same as the person who was the interior minister before the revolution.

[Mitroi] But do you feel the same as the other persons who were interior ministers after the revolution?

[Babiuc] I would not say so. I would not use an equal sign in this respect. However, I am sure that they were honest ministers, who tried to do all they could under the conditions that existed after the revolution.

[Mitroi] I want to believe that, when you say "honest," you do not make any connection with the former Onesti Street.

[Babiuc] No connection whatsoever.

[Mitroi] Since you come from the Ministry of Justice, which works in a spirit of justice, how do you view the current situation within the Ministry of the Interior?

[Babiuc] Up to a point, the Ministry of the Interior reflects the state and the situation of the country as a whole. We are going through a period of transformations in every area. And the Ministry of the Interior, taking into account all the transformations that have occurred since the revolution, continues to change, and I hope that the changes will be for the better. A number of modifications have been made, as you well know, and other modifications are currently under discussion, modifications that we are still thinking about. For example—I will give you only one example—in its organizational structure, the current Ministry of the Interior in fact includes four ministries that have four departments with a vertically organized structure, something that can only hamper cooperation between the ministry departments and the units under its jurisdiction, and it can affect the flexibility of the units that it comprises; such a situation can only hamper the proper operation of the ministry. Because of this, very shortly after I took office, I talked with my closest assistants, and all of them agreed that the organization should be changed to make the Ministry apparatus more flexible and make it operate better.

[Mitroi] One of these structures is the police, a department that a lot of people identify with the Ministry of the Interior, something that is a mistake.

[Babiuc] It is a mistake certainly, but at the same time one cannot forget that the most representative figure in the Ministry of the Interior is the policeman. Thus, the erroneous generalization can obviously be explained, at least as far as the general public is concerned.

[Mitroi] You were proposed as minister of the interior by the ruling party, that is, by the National Salvation Front, if I am not mistaken.

[Babiuc] Yes, that is right.

[Mitroi] Does this mean that—at least that is how I see it—the ministry, through you, has a certain place in the political spectrum?

[Babiuc] You see, certainly each minister is a political person up to a point. However, any state apparatus should deal equally with all citizens of our country, regardless of their political orientation. From this point of view, neither I, at the helm of the ministry, nor the ministry, as such, and its units can differentiate between those they are dealing with on the basis of their political orientation.

[Mitroi] And since we were talking about the police, for some time now we have heard about a demilitarization of the police. What can you tell us about it?

[Babiuc] Yes, there is talk about this subject. I can tell you that I talked about it myself before I joined the ministry and also since I have been here. However, the problem is quite complicated, but it is not insolvable. I think it is insolvable only for a very short period of time. I am talking about a period not longer than a few years. However, it should be solved because the police is a civilian institution in all civilized countries and in all democratic countries. The only military personnel are the gendarmes. This is something that has to happen in our country as well. It is an operation that I have asked my assistants to think over, in order to achieve it without convulsions at a time that is found to be the most appropriate. However, we are afraid that during the short mandate of this government—a very short term, indeed—I will not have enough time to take this measure that I think is essential to give the police its proper status. The problem has several aspects. We are not just talking about wearing or not wearing military uniforms; it involves a problem of wages and the status of the policeman. Thus, there are many issues one has to take into account, and when they become concrete, sufficiently clear concepts will be reached and the clear status of the policeman will be ensured.

[Mitroi] As a rule, when someone comes from the outside to be head of a structure, that is, a government structure, in this case the Ministry of the Interior, the way you came to be head of this ministry, there is

unspoken opposition from those on the inside against the newcomer. Have you noticed anything like that?

[Babiuc] I do not want to accuse anybody without proof. I do not think that one can really talk about such an opposition against me.

[Mitroi] I do not necessarily mean it in a pejorative sense.

[Babiuc] Of course not. I understand your question very well, and I know it from other areas or in connection with other people. However, as far as the number of people I have dealt with is concerned, because obviously I dealt with a relatively small number of people from the inside or the outside of the ministry, I believe that I can state that one cannot question the good intentions that one witnesses in the cooperation with the new minister.

[Mitroi] Since I am a journalist, I would like to ask you: If the ministry is going to be criticized, and you are going to be criticized together with it, something that I am sure will happen from time to time, will you be very upset?

[Babiuc] I have not had a reason to feel upset. After all, when he accepts a position at the head of an institution, and especially of such an important and controversial institution as the Ministry of the Interior, a person should also be prepared for the hypothetical situation that he will be criticized. It is important that the criticism should come at the right moment and in a civilized manner, not in an uncivilized manner such as unfortunately happens in case of certain newspapers. I am not talking about your paper, not because you are present, but in general, your paper is more civilized.

[Mitroi] Thank you for your remark. Here is a question that I asked your predecessor, Mr. Doru Viorel Ursu, exactly in this building: The Ministry of the Interior is in conflict mostly with people who violate the law. Certainly you, as a physical person, are exposed to certain danger, and not only you, but your entire family, too. Have any measures been taken in this respect?

[Babiuc] This is something that has made me uncomfortable ever since I started working here. When I went to the office at the Ministry of Justice, I was accompanied by people whom, through a little trick, I escaped in about a month, and I started moving around like any ordinary citizen in Bucharest, either in the ministry's car or in my private car, and I was not accompanied by anybody. However, I never felt that I was in danger. I do not feel that I am in danger here either. Nevertheless, I must admit that the people in the ministry have not let me move around alone. They take me home and back, as far as I know there is nothing else they do. I will find out soon if they have taken other precautions too.

[Mitroi] My question was referring mostly to your family.

[Babiuc] No, nothing has been done in this direction.

[Mitroi] Let us pray to God that nothing happens.

[Babiuc] Let us hope indeed!

[Mitroi] Since you are going to be at the head of the ministry for a short period, I believe our discussion should also be short. Hence, in conclusion, I would like to ask you what would you like to hear about yourself when you are no longer interior minister?

[Babiuc] It is a subject I have not thought about so far. I could give you an answer that I might not be pleased with or agree with in a month's time or later. However, I would like to hear some things that I have just thought about. First, I would like to hear that I made a small contribution to the democratization of this ministry and to organizing it into something that a Ministry of Interior is supposed to be in a democratic country. I would also like to hear that I also contributed to the establishment of good habits that should exist in a police department, that is, to make corruption disappear as much as possible, increase cooperation and collaboration between departments and units that are under the ministry's jurisdiction, and promote the good behavior that should exist in relations between the police and citizens. I would also like to hear that I succeeded in modernizing this ministry to a certain extent, that maybe I succeeded in making the local administration one of the Interior Ministry's concerns, that I succeeded in introducing civilians into the ministry, meaning that I succeeded in demilitarizing the police.... Probably I would like to hear other things as well, but these are the first things that come to mind at the moment. And something else—I would like to be able to say in the end that the Romanian Police got rid of a certain complex that it had after the revolution, a complex that the police has so far not succeeded in getting rid of.

[Mitroi] I must apologize because my last question was not the last one after all. Have you taken any punitive measures since you came to this ministry?

[Babiuc] I have not. However, I have asked for several issues to be clarified by the investigation bodies in connection with certain actions that I believe were infractions that cannot be left unpunished.

[Mitroi] Thank you, and I wish you success in fulfilling all the positive ideas with which you came to work at the helm of this difficult ministry.

Egypt, Others To Pay Debts With Consumer Goods

*AU2511155191 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
1355 GMT 25 Nov 91*

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 25/11/1991—As a result of the unfolding of the contracts for the retrieval of the outstanding debts from Egypt, consumer goods are to enter the Romanian market in December. Among them—the 7,500 refrigerators which are in ever higher demand in Romania, 40 A [amperes] and 50 A accumulators, 140 tons of sweets, 300 tons of jams and fruit in syrup. Likewise, 1,500 tons of rice are to arrive from

Pakistan on account of money owed by that country and goods worth 1.4 million dollars from the Philippines.

Market To Be 'Flooded' With Goods at Holidays

AU2511153091 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
1352 GMT 25 Nov 91

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 25/11/1991—According to experts in the Trade and Tourism Ministry, thanks to economic agents the Romanian market will be flooded with imported goods on the eve of winter holidays: 15 thousand tons of lemons, 112,000 tons of oranges, 6,100 tons of bananas, 8,500 tons of pepper, 30,000 tons of coffee, 3,300 tons of instant coffee, 750 tons of powder cocoa, 3,500 tons of olives, 1,215 tons of resins, 190 tons of rice, 620 tons of butter and margarine, 6,400 tons of chocolate, 1,000 tons of candies, 8,500 tons of dry yeast, 85 tons of powder milk, adding to which are other products of current necessity.

As for the potato supply, the situation is not that dramatic. To cover the 300,000-ton deficit announced by the Agriculture Ministry the Department of Home Trade concluded a contract with Turkey for 60,000 tons. Another 170,000 tons are to be brought to this country as aid from the common market, while the rest will be imported by economic agents who have already applied for licenses covering one million tons.

The situation improved with sugar and will be solved as soon as 7,000 tons arrive in the country as aid from Italy. As for edible oil, the offer of the Romanian industry is far smaller than the demand but imports will be made from France and aid will be brought in from Italy. There is still a problem with cheese and butter but hopefully these products will be plentiful on the Romanian market on the eve of the winter holidays thanks to the 30-billion-lire aid offered by Italy to Romania (covering cheese, olive oil and oranges).

ROMANIA LIBERA Protests Mistreatment

AU2511131391 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA
in Romanian 23-24 Nov 91 p 1

[Steering Committee of the ROMANIA LIBERA Newspaper Note: "For the Public's Attention"]

[Text] It no secret to anyone anymore that the attitude of ROMANIA LIBERA disturbs those in power. By now we have become used to the fact that the president considers us "extremists," that we are charged with all kinds of imaginary crimes and are connected with all kinds of foreign organizations. We have understood that this is the way that those in power consider appropriate to defend themselves against the accusations directed against them. For the past two years, we have also gotten accustomed to threats. We have gotten accustomed to insults as well. We have been hurt in the ugliest possible manner. Our families have not come off any more easily either. Since last June, we have known that we would also be beaten up. At that time, our colleagues, with no other fault than that of working for a newspaper that denounces the continuation of communist practices, were attacked, savagely beaten up, and injured, and they have been ever since.

Those who according to the law have the duty to defend us, namely the police, have not spared us from their clubs and threats either. Nevertheless, we were hoping that there is a limit and that those in power would get used to the idea that is somehow new for them, that is, that there could be other opinions apart from their own, and there can be independent journalists who have embarked on the path of truth that, this time, is not the truth imposed by those in power but the one that we are looking for, together with the tormented and frustrated people of this nation. Unfortunately, we were terribly wrong. We continue to be beaten up, watched, and threatened. Witnessing this new proof of aggression, we inform the public that we are determined to turn to all institutions at home and abroad that can help us carry out our profession in safety. We ask for nothing more nor less. There is no way back for us. The ROMANIA LIBERA newspaper will stay ONLY an independent paper until those in power physically destroy all of us.

[Signed] The Steering Committee of the ROMANIA LIBERA newspaper

International

Slovenia, Lithuania Establish Diplomatic Ties

LD2311124791 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service
in Serbo-Croatian 1724 GMT 22 Nov 91

[Text] Ljubljana, 22 Nov (TANJUG)—Lithuania and Slovenia today established diplomatic relations following the exchange of notes by the foreign affairs ministers, the Slovenian Foreign Ministry information service revealed.

An official statement says that this was done on the basis of a memorandum signed on 3 September in Lithuania by Dimitrij Rupel and Algirdas Saudargas, the foreign ministers of the two republics.

Slovenia's Peterle Views War, Ties With Hungary

AU2511114491 Budapest MAI NAP in Hungarian
21 Nov 91 p 2

[Interview with Slovenian Prime Minister Lojze Peterle by Ujvideki in Budapest on 20 November: "International Recognition in December Already"]

[Text] Lojze Peterle visited Budapest on 20 November. He participated in a conference on central Europe's economic transformation, and he was received by Prime Minister Jozsef Antall.

[Ujvideki] You are asking for Slovenia's international recognition; when do you think this will happen?

[Peterle] Soon—I think it will happen as early as at the beginning of December.

[Ujvideki] In the meantime, the war is continuing in Yugoslavia. Are you not afraid that the war might spread to Slovenia?

[Peterle] No, because the federal Army has had bad experiences in our republic. Nevertheless, we have prepared ourselves for the crushing of a possible aggression.

[Ujvideki] An increasing number of people are calling for peace in Serbia. How can Slovenia help the peace movement?

[Peterle] Given that all our links with the eastern part of the country have been broken, it is difficult for us to help. We support the sending of United Nations peace-keeping forces to Yugoslavia, but where should they be stationed? If they were stationed on the front, this would mean that Europe recognizes Greater Serbia.

[Ujvideki] What are relations like between Slovenia and Hungary?

[Peterle] On a political level, they are excellent. As for the economic level, we have every possibility of developing good relations. I think it is important for our two

countries to exchange experiences. This would help both our countries in finding a more developed society after socialism.

Kosovo League Chairman Meets Austrian Ambassador

AU2211134091 Tirana ATA in English 1025 GMT
22 Nov 91

[Text] Tirana, November 22 (ATA)—As the Information Center of the Democratic League of Kosovo reports, Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, chairman of the Democratic League received on November 21 in Pristina the ambassador of Austria in Belgrade, Dr. Walther Siegel and thanked for the support Austria has given and is giving to the just solution of the question of Kosovo. Dr. Rugova forwarded three known options of the Albanian political parties for the solution of the question of Kosovo and the Albanians in Yugoslavia and the Balkans.

Representatives of the other Albanian parties and associations in Kosovo, were present at this meeting, briefed the Austrian ambassador on the grave situation in Kosovo, the continuous violence and terror the Serb power is exerting there.

The Austrian ambassador took interest especially in the referendum organized in Kosovo, where the majority of population was for the Republic of Kosovo as a sovereign and independent state. He voiced his worry over the grave situation of the Albanians in Kosovo and stressed the continuous commitment of the Austrian Government for the solution of the question of Kosovo, supporting the legitimate rights of the Albanian people.

Dr. Ibrahim Rugova met also these days with the Swedish ambassador in Belgrade.

Kosovo Representative Holds Talks

LD2311123791 Belgrade TANJUG in English
0338 GMT 23 Nov 91

[Text] Pristina, November 22 (TANJUG)—International interference with political problems in the Province of Kosovo and Metohija, southern part of Yugoslavia's Republic of Serbia, would bring about conflicts fraught with unforeseeable consequences, Momcilo Trajkovic, chairman of Serbia's parliament Committee for Kosovo and Metohija, cautioned here today.

Austria's ambassador, Walther Siegel, proposed Friday [22 November] that the settling of political problems in the Province of Kosovo and Metohija, southern Serbia, be internationalized.

In a talk with Siegel, Momcilo Trajkovic, the committee chairman, energetically rejected such a suggestion, the provincial Secretariat for Information pointed out in an announcement. The problem of Kosovo and Metohija is, above all, an internal matter for the Republic of Serbia, Trajkovic stressed. The talk also dealt with the position

of ethnic Albanians, a national minority in Yugoslavia, the announcement emphasized.

Trajkovic voiced his discontentment with efforts for turning the Albanian national minority into a constitutive people in Yugoslavia. This is an attempt at bringing Yugoslavia's ethnic Albanians at the back door into international relations as a political subject.

Siegel met Thursday [21 November] with representatives for political parties rallying ethnic Albanians.

The president of Kosovo's Democratic Union, Ibrahim Rugova, thanked the ambassador for Austria's support in solving the question of Kosovo and the problem of ethnic Albanians, the communique from the meeting pointed out. Rugova sent words of gratitude apart to Austria's humanitarian organizations for, he said, care taken about the fate of ethnic Albanian soldiers who, after deserting the Yugoslav Army, found shelter in Austria.

Rugova asked from Siegel that the question of Kosovo and the problem of ethnic Albanians be internationalized, says a communique forwarded to the Albanian-language newspaper BUJKU only.

Serbian Party Sends Letter to French Ambassador

*LD2311214191 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1926 GMT 23 Nov 91*

[Text] Belgrade, Nov 23 (TANJUG)—The Serbian National Renewal (SNO) Party, an opposition party in the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia, today sent an open letter to French Ambassador in Belgrade Michel Chatelais in the hope that he will "raise his voice in the protection of not only the persecuted Serbian people who have lived in the regions of Slavonia, Baranja, Western Srem and the Knin Krajina for centuries, but also the centuries-old friendship between the French and the Serbian peoples."

The letter says that Ambassador Chatelais could have seen "on television, if not personally on the spot... the endless columns of displaced Serbian people, Serbs' massacred bodies, their burned and demolished homes," and how the "poorly and inobjectively informed French reporters are creating an untrue and extremely distorted picture of Serbia and the Serbian people."

"These scenes are reminiscent of columns of refugees fleeing during the First and Second World Wars before persecution by Austro-Hungarian and German forces...when France was Serbia's ally and powerful protector," the letter says.

The SNO says that now, however, "France is unfortunately ceding the lead and power in Europe to Germany."

Federal

Presidency Statement on Cease-Fire Violations

*LD2511194391 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service
in Serbo-Croatian 1817 GMT 25 Nov 91*

["SFRY Presidency Statement"—TANJUG headline]

[Text] Belgrade, 25 Nov (TANJUG)—The SFRY Presidency held a session in Belgrade today (presided over by Vice President Branko Kostic), and also attended by the SFRY Assembly president, the federal secretaries for national defence and internal affairs and the deputy federal secretary for foreign affairs.

At the beginning of the session representatives of adequate state departments informed the SFRY Presidency about the current political and security situation in the country. It was stressed that the situation is still extremely difficult because armed formations of the Republic of Croatia do not observe obligations set out in the cease-fire agreements, and have not lifted a blockade of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) barracks and facilities in the Republic of Croatia. It was stressed that the situation is being exacerbated by an increasing number of refugees from threatened areas.

It was also stressed that the war-mongering policy of the Republic of Croatia further attempts to spread armed conflicts outside the Republic of Croatia, particularly to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Highlighting the importance of preventing such intentions, the SFRY Presidency supports the efforts of the government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and, in this connection, its protest sent to the government of the Republic of Croatia.

Federal Secretary for National Defence Veljko Kadijevic informed the SFRY Presidency about talks and a cease-fire agreement in the Republic of Croatia, concluded in Geneva on 23 November. The SFRY Presidency endorsed this report, concluding that the Geneva agreement is in line with decisions and efforts of the SFRY Presidency to put an end to the conflict and to find a peaceful solution to the Yugoslav state and political crisis. The Presidency also stressed that the JNA will consistently observe the cease-fire, which should also be done by armed formations of the Republic of Croatia. They should also lift a blockade of JNA barracks and facilities in Croatia.

The SFRY Presidency paid tribute to all volunteer units and individuals who, together with the JNA, made a large contribution to the struggle against Nazi-fascism and its pogrom policy against the Serbian population in Croatia. At the same time the SFRY Presidency points out that all units and volunteer detachments must strictly observe orders from relevant JNA commands. The SFRY Presidency firmly reiterates its determination to provide physical protection to the imperilled Serbian population in Croatia, and to ensure that the blockade is lifted from all barracks and military facilities on the territory of the Republic of Croatia.

The SFRY Presidency is of the view that the two tasks could be executed in a peaceful way on the basis of the Geneva agreement, and rightly expects the Croatian leadership for once to act in line with the obligations it has taken upon itself. In order to ensure that the Geneva agreement is strictly observed the SFRY Presidency has, for its part, authorized the JNA to take all necessary measures against those units, armed detachments and individuals who fail to obey orders from their relevant commands.

The SFRY Presidency endorsed a report on Borisav Jovic's working visit to the PRC on 23 November. The SFRY Presidency expresses thanks for the understanding shown by the Chinese side for Yugoslavia's internal difficulties, and for its readiness to help resolve them through constructive involvement.

Kostic: Serbs, Croats Cannot Live Together

*LD2511135391 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1240 GMT 25 Nov 91*

[Text] Belgrade, Nov 25 (TANJUG)—"Scenes from the battlefields show" that "fascism is in sight in Croatia," member of the Yugoslav Presidency from the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina Jugoslav Kostic said. He stressed that "after everything, it would be absolutely unrealistic to expect that the Serbs and Croats can live together in one state."

In an interview published by the Belgrade daily POLITIKA EKSPRES today Kostic said he personally believes that a U.N. peacekeeping force should be sent to regions in the Yugoslav Republic of Croatia where Serbs are the majority population, "in order to protect the Serbian people."

"This would create territories where the Serbian people would be completely protected," he noted.

"In several years these people should be enabled, again under international supervision, to decide freely in which state they want to live," Kostic explained.

He maintains that the U.N. and the entire world public want a lasting peace in Yugoslavia, because large-scale clashes in the country could be very dangerous for the Balkans, Europe and the world.

Emphasizing that the Yugoslav crisis should be settled by negotiations, Kostic argued that this should be done "through the procedure of forming a new Yugoslavia, from the republics and peoples who really want it."

"All national minorities in this new Yugoslavia would have the rights which the national minorities enjoy under all international conventions in the most developed, democratic and civilized countries," Kostic said.

He pointed out that the "European Community has proved less than objective in dealing with the Yugoslav crisis" and "did not treat all proposals equally."

Commenting on the announcements by some countries that they would soon recognize the independence of Slovenia and Croatia, Kostic warned that such an act "would question the integrity of Yugoslavia and its internationally recognized borders."

General Negovanovic on Army's Presence in Macedonia

*AU2511173491 Belgrade RTV Sat TV
in Serbo-Croatian 2035 GMT 24 Nov 91*

[Interview with Lieutenant General Marko Negovanovic, assistant federal secretary for national defense, by an unidentified correspondent; place and date not given—live or recorded; monitored in progress]

[Excerpt] ...[passage omitted] [Correspondent] General, will the Yugoslav People's Army, as rumored, pull out of the territory of Macedonia?

[Negovanovic] According to the latest acts, which were adopted by the Assembly of Macedonia through the adoption of the constitution, the constitutional provisions on national defense envisage that the Republic of Macedonia has its Army and that the Army of the Republic of Macedonia essentially consists of the Territorial Defense of Macedonia. When this constitutional provision is taken into account, and when one bears in mind the previous moves that have suspended recruitment and the obligation to serve in the reserve units of the Army, then it is quite clear that with these acts the Republic of Macedonia has directly attacked the unity of the defense system and the unity of the Yugoslav People's Army.

The deployment of the Yugoslav People's Army in Macedonia, which so far, as can be seen—at least as far as the provisions that refer to national defense and the Yugoslav People's Army—means to a great extent the emulation of some scenarios that were realized in Slovenia, is not dangerous for the Yugoslav People's Army at present. [sentence as heard]

The Yugoslav People's Army is performing its functions in the Republic of Macedonia normally. Of course, our behavior will depend on the behavior of the other side.

[Correspondent] Do you have any information that about 3,000 armed members of the VMRO [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization] are currently being trained in a camp on a mountain in Macedonia?

[Negovanovic] This was reported in the media. I do not have any confirmation that this information is correct. However, one thing is certain. The arming of the so-called paramilitary organizations and party armies is taking place in Macedonia, because the extent to which interethnic relations have become aggravated has reached the level of militarization, and this militarization is now being expressed through the arming of certain party formations.

I think that it is perfectly clear where this is leading when one bears in mind what happened in Croatia, because Macedonia is also a multiethnic country. [passage omitted]

Chambers Overcome Obstacles to Working Practices

LD2311124391 Belgrade TANJUG in English
0737 GMT 23 Nov 91

[By Miodrag Dundjerovic]

[Text] Belgrade, November 23 (TANJUG)—Both chambers of the Yugoslav parliament have found an acceptable formula for overcoming the months-long blockade of their work following the departure of delegates from the Yugoslav Republics of Slovenia and Croatia.

The two republics last summer unilaterally adopted decisions on independence and sovereignty which are not recognized by the federal authorities.

At a session last Thursday [21 November], the Federal Chamber decided it could work if the majority of remaining delegates were present. An exception are sessions devoted to war and peace, national equality and human rights. Decisions on these questions are to be adopted by 10 votes more than the new quorum.

The Federal Chamber used to have 220 and now has 160 delegates (each republic is represented by 30 delegates and the provinces by 20 delegates each).

Essentially, there are no major changes in the decision-making in the Federal Chamber and the Chamber of Republics and Provinces. Decisions in the Federal Chamber are still passed the majority, while the principle of consensus still applies in the Chamber of Republics and Provinces, which means that each federal unit has the right of veto.

A novelty is that decisions are adopted by a majority of delegates present at the session, while emergency measures are adopted by a two-thirds majority.

It is, however, unlikely that there will be no friction in the Federal Assembly in future since national divisions are so deep that even delegates from the same republic cannot agree on most issues.

After all hurdles are cleared, the friction and divisions can be overcome, but the question is how and to what degree will decisions and regulations adopted by the Federal Assembly be respected.

Another question is how to continue work on the document on the future order in the Yugoslav community and how to ensure agreement from all sides concerning preparations for the federal parliamentary elections, which are long overdue.

Its success in settling these matters will determine whether the Federal Assembly will finally muster up

enough strength to give its contribution to the ending of the war and the establishment of lasting peace in the country.

Slovenia

Kucan Comments on Republic's Recognition

AU2611113391 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES
in Czech 22 Nov 91 pp 1, 9

[Interview with Slovene President Milan Kucan by Viliam Buchert on 20 November; place not given: "Unified Yugoslavia Is Not a Factor of Stability"]

[Text] At the conclusion of his visit to Czechoslovakia on 20 November, Slovene Republic President Milan Kucan granted an interview to MLADA FRONTA DNES and Slovak Radio.

[Buchert] Have all the possibilities of solving the crisis, the Croatian crisis in particular, been exhausted? Do you believe that there is still hope that the desperate situation can be overcome?

[Kucan] I am of the opinion that there still are possibilities of solving the crisis. However, we must look at the Yugoslav problems with new eyes—without the prejudice of old concepts. Europe is gradually discarding the still prevailing opinion that a unified Yugoslavia is a factor of stability in the Balkans. The world has changed and so has Yugoslavia. The current events in the former Yugoslavia are not Yugoslavia's internal affair at all. This is not a civil war or ethnic unrest—this is a real war between two countries and nations. The unresolved status of the ethnic Serbian minority in Croatia is the reason for the war. As soon as the world learns what the true nature of this war is, it will be possible to find an efficient solution.

[Buchert] Do you sometimes believe that West Europe does not understand you and that it has sacrificed you?

[Kucan] No, I do not. I believe that Europe wants a genuine solution to this problem, but it took Europe a long time to begin to roughly understand the problem. Now Europe realizes that this war could become a European war, too. By recognizing the facts about Yugoslavia, Europe has begun solving the crisis.

[Buchert] A continent without borders is a frequently discussed concept in Europe. How do you view this idea?

[Kucan] This idea is Europe's future and we support it very much. However, in order to have a continent without borders it is necessary, in the first place, to confirm its borders. Europe did confirm this in Helsinki and this also applies to the former Yugoslav federation.

[Buchert] Do you believe that the date of the recognition of your country before the year's end is realistic—no matter what the result of The Hague conference is?

[Kucan] This date was actually fixed by the present chairman of the European Twelve, Hans van den Broek. An EC meeting discussed this and the deadline will expire on 9 December. At that moment European countries will have to decide whether to recognize in Slovenia's case what they have recognized in other cases.

[Buchert] Does Croatia and its problems obstruct your road to Europe?

[Kucan] Croatia does not obstruct us, but the idea that Croatia and Slovenia are the same country does. These are two different countries and each of them must meet the conditions for their recognition separately.

[Buchert] Slovenia and you, yourself, have undergone a democratization process in recent years. Are you afraid that militant forces could endanger this process in your country if the Balkan conflict continues?

[Kucan] It can be said, in every case, that the crisis in the Yugoslav republics is leading to economic problems and this is why it cannot be ruled out that, for example, populist politicians could come to power.

[Buchert] The possibility of sending peacekeeping troops to crisis regions in Yugoslavia has been discussed recently. Do you believe this would help solve the crisis?

[Kucan] Yugoslavia does not function as a state, and there is no one who could invite the troops. However, in my opinion, the presence of the troops in the battle areas would be welcome. It would make sense to invite these troops to Croatia when the Yugoslav Army withdraws. This would make it possible to start solving the problem and it would clearly show that the aggressor can achieve nothing by aggression and that borders cannot be forcefully violated.

[Buchert] Are you afraid of economic catastrophe if Slovenia is not recognized shortly?

[Kucan] This is what we are very afraid of, and this is why we demand recognition. It is just because of economic reasons that this issue has become a problem of existence. Slovenia has done everything in order for the process of recognition to be carried out according to all European legal criteria. This is why we have recognized all our minorities' rights as required by Europe. Above all, we want to continue the peace conference and solve the problem at the negotiating table.

Government Will Initiate Vote of Confidence

AU2511163091 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 25 Nov 91

[Excerpts] On the domestic political scene, we awaited with special interest today's news conference by the representatives of the Slovene Government. Lojze Peterle, president of the Slovene Executive Council, informed us that the government has decided to initiate the procedure for holding the vote of confidence, because it needs clear demonstration of the trust of the

parliament in light of the current situation. [passage omitted] Vesna Burnik has more details:

[Begin Burnik recording] In his introduction, Lojze Peterle stated that the government at its Thursday [21 November] session decided to initiate the procedure for holding the vote of confidence by itself. In adopting this decision, the government deviated from Article 400 of the Constitution. Their demand follows the argument that the Assembly has been preventing the government from implementing its policies. With continuous questioning [interpelacija] and criticism, the Assembly is putting the government into an impossible position. Namely, the government is still the Executive Council of the Slovene Assembly and not a government in a parliamentary sense. Lojze Peterle stressed that the initiative by the Socialist Party to hold vote of no confidence in the government—which later was not carried out—has created an unstable situation. The initiative adopted by the Liberal-Democratic Party also provoked negative reactions abroad. The pressures on the government are hurting its overall image and influencing the attitude of foreign countries toward Slovene independence. For this reason, the government needs a clear demonstration of trust from the parliament. When asked what new qualities the government expects if the vote of confidence is passed, Peterle answered that the government will continue working on the basis of the current policies, because a government reshuffle is not possible without a new constitution. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Croatia

Tudjman Calls For Urgent Dispatch of UN Troops

AU2611075791 Paris AFP in English 0146 GMT 26 Nov 91

[Text] Zagreb, Yugoslavia, Nov 26 (AFP)—Croatian President Franjo Tudjman called on Monday [25 November] for the urgent dispatch of United Nations peacekeeping forces to halt the spread of war in his republic.

His appeal, in an interview with AFP, came as the U.N. Security Council held an informal meeting in New York following a request by France and Germany for an emergency Security Council session.

"I would like the (U.N. troops) to arrive in one week, or two weeks at the latest, to stop this war," he said. U.N. diplomatic sources in New York said the Security Council would soon adopt a provisional resolution aimed at convincing the warring Yugoslav parties to hold their fire to allow the deployment of U.N. troops. Tudjman said he believed 10,000 troops "would be sufficient." "What is essential is that French President Francois Mitterrand, U.S. President George Bush and other heads of state make Serbia understand that it cannot continue to act with impunity," he told AFP.

Politicians Criticize Tudjman Address

LD2511192791 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1802 GMT 25 Nov 91

[Text] Zagreb, Nov 25 (TANJUG)—Vice President of the Croatian Party of Rights (HSP) Ante Djapic stated today that President of the Yugoslav Republic of Croatia Franjo Tudjman's address to the nation last night was "an attempt at breaking Croatia's national unity."

Tudjman was doing all to shift to the HSP his responsibility for his own incapacity and incorrectness, said HSP Vice President Djapic. The president of this extreme rightist party, Dobroslov Paraga, was arrested by Croatian police on Friday [22 November].

Djapic denied that the HSP's armed wing "HOS" was an extreme paramilitary and fascist formation. He said the HOS was made up of volunteers within the Croatian Interior Ministry (MUP) and the Croatian National Guard.

HSP officials announced public protests to be held over the arrest of Paraga who has been on a hunger strike in a Zagreb jail. They said the protest meetings would be held in Split today, in Rijeka tomorrow and one more in Zagreb on Wednesday [27 November].

Kresimir Dzeba, vice president of the Croatian National Party spoke at a press conference about the "mistakes and short-sighted acts by the authorities" and asserted that "the rule of law was not applied" in Croatia, while the "characters of totalitarian power were getting stronger."

Dzeba criticized both an attempt "to cast the blame onto others because of the current situation" in Croatia and the "struggle to preserve power."

Mika Tripalo, member of the same party's caucus, assessed as unacceptable yesterday's speech by President Tudjman, stressing that he dealt with "qualifying the acts by individuals" instead of ceding such a job to the competent organs.

Separovic Interviewed on Crisis, CSFR Ties

Part One

LD2511234691 Prague Ceskoslovensky Rozhlas
Radio Network in Czech 1100 GMT 25 Nov 91

[First of two installments of interview with Croatian Foreign Minister Zvonimir Separovic by editor Jitka Obzinova on 24 November; place not given; from the "Echoes of the Day" program—recorded; Separovic in Serbo-Croatian fading into Czech translation]

[Text] [Obzinova] Mr. Minister, with what expectations did you arrive in Prague and to what extent were these expectations met in talks with our representatives?

[Separovic] I came here with the hope that I would be received as a friend from a country which has traditionally had good relations, historical and other, with the Czech-land and Slovakia. My expectations have been fulfilled. In the talks, we analyzed in detail bilateral relations, which have always been possible, but were not utilized sufficiently. Also now, under the conditions of war, it is necessary to think of them, although the issues of war and peace in Croatia are much more important. In this matter, we received considerable support from your side. President Havel has signed the Krakow declaration and also the appeal in support of saving Dubrovnik, which he signed with Slovenian President Kucan. In this way, he also supported the option of sending peace-keeping forces to Croatia.

Czechoslovakia also provides us with considerable help in other ways. Your country is also important for us as a partner in international relations. We have expected and continue to expect Czechoslovakia to play an important role in recognizing Croatia and Slovenia as independent international subjects. Therefore, we were slightly surprised at the beginning, and maybe we also did not understand it correctly, that Czechoslovakia would be prepared to recognize Slovenia but not Croatia. If it did happen, we really would be sorry. Our delegation submitted an interpellation, in this sense.

It would be equally unpleasant for us if Czechoslovakia waited for a long time to recognize us, because we think that conditions now are being created for the possibility of recognizing Croatia. We know that it would not be easy for Czechoslovakia to be the first one to do this and to be on its own in this action. This would actually not be good, either for Czechoslovakia or for our independence. However, we expect Czechoslovakia to take part with that group of countries which will recognize the independence of Croatia and Slovenia at the same time.

[Obzinova] There are many Croatian refugees from Slavonia in Czechoslovakia at the moment. Do you expect that they will be able to go back to this area in a short time?

[Separovic] First, I have to say that I am happy and very grateful that friendly Czechoslovakia has received people who are in danger. Among them are people of Czech and Slovak origin and also other people from Croatia, regardless of their origin. Can we express our thanks to Czechoslovakia for helping our refugees and for helping us in other necessary ways?

It is difficult to say now what the chances are for the return of the refugees. We might say what we would wish for this, but reality is quite different. I think that, if the process of sending peacekeeping forces starts, if the situation can be stabilized, and if the withdrawal of the federal Army from Croatia is achieved along with the emplacement of peacekeeping forces on the border and in crisis-ridden areas, their return will become possible. However, because we cannot envisage this possibility

until the end of this year, it would be suitable to recognize Croatia and in this way give it security and stability.

It is difficult to make predictions. There is a desire for these people to go back home. We will do our utmost, but we will be unable to do anything without international aid. And Czechoslovakia too can help this with its own means and also with its participation in international organizations. It is necessary to do the utmost to make it possible for people who have been thrown out to come back.

Part Two

LD2611001891 Prague Ceskoslovensky Rozhlas
Radio Network in Czech 1513 GMT 25 Nov 91

[Second of two installments of interview with Croatian Foreign Minister Zvonimir Separovic by editor Jitka Obzinova on 24 November; place not given—recorded; Separovic in Serbo-Croatian fading into Czech translation]

[Text] [Obzinova] After the signing of the cease-fire in Geneva on Saturday [23 November], to what degree will Croatia be able to observe this cease-fire, especially with regard to the antigovernment units HOS [armed wing of the Croatian Party of Rights].

[Separovic] Croatia wants to observe the cease-fire agreement. Let us hope that we will succeed on this occasion, although the news coming from Zagreb says that the town of Osijek, the metropolis of Slavonia is being destroyed. I can say that we are quite unhappy over this.

And now about the issue of the HOS: It is not an authoritative force. Moreover, it has been left without a leader now, because the party to which HOS belongs was headed by a person who maintained the Ustasha fascist ideals of Greater Croatia spreading right up to Belgrade, the river Drina, and Boka Kotorska. This man was detained. The point was that his conduct not only irritated the other side and kept creating an impression that Croatia's conduct was undemocratic, but there was also a suspicion that Paraga was active against the state. But this suspicion still has to be confirmed. If it is not confirmed, he will be freed, for we are a law-governed state after all.

But the HOS units must be disbanded, because the law bans the forming of troops and militias by the parties. We are aware that militias of this kind caused hell in Lebanon, for example. The HOS harbors radical fascist ideals, and they will therefore be neutralized or attached to regular units and their commanders will be politically neutralized.

[Obzinova] How great are the current disputes between the official representatives and the opposition from the viewpoint of solving the situation?

[Separovic] Differences do exist, of course, although I should say that I am a member of the coalition government and the coalition comprises all parties starting from the left, via the strong center and right up to the right, plus of course the still-dominating ruling party, which won the elections with a majority of votes.

The opposition is expressing the typical viewpoint of the opposition. It is critical, impatient, it would like to see everything take place quicker, it is always convinced of its ability to achieve more than the ruling party, more than the ruling team. We are acting as best as we can, so that all viewpoints, but particularly the viewpoints of the Government, which is a war cabinet at this moment, can be given a chance of being expressed. And these viewpoints are formulated accordingly. And in this respect, a part of the opposition is more inclined towards the right, which is more radical than we are, which criticizes our talks in The Hague and our talks about solving the conflict in a peaceful way. The right regards the war as the only solution. It disagrees with our stopping the blockade of federal barracks, it forces us to do everything to effect the return of the seized territory to us. But it is forgetting that our options are very restricted, that we do not have a sufficient amount of weapons.

[Obzinova] Cannot Croatia consider giving up a certain part of Slavonia in exchange for Serbian recognition of Croatia?

[Separovic] Serbs, according to our Constitution, have all the rights. We are now preparing a law on rights for national minorities. However, we are absolutely not willing to discuss any changes in borders. Europe says, and this is a world legal point of view, that borders cannot be changed by force. Europe is to guarantee both internal and external borders. All this strengthens our position. The issue remains, however, how we will implement rights for minorities. In other words, we will not allow any territorial concessions, and this is not even in a case when this should mean that our independence would not be recognized. It is necessary to observe the no-force-in-politics principle, because political aims cannot be asserted by force, above all not those aims which are not just.

The fact that Serbia wants Slavonia—the east and the west—this is absurd. Serbia was never there. Serbs have no majority there. We agree to guarantee their rights under international control, to observe legal obligations and standards set in agreements from The Hague. Thus, there is not a single reason for a war or exchange with that area—only because at present someone has more tanks, planes, or Navy ships than someone else.

Croatia is fighting for a just cause, and we will continue to fight, if necessary, until the last man, only to protect our homeland and nation, for our nation to be able to live on its own territory, which is historical and set by the Constitution and the law from 1945 and is still valid. This is the basic essence of our struggle.

I greet listeners of Czechoslovak radio. I am grateful to the Czechoslovak Government and people who I have met here for the goodwill, interest and understanding, for the support which you have been giving us.

[Obzinova] Thank you.

Separovic Explains International Policy

AU2211125191 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
18 Nov 91 pp 1, 7

[Interview with Croatian Foreign Minister Zvonimir Separovic by Ryszard Bilski; place and date not given: "Without Altering the Borders"]

[Text] [Bilski] What are the main paths of Croatia's international foreign policy?

[Separovic] Our main objective is to achieve international status for the war against Croatia and recognition of our independence and sovereignty. This objective is served and will continue to be served by our contacts with the world and visits to the United States, Great Britain, Austria, Hungary, Italy, and Australia.

[Bilski] What do you expect from your Warsaw visit? What offer are you taking to Poland?

[Separovic] I have already been to Poland. I was a professor in Warsaw and Krakow, and also stayed in Oswiecim and Czestochowa. Now, as minister, I expect a "summit meeting." I expect to be able to convey the truth about Croatia's difficult situation. I expect help and understanding. We will ask Poland to recognize us, so that Poland may be one of the first countries to do so. I will ask your country to consider what it can do in the way of humanitarian aid for the Croatian people. I will ask to speak in defense of Dubrovnik and Vukovar.

Dubrovnik, let me remind you, is under special protection from UNESCO. Vukovar is a martyr city! We are trying to organize a team of observers in the operation to help Vukovar.

[Bilski] What do you think of the EC sanctions against Yugoslavia? Are they proving effective?

[Separovic] They are unjust, because they apply to the whole of Yugoslavia, and make no distinction between the aggressor and the victim. The NATO and EC meetings in Rome reached what I would call double-value decisions. It is bad that these meetings failed to firmly condemn the war against Croatia, but it is good that the heads of the NATO countries described the conduct of the so-called Yugoslav People's Army as aggressive and expressed deep concern over the fate of Dubrovnik and many other Croatian cities. They also drew attention to the right of nations to self-determination and to the fact that it is unlawful to alter borders by the use of force.

Now we are seeking support, mainly among the European countries for undertakings in aid of Croatia. We sorely need humanitarian aid. Almost half a million

people have been forced to leave their homes and farms, which have been either destroyed or seriously damaged. Some of them are fleeing abroad. Over 40,000 Croatian citizens of various nationalities have already entered Hungary. About 150,000 people are living on the perimeter of cities like Vukovar, Dubrovnik, and Slunj.

[Bilski] How do you think the situation in Yugoslavia will develop now? What concessions is the Croatian Government prepared to make for the sake of establishing lasting peace as quickly as possible?

[Separovic] It is very difficult to foresee anything because we are on the receiving end of open aggression from Serbia, Montenegro, and the so-called Yugoslav People's Army, which has in fact become the Serbian Army, and is still a powerful force. This is a great danger not just to Croatia. There is a danger that the so-called Yugoslav People's Army will use heavy weapons, and even biological ones, which it probably has at its disposal. This fact was mentioned during the Iraqi war. It was revealed that Yugoslavia had sold to Iraq not just conventional weapons, but war gases as well, and had also taken part in preparing and implementing the nuclear program in Iraq.

We expect the Yugoslav Army to leave Croatia by the end of the year. Most of the barracks have already been vacated. But a very worrying fact is that about 100,000 reservists have entered Croatia from Serbia and Montenegro, and from Bosnia-Herzegovina, from where attacks on our territory are being carried out. I hope that the 25th December deadline for the pullout of forces from Croatia will be kept. We also want to see the Serbian paramilitary units leave. If they do not wish to leave, they should at least lay down their arms.

For these very reasons the arrival of UN peacekeeping forces in Yugoslavia is an urgent matter. When the Hague Conference began, we insisted on the intervention of the "blue helmets," and we still do. We demanded that the American 7th Fleet come to our aid. This fleet would guarantee peace in the Adriatic. We of course agree that UN peacekeeping forces should be deployed along Croatia's borders and, after the departure of the so-called Yugoslav People's Army, should move into the crisis areas, from which we are prepared to withdraw all our forces except peacekeeping ones, which would perform their task under the aegis of peace observers or forces.

The most important matter is to stop the war and resolve all the problems on the basis of European international law. A fait accompli is unacceptable, for one cannot accept the Serbian-Montenegrin aggression and the Belgrade philosophy of grabbing everything first and holding talks later. According to some sources, Lord Carrington has suggested a referendum to the Serbs in Croatia. If this referendum is supposed to concern self-determination and the right to secede, then we do not agree to it. Croatia accepts international decisions and the Hague agreements concerning autonomy and the

so-called special status for ethnic minorities, but this not only applies to the Serbian, Italian, and Hungarian minorities in Croatia, but also to the Albanian, Hungarian, Muslim, and Croatian minority in Serbia. However, Croatia does not agree to the separation of these minorities from their mother countries. Human rights, including the rights of ethnic minorities, will be protected, under international control if necessary. The Croatian parliament has accelerated work on a special law on the rights of people, nations, communities, and groups. We are not doing this in order to fulfill some EC conditions for Croatia's recognition, but mainly because the ethnic problems that have exacerbated recently dictate such a need. This problem must be solved in the same way for everyone.

[Bilski] Is it possible to resolve the Serbo-Croatian conflict without altering the borders?

[Separovic] Absolutely! Any alteration to the border is out of the question, and an alteration by the use of force is downright unthinkable. The solution to the present crisis should be sought not at the battle front, with the use of weapons, but at the conference table, on the basis of international law. We keep repeating at every occasion, so I will also repeat, that we are ready to furnish any legal guarantee and accept any international supervision in order to safeguard the rights of Serbs in Croatia.

Reaction to Party of Rights Leader Paraga's Arrest

Demonstrators Rally in Split

LD2511202191 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service
in Serbo-Croatian 1825 GMT 25 Nov 91

[Excerpt] Split, 25 Nov (TANJUG)—A letter written in jail by Dobroslav Paraga, the arrested leader of the Croatian Party of Rights, has been read out to 2,000 people who gathered at a protest rally in the main market in Split. In the letter, Paraga rejects all accusations against him and his aide, Milan Vukovic. He sees the reason for his arrest as "Tudjman's attempt to avoid responsibility for the fall of Vukovar and for all the miseries of the regime which, in a year of its neo-Bolshevik rule, caused only war in Croatia, which resulted in tens of thousands of people being killed, several hundred thousand displaced, and the loss of sovereignty over half of Croatian territory."

Paraga called on all his followers and on all true "Croats" to hold public rallies and to write to foreign governments that the Croatian people did not want this neo-Bolshevik government, and he urged the Croatian people to champion the cause of "legendary Mile Dedakovic" [commander of the Vukovar defense]. He informed his followers that he and Milan Vukovic went on hunger strike on 23 November. [passage omitted]

Prosecutors Request Investigation

LD2511210691 Zagreb HTV Television
in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 25 Nov 91

[Text] The Zagreb District Public Prosecutors' Office today presented to the investigating judge of the Zagreb District Court a request for carrying out an investigation against Dobroslav Paraga and Miran Vukovic.

The request has been submitted because there is evidence that they committed a criminal act against the Republic of Croatia by instigating an armed uprising as well as the criminal act of retaining arms and explosives without permission, says today's statement issued by the Zagreb District Public Prosecutors' Office.

It goes on to say that it has been proposed to the investigating judge that measures of detention be brought to bear against the two accused.

In a separate request for carrying out an investigation, Paraga is accused, in his capacity as chairman of the Croatian Party of Rights, of having organized and armed paramilitary units called HOS (Hrvatske Oruzane Snage—Croatian Armed Forces), set up an autonomous formation of military commands outside the control of the Croatian army and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and proclaimed himself commander of all the units of HOS—and all this for the purpose of suspending the legally elected authorities in the Republic of Croatia and taking over the function of these authorities.

At present it has been established, following a criminal analysis, that HOS units without permission carried out searches of the flats of individual citizens and confiscated weapons. There is also evidence that the two accused made arms deals. In this way, in one transaction alone, 185,000 Deutsch marks were paid to them in cash.

Paraga Criticizes Tudjman

LD2511232691 Belgrade TANJUG in English
2221 GMT 25 Nov 91

[Text] Split, November 25 (TANJUG)—Leader of the extremist nationalist and pro-fascist party—the Croatian Party of Rights (HSP)—Dobroslav Paraga accused on Monday [25 November] Croatian President Franjo Tudjman of trying to "avoid responsibility for the fall of Vukovar" by arresting him. He also said that Tudjman's "neo-Bolshevik authority" managed to produce "only war in Croatia."

In a letter sent from detention and read out at a protest meeting in central adriatic city of Split before some 2,000 people, Paraga accused the Croatian president of trying with his arrest to "avoid the responsibility for the fall of Vukovar and all the misery of the regime, which during one year of its neo-Bolshevik authority managed only to cause war in Croatia."

Result of this, Paraga said, were "scores of thousand of dead, several hundred thousand refugees and loss of sovereignty over one-half of Croatia territory."

Paraga was arrested in Zagreb last Thursday, together with HSP Vice-President Milan Vukovic, on charges of "forcible overthrow of legally elected authority" and "forming an armed formation which committed a series of criminal acts."

The HSP has formed its own army—the Croatian Defense Union (HOS)—made up of HSP members.

Paraga called on his followers and all "true Croats" to hold public rallies and write to foreign governments that the Croatian people did not want these "neo-Bolshevist authorities."

The rally in Split expressed disgust that the HSP members, "after the heroic battles on all battlefronts in Croatia, were being persecuted and locked up."

Luka Podrug, president of the Split branch of the Croatian Democratic Party (HDS), strongly attacked the "Bolshevist authorities" in Croatia and called on all Croats to struggle for Croatia's freedom.

The rally passed without incidents, although a large number of HOS members carrying hand grenades at the waist, were seen at the end of the gathering. Also, shooting was heard on a number of times in the city.

Government Urges Unity Among 'Democratic Forces'

*LD2511204191 Zagreb HTV Television
in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 25 Nov 91*

[Text] A few moments ago we received a statement from a Croatian Government session which was held today under the chairmanship of Croatian President Franjo Tudjman:

The political and military situation in the Republic of Croatia was examined in the light of negotiations in The Hague and in Geneva. The republican president informed the government about the negotiations which two days ago brought about the Geneva cease-fire agreement and about the talks which were devoted to the deployment of the UN peacekeeping forces. The political situation in Croatia was discussed as well as measures that the government should take.

It was stressed that at this crucial moment all democratic forces must be united, the functioning of all segments of a law-governed state must be secured, and economic activity coordinated to ensure the regular supply of the armed forces and the population of the Republic of Croatia in general.

Minister of Maritime Affairs Comments on Borders

*92BA0156B Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian
18 Nov 91 p 7*

[Article including interview with Dr. Davorin Rudolf, Croatian maritime minister, by Drazen Jankelovic; place and date not given: "All the Boundary Lines Are Established"]

[Text] Every state, and therefore an independent Croatia as well, tries to regulate its borders and regime, along with its neighbors. The view of Croatia is that its borders as they existed in the former Yugoslavia are well-known and unchangeable. The border is well known toward Hungary, Slovenia, the maritime border with Italy, and then toward Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serbia. It remains to define the maritime boundaries with Slovenia and Montenegro. To be sure, there is a war going on, and borders can be talked about only when there is no war. The government of the Republic of Croatia has established a commission to see to regulation of borders, and it is headed by Dr. Davorin Rudolf, maritime minister. The commission includes specialists from various ministries (internal affairs, transportation, health care, the environment, and others), and a team of experts has also been established for practical matters. We talked with Dr. Davorin Rudolf, its chairman, about the task and future work of the commission.

First the Border With Slovenia

"This government commission," Dr. Davorin Rudolf said, "is, of course, a commission that should join the partners in laying down the principles on which first the regime on the border would be regulated and possible disputes resolved in principle. The first step to be taken is regulating the border with Slovenia. It is our position that Croatia's border with Slovenia is fine as it is, Croatia has no territorial claims at all, and Slovenia likewise has none toward Croatia. This is a border that has remained as it was found, except at sea there off Secovlje. The border at sea will be regulated on the basis of the principles and methodology that hold in international law, that is, according to the rules of international law, as is always the case in such situations between states. It is very important now to agree on the regime along the border. First of all, our fundamental position is that the best border is the one felt the least, a border that actually does not exist. We will propose to the Slovenes—these matters will, of course, be regulated in an intergovernmental agreement—that the fundamental principle be that actually there be no border between Croatia and Slovenia, as is the case, for example, in the Benelux countries or in the Scandinavian countries. In other words, the border for Croatia would also be on the Slovene-Italian and Austrian border, while for the Slovenes it would be on the Croatian-Hungarian border or on the borders with the former Yugoslav republics.

In the opinion of Dr. Davorin Rudolf, there would in practice be no internal border between Croatia and

Slovenia; there would only be the boundary line. The functions of the border, customs, police, public health, and others, would be performed simultaneously for Slovenia and Croatia on the Slovenian-Italian and Slovenian-Austrian border, and at the same time for Slovenia on the Croatian-Hungarian or on the border with the other Yugoslav republics, which, it is anticipated, will also be states.

The Most Liberal Regime Possible

[Jankelovic] Is it possible to carry out something like that?

[Rudolf] Because Croatia is at war, this cannot be realized in practice as long as the war is going on. Our position is that in this transitional period, until conditions in Croatia change, the regime on the border with Slovenia should be as liberal as possible, especially for the crossing of persons from one state to the other. For citizens of Croatia or Slovenia, the formalities ought to be reduced to the absolute minimum. The regime should especially be very liberal for local border traffic, for people who live along the border, who go to work in Slovenia, who have farms on the Slovenian side, and so on. The performance of border functions should be simplified. We will propose to the Slovenes that customs and police functions be performed in one place, in a border station for both our people and theirs. That would be at the so-called international border crossings. And at the others, we will propose, a compromise might be reached to divide the border stations into odd and even, for instance, with our people in one group and their people in the other group, and they would simultaneously perform functions for Croatia and Slovenia. That would also cut costs. And it would achieve what Croatia wants—to be a modern European state, a state that is free for the flow of people, ideas, and culture. The Slovenes, we have heard, have already prepared the draft of an agreement, and perhaps we will begin talks in this coming week.

Special Agreements for Fishermen

[Jankelovic] Have any issues already arisen for specific agreement, say, concerning fishing? How will that be worked out?

[Rudolf] When the boundary line is drawn, a special agreement will regulate the fishing of Slovene fishermen in Croatian coastal waters. There are various alternatives here which we will examine with the Slovenes, beginning with the issuance of licenses, the setting of quotas, joint ventures, and so on. The model that is adopted will, of course, depend above all on the interests of Croatia and the interests of Slovenia. We certainly have a duty to be mindful first of national interests and of the interests of Croatian fishermen, to see that those interests are adequately protected. In Istria, relations are very good with "Delamaris," which has a large number of cooperators among Croatian fishermen, and there is also a rich trade in fish with both Slovenia and Italy, and many other such

things. We will try to regulate those relations so as to improve them, mindful of our own interests. There are also international treaties—for instance, the Osimo agreements—which Yugoslavia had, treaties on transit, on transportation, and the like, and the benefits from those treaties must not be diminished, indeed they should be augmented. We will try to reach agreement with the Slovenes and to make that road from Istria to Europe completely open.

[Jankelovic] Do you believe that there ought not to be any border problems?

[Rudolf] In practice, when a border is marked, there will be problems raised by life and the situation in nature. However, with goodwill and understanding, all those problems can be solved without difficulty. Our leading idea is that the border should be such that people do not feel difficulties.

[Jankelovic] And how about the other borders?

[Rudolf] All the borders have actually been established; there is no debate about the boundary line. Toward Bosnia-Herzegovina, we will establish the border wherever possible, again guided by the same principle that the regime be as liberal as possible. At this point, no issue has been made of regulating the border with Montenegro and Serbia because of the war being waged against Croatia. When the war is over, we will also offer the Hungarians the more liberal regime that has been achieved in Europe. Our fundamental orientation is toward a modern regime. A liberal regime so that the border is felt as little as possible (we were told in conclusion by Dr. Davorin Rudolf).

Serbia

Kosutic Sees UN Force 'More Desirable' Than EC

LD2511130891 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1213 GMT 25 Nov 91

[Text] Belgrade, Nov 25 (TANJUG)—Vice premier of the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia Budimir Kosutic maintains that the "participation of the United Nations Organization in the resolution of the Yugoslav crisis is more desirable than that of the European Community."

In an interview published today in the Belgrade daily POLITIKA, Kosutic stressed that "if a U.N. peace-keeping force is positioned on the demarcation line between the warring sides, the conditions will be created for a diplomatic resolution of the Yugoslav crisis and the suppression of the armed uprising in the Yugoslav Republic of Croatia."

"Germany's influence in the E.C. is exceptionally strong," Kosutic said, adding that "this was what obstructed constructive progress at the conference on Yugoslavia in The Hague."

"The future of Serbia and the Serbian people depends on the success with which Serbia will be able to oppose certain circles in Germany, Austria and other countries and Catholic centres, and the extent to which the Serbian people can be united," Kosutic stressed.

Kosutic remarked that "it is Germany and these centres who want to establish a new order, but one retaining to a large extent the old spheres of interest" and, according to the concept most openly advocated by the Austrians in the CSCE, Serbia could possibly survive within its 1912 borders.

"Because of this Serbia must demand the observance of accepted international regulations on the rights of peoples to self-determination and the territorial integrity of states, and must be ready to protect those rights with all available means," the Serbian vice premier said.

POLITIKA Views Markovic Resignation

*LD2411180691 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1327 GMT 24 Nov 91*

[Text] Belgrade, November 24 (TANJUG)—The Belgrade daily POLITIKA is of the view that in the background of Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante Markovic's decision not to withdraw voluntarily from his post, there is "some plan whose tactics have been dreamed up in some European ministry."

POLITIKA writes that Markovic's current role is probably "to bring things to the point to justify the punishing of those parts of Yugoslavia which uphold the idea of continuing life together."

According to POLITIKA, Markovic is spreading a story that the federal government is now the sole legitimate institution in Yugoslavia, while the Federal Presidency and the federal parliament are not, because they are incomplete.

Once such a view of the Federal Presidency and parliament have been imposed, then "those foreign factors which no longer want to see any kind of Yugoslavia, have a free hand to interfere and punish the guilty according to their standards," writes POLITIKA.

The chamber of republics and provinces in the federal parliament denied confidence to Markovic ten days ago, but he described the decision as illegitimate because it had not been adopted by all members of the chamber.

The Federal Chamber of the Yugoslav parliament will take a vote of confidence to Prime Minister Markovic in Belgrade on November 27.

The Belgrade daily VECERNJE NOVOSTI writes today that Markovic, a Croat, "represents one (federal) state, and serves another (Croatia), which is at war with the first."

Markovic wants to remain prime minister to "cause obstructions and blockades," according to VECERNJE NOVOSTI.

VECERNJE NOVOSTI writes that Markovic has inclined towards the secessionist Republics of Slovenia and Croatia, and that he is prime minister in order "for the disassociation of those leaving Yugoslavia not to be carried out in accordance with the wishes of those who do not wish to leave."

Decrees Approved To Restrict Interrepublic Trade

*AU2511163591 Belgrade Radio Belgrade Network
in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 25 Nov 91*

[Report by Slavisa Stojkovic]

[Text] The government of the Republic of Serbia has passed two decrees which regulate the flow of goods and services and ban the sale of certain products outside Serbian territory. For instance, these decrees state that Slovenia can purchase goods in Serbia only with foreign currency, and that foodstuffs cannot be sold outside Serbia without permission. Slavisa Stojkovic has the details:

[Stojkovic] The decrees have been passed in order to ensure stability of supplies for the Serbian market. This primarily refers to food products. Today's issue of the Serbian Official Gazette carries the full text of the decree banning sales of certain goods. As of tomorrow, no social or private firm registered in Serbia can sell the following products to firms in other republics: wheat, flour, pasta, tin, vegetables, fruit, cattle, meat, meat products, poultry, eggs, milk, milk products, sugar, cocoa, chocolate products, vegetable oil, lard, coffee, herbs, wine, spirits, crops used for industrial purposes, animal fodder, wood, and cured tobacco.

Apart from being banned from sale, these products cannot be exchanged or given as gifts, that is, they cannot change hands and leave Serbian territory. Exemptions are granted personally by the republican minister for trade and tourism, and only in cases when the sale of these products secures raw materials, production materials, and consumer goods for Serbian residents, or in cases when the sale clears surplus inventory.

Those who violate the decree face a fine of up to 450,000 dinars and confiscation of the goods intended for sale.

The decree on special conditions concerning the flow of goods and services is also supposed to take effect tomorrow. The result of this decree is that social and private firms from Serbia can sell goods and provide services to firms registered in Slovenia only if these goods and services are paid for in advance with convertible currency. Similarly, (they can also be exported) if an agreement has been concluded on compensation or exchange of goods and services. Goods from Slovenia and Croatia may be sold on Serbian territory, provided that a special compensation [naknada] for recordkeeping

costs has been paid. This compensation amounts to one percent of the price of the product.

This also applies to goods bought in other republics but which originate in Slovenia or Croatia.

Those who violate the decrees also face fines of up to 450,000 dinars and possible confiscation of the goods.

Opposition Leader Calls For Ending Hostilities

AU2511203791 Belgrade RTV Sat TV
in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 25 Nov 91

[Statement by Dragoljub Micunovic, leader of the Democratic Party of Serbia; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] The news from Geneva has convinced us that we have reached the dramatic moment in the denouement of the Yugoslav state crisis. It would be very important if everyone profoundly understood that this is the last chance to come out of the war honorably, the last chance to see the end to this war. Otherwise, we will embark on a war that may last for decades, a war that can result in enormous destruction and suffering.

With this war, and the extent of destruction which it has brought, we have managed to frighten not only ourselves but the rest of the world. We must not do such things anymore. For this reason it is very important that all signatories of the Geneva agreement strictly observe it. The one who fails this time will be the main culprit and find himself in the docks of the United Nations.

We saw that Tudjman has understood this. This is why he immediately lifted the blockade of the barracks, why he offered talks on the territorial, cultural, political, and other types of autonomy of Serbs, this is why Paraga was arrested. He wants to rid himself of the image of a fascist country.

We must learn a lesson from this. Thus, we must not in any way undertake offensive actions against Osijek or other places, and therefore present ourselves as people who do not stick to their promises. Serbia has a great responsibility. What is even worse is that actions of the Army will also be ascribed to Serbia.

Militia 'Harassed' Kosovars To Enlist

AU2411211991 Zagreb Radio Croatia in Albanian
2215 GMT 23 Nov 91

[Text] A communique from the Council for the Care of Soldiers states that the Serbian militia and Army have in recent days openly and incessantly harassed young people in Kosovo. Militia patrols are stopping young people without warning, checking their papers, enlisting them, and sending them to unknown destinations. Such behavior, so dangerous to the lives of our young men, obliges parents and young people to be careful lest they become hostages of the Army, which has now come out openly against certain peoples. The Army's attitude

toward Albanians and their treatment in several theaters of the war means that Albanians are no longer required to heed summons to serve in this Army, which is fighting for the purposes of the occupying Serbian political-military regime.

As in other areas of Kosovo, in Gjilan [Gnjilane] Commune, too, the Serbian police and the Army have in the last two days forcibly detained a considerable number of young Albanian men, sending them to the Army and to the Croatian front immediately.

Bosnia-Herzegovina

Government Issues Statement on Croatian 'Community'

LD2411103791 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service
in Serbo-Croatian 1655 GMT 23 Nov 91

[Text] Sarajevo, 23 Nov (TANJUG)—Regarding a decision on setting up the Croatian Herceg-Bosna community and decisions of the Croatian Bosanska Posavina community, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government said that the provisions of the decision on setting up the Croatian Herceg-Bosna community to not give rise to the conclusion that a community of municipalities has been created because constitutional provisions set out that such a community may be created through an agreement concluded by municipal assemblies, a Bosnia-Herzegovina Information Ministry press statement says.

Therefore, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government says, that does not represent the setting up of a social and political community nor do the provisions of the decision contain elements of state power; hence, this community cannot act as an institution of power. The government says this is only a form of political organization.

Stressing that the Croatian Bosanska Posavina community was set up by a regional committee of a political party, it also represents a political form of organization without elements of power.

The government said that in the given cases it is not advisable to set up such and similar communities which under present circumstances in Bosnia-Herzegovina cause justified distrust, because they are associated with communities of municipalities, on which the government had long ago expressed its principled position.

The government is again warning that it will not accept as legal institutions all those communities which show pretensions to be constituted as institutions with prerogatives of regional government bodies, a statement issued this evening by the republican Information Ministry says.

Serbian Deputies Boycott Republic Assembly*LD2311215591 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service
in Serbo-Croatian 1958 GMT 22 Nov 91*

[Text] Sarajevo, 22 Nov (TANJUG)—We did not attend today's session of both chambers of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly because we maintained that the session had not been well prepared. However, the Assembly will not be deprived of Serbian deputies' views, Aleksa Buha, president of the Club of Deputies of the Democratic Party [Srpska Demokratska Stranka—SDS] in the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, said in a statement tonight to Sarajevo Television.

Explaining why SDS members had not attended tonight's session, Buha said that "apart from this there are also old reasons which render it impossible for us to participate in the routine work of the joint session."

Our deputies, Buha said, otherwise do take part in the work of the Assembly commissions and committees. It is a known fact that at one of our last joint sessions we were rudely outvoted and a decision was passed on the adoption of a platform and memorandum in contravention of our will. We demanded that these documents be withdrawn, something that has not yet been done. There are also old reasons behind our failure to take part in the joint session of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly, Buha said.

Banja Luka Krajina Wants UN Troops in Croatia*LD2411231291 Belgrade TANJUG in English
2051 GMT 24 Nov 91*

[Text] Banja Luka, Yugoslavia, Nov 24 (TANJUG)—The Government of the Autonomous Region of Krajina in Banja Luka in the Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina says in a statement released here today that the 'blue helmets should only be deployed in the territory of the Republic of Croatia where war is in progress and where the Serbian people are defending their ancestral homes from ustasha fascists."

The statement of the recently self-proclaimed Serb autonomous region specifies that "U.N. peacekeeping troops should be deployed along the present borders of the Serb autonomous regions of Krajina and of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem to Croatia."

"The autonomous region of Krajina does not agree with the proposal put forth by President of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency Alija Izetbegovic for the U.N. peacekeeping force to be deployed also in Eastern and Western Herzegovina, along the Drina River and in parts of the Bosnian Krajina region," the statement says.

The regional government goes on to say that U.N. peacekeeping troops "cannot be deployed between the autonomous region of Krajina, based in Banja Luka, and the Serb autonomous region of Krajina, based in Knin,

where they would penetrate the living flesh of the Serbian people who have, in a recent referendum and plebiscite, clearly stated their political will to live together forever."

Increased JNA Incidents in Mostar Area*92BA0127A Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian
29 Oct 91 p 12*

[Article by Ermin Krehic: "Unarmed—Unsafe!"]

[Text] Mostar—Even though by their surprise movements along the outer edges of Mostar Opstina in the direction of western Herzegovina the forces of the Yugoslav Army [JA] have been disturbing the people greatly, those movements are not ceasing. The inhabitants of the village Krivodol, in which the house numbers go up to 90 and the inhabitants are exclusively Croat, say that the olive-drab Army has dug in in the vicinity of that village. The incident caused on 26 November by the JA "special landing troops" in precisely the area of this village is still the topic of the day in Herzegovina. At that time, readers will recall, soldiers of the federal Army first provoked gunfire and then arrested the police patrol that was sent from the Mostar station to see who was shooting and why.

Indicative "Explanation"

Official military sources say that their units were fired upon from a little wood near there. Following the shots, they said, uniformed personnel suddenly appeared along with one civilian (this was the police patrol's guide), and it seems the Army landing units took them into custody just to be sure. The "explanation" given by Lieutenant Colonel Dragan Borojevic as to why the policemen were arrested is interesting and quite indicative: "The local inhabitants of Krivodol opened fire on personnel of the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] when they were coming down to the village by helicopter, and accordingly, the police had no business being there."

But the people of Krivodol themselves, whose representatives made the rounds of several newspaper bureaus in Mostar on Monday, say that none of them fired on the Army, but that members of the JA fired first without any pretext. The Krivodolians on the other hand put this question to the military leadership: If someone did after all fire on them, why did they not capture the attackers (as they did the policemen) or kill them? They are categorical, the inhabitants of Krivodol will never again allow anyone to take away the police. If there should be any very comprehensive involvement of reservists, they say, all the Krivodolians will serve as the police!

Frequent "Visits" of the Landing Units

But the Army is not interested in the consequences of its disproportionate and provocative movements! There is an ever-increasing number of helicopters in the Mostar sky. The landing units make frequent "visits" to Hum Hill, which rises up on the south side of the city along the

Neretva, where, it is said, the Army is installing heavy military equipment and armament. Few, then, believe the military officers who say that a certain number of reservists from the Mostar Airport were withdrawn the other day. Based on the number of incidents caused by those same reservists, that is, it seems that the Army is growing all the time. Finally, we will record a move that the people of Mostar have made in their self-defense. During the night from Saturday to Sunday, a seizure of weapons was reported: one submachine gun and one automatic rifle from two reservists by persons as yet unknown. The incident occurred in what is called the Old City, the historical core of Mostar right next to the Old Bridge. Up to now, it has only been the reservists who have been harassing the inhabitants of Mostar, almost always when they have been given an occasion, by firing shots—and they are not merely in the air, but also at targets. And the answer given to the request of the civilian municipal authorities to the military command not to allow their subordinates to enter the city with arms and ammunition was this: "The soldiers feel unsafe in the city if they are unarmed."

Professor Interviewed on Serb-Muslim Relations

92BA0127C Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian
25 Oct 91 pp 18-20

[Interview with Dr. Darko Tanaskovic, professor of oriental studies, by Ivana Pribicevic; place and date not given: "The Islamic State Is Far Away"]

[Text] Darko Tanaskovic (born in 1948), professor of oriental studies in the School of Philosophy of Belgrade University, is one of our best scholars of Islam, Islamic doctrine, and the culture of the Muslim ethnic component. His opinion is respected even in international scholarly circles. Darko Tanaskovic is a lecturer with the highest professorial title in the High School for the Social Sciences in Paris and has participated in carrying out a sizable number of international scientific projects. He is a particular student of Islamic mysticism and of dervish orders in the Muslim countries. He has published several books and dozens of studies in the fields of Arabic studies, social linguistics, Turkish studies, and general oriental studies, both in Yugoslavia and abroad.

In the interview below, Professor Tanaskovic interprets current events in Bosnia and Hercegovina and those related to Serb-Muslim relations, not only from the standpoint of his own science, but, as he himself says, also as a citizen who is perhaps a bit better informed.

[Pribicevic] What is the importance and political weight of the Memorandum on an Independent and Sovereign B-H [Bosnia-Hercegovina]?

[Tanaskovic] Adoption of the Memorandum at one and the same time changes nothing and changes a great deal. It has political weight mostly because of the shocking way in which the coalition adopted it, bypassing any legal or democratic procedure. But, they were in a hurry.... Viewed in principle, from the standpoint of the

essentially triethnic structure of our central republic, Izetbegovic's acceptance of only a Yugoslavia that would include both Croatia and Serbia seems utterly reasonable. Under the circumstances of the moment, it is also cynical to at least an equal degree. It is also too absurd to speak about any independence of political decision-making and of an independent position when the choice is decisively determined in advance by decisions of others, and in this specific case by Croatia's determination to leave Yugoslavia.

[Pribicevic] Why is Izetbegovic, that is, the SDA [Democratic Action Party], insisting that B-H not remain in a possible truncated federation?

[Tanaskovic] One should not draw a literal conclusion from Izetbegovic's behavior and the views of the policy he advocates that he is against Yugoslavia. He is actually known to be in favor of Yugoslavia. At the same time, he is conscious of the limited room he has in which to maneuver, because it is probably clear to him that a unified B-H within its present borders cannot survive outside of Yugoslavia (the Serbs would not accept that), but neither could it survive on the principles of the Belgrade initiative (the Croats would not accept that). His expectations are bound up with the survival of Yugoslavia with all six republics, and according to the formula that has been suggested in The Hague, which, he believes, will ultimately be accepted even by the Serbs under international pressure and the pressure of reality, although there possibly would be a certain regionalization within the republic. It is to that end that he pushed through the vote on the Memorandum in urgent procedure. That calculation is not without basis, and we will most probably know very soon whether it is sufficiently correct. It is not even precluded that Krajina Serbs, both those in Bosnia and Croatia together, are seeking a place for themselves in the coordinates of The Hague formula in their own "sovereign state."

[Pribicevic] What is your comment on the framework for discussion which the EC has offered in The Hague: a loose alliance of Yugoslav republics without changing internal borders?

[Tanaskovic] I, of course, do not consider myself sufficiently informed or called upon to comment on the framework that the EC has offered the Yugoslav participants in discussion and agreement concerning Yugoslavia's future. From the standpoint of what we are talking about, it is my impression that the platform offered best suits the Muslims in B-H and the Macedonians in view of the way in which the Macedonian national interest is today being articulated in Macedonia. It is somewhat less suitable to all the rest, even the Croats and Slovenes, and official Serbian policy has already stated its reservations. That is, The Hague proposal follows in many respects the basic ideas in the Izetbegovic-Gligorov platform. It calls for survival of some loose association among the Yugoslav republics that would have a chance to become more stable in time. That would obviously suit Europe most of all. As for Slovenia, it restricts the

independence of a republic that already considers itself a sovereign state, nor can it suit the extremist nationalist wing in Croatia, which is today increasingly influential in view of the deterioration of the Yugoslav crisis.

[Pribicevic] Is that intolerant view toward the Republic of Serbia, and thereby also toward the Serbs in B-H (in one of the points of the Memorandum), now being defined almost openly for the first time, at the same time the crowning confirmation of the old Croat-Muslim coalition?

[Tanaskovic] No crowning proof is needed as to the existence of that coalition. It is obvious, and it has begun to function altogether openly through the mechanism of the vote on the Memorandum itself. However, I think that the existence of this coalition in practical politics and tactics ought not to be associated with assessments of intolerance toward Serbs in all Muslim communities with any sociologically relevant foundation. Relations are much more complicated, and their rationalization in day-to-day politics through the channel of the exclusive nationalistic parties need not always be a sufficiently accurate mirror of all the dimensions of relations among the nationalities.

[Pribicevic] If one looks behind the Memorandum, does one see the idea of an Islamic republic on the soil of Yugoslavia or B-H?

[Tanaskovic] The idea of an Islamic republic on the soil of Yugoslavia may be somewhere in the deep background of the political efforts of a group of people in the SDA and in the Islamic community. However, that idea should not be excessively exploited in explaining the situation at the moment. In this phase in Yugoslavia, we can speak about a republic in a possibly sovereign state in which the Muslims would represent a majority of the population. That might be a step toward an Islamic republic, but I think that in the Balkans that road is so long that at this moment we should not fix our gaze on distances that are hazy and in the end, judging by all appearances, utopian.

[Pribicevic] Is the Memorandum yet another step toward civil war in B-H?

[Tanaskovic] Looked at logically, it is, but in view of the fact that we are talking about B-H, it need not be.

[Pribicevic] Mindful not only of the Memorandum, but also of the policy being conducted in B-H and the campaigns in the media, can the question be asked of how is it that the Muslims and Serbs have not gone to war already?

[Tanaskovic] Even in spite of all the assaults on the integrity of the Muslims and on their attitude toward the world, there is still the favorable constant of the desire to live in peace and the fact that a majority does not see its interest in any kind of drastic conflict with one's neighbors. Of course, segments of the Muslim, just like segments of the Croat and also segments of the Serbian

nationalities (although we certainly should not draw artificial symmetries, which in large part have in fact brought all this upon us) will be so oriented as to believe that their vital interest lies in a conflict with their neighbors, but I think that the deep structure of the Muslim collective consciousness has still not been dragged over to that side. But if it should be, that would be too great a trial for Yugoslavia, which is disintegrating anyway. In many respects, the Muslims actually do hold the destiny of Yugoslavia in their hands, but it is at the same time their own destiny, which they must not forget.

[Pribicevic] How can the referendum that has been announced concerning the autonomy of the Sanjak be related to events in the "central headquarters"? Is it a question of synchronization of activities?

[Tanaskovic] There is no doubt whatsoever that the decision made to hold a referendum in the Sanjak is related to events in B-H, and at the same time it is related to developments on the international political scene and in the Balkans, so that it must be viewed as one link in the chainwise activation of a reaction which, it is thought, could finally decide the destiny of Yugoslavia in a manner which the participants in those events (who are associated with one another, from Macedonia, through Kosovo and the Sanjak, to B-H) believe is suitable to them at this moment and indeed permanently.

[Pribicevic] The Muslims are recognized to be a nationality in Yugoslavia, and, viewed from that angle, their right to self-determination in the Sanjak might be treated in the same way as the right to self-determination of the Serbs in Croatia?

[Tanaskovic] The very idea of the Sanjak referendum and of establishing its legitimacy is most directly bound up with the "Krajina" status being sought for the Serbs in Croatia and which the Serbs have to a certain degree won for themselves. The mechanism of that analogy holds the key to the philosophy behind the activity of Muslim separatism in the Sanjak. A certain legitimacy can certainly be obtained in this fashion, and it is very difficult to say that the Muslims in the Sanjak, within Serbia, should there be a breakup of Yugoslavia, do not have those same rights which the Serbs have in Croatia or any other Yugoslav nationality in a federal unit that objectively becomes an independent state. The only essential reservation can be stated in the sense (and that is probably why Serbian policy insists on this) that Serbia is not seceding and not leaving Yugoslavia, but, on the contrary, is trying to maintain the continuity of the governmental community in which the Muslims may not be a minority in any part of that territory nor even in its one unit, but they have the status of a nationality.

[Pribicevic] How do you evaluate the activities of the leading Muslim parties in the period since the announcement of the Serb-Muslim agreement (which subsequently was not realized)?

[Tanaskovic] The events that have followed have mostly occurred in the effort of the leading political party of the

Muslim nationality, the SDA, to somehow take the advantage away from the MBO [Bosnian Muslim Organization] (for the present, its only serious rival, and one that is still incomparably weaker) and the SDS [Serbian Democratic Party], and in some fashion to neutralize the head start that these two parties jointly achieved by announcing their "historic" agreement. On the one hand, the activity of the SDA and of Mr. Izetbegovic has been aimed at spectacular political moves that would absorb the shock of that action so as to regain the advantage in that manner. At the same time, one gets the impression that from the moment that agreement was announced, Mr. Izetbegovic has again come quite seriously close to establishing some kind of agreement with the SDS. This is occurring largely away from that part of the political scene on which the news media focus their light. Very serious negotiations, for the most part responsible, sometimes nervous, and quite often feverish, are taking place behind the scenes, and it is they that have made it possible for B-H to have refrained so far from crossing the "red line" at a run.

[Pribicevic] Aside from Alija Izetbegovic and Adil Zulfikarpasic, the third important figure in the Muslim political milieu is Fikret Abdic. How do you see his position?

[Tanaskovic] In my opinion, Fikret Abdic is somewhere close to the happy medium as a political figure. He is quite sufficiently a Muslim to be accepted by fellow members of his nationality, but also sufficiently rational, modern, and sober so that he can also be accepted by everyone else on the B-H political scene. It should not be forgotten that Mr. Abdic received more votes of voters in the direct secret elections than any other member of the B-H Presidency. Alija Izetbegovic was nevertheless elected president. Many people think that it would have been better if the choice had fallen on Fikret Abdic.

[Pribicevic] Can Mr. Izetbegovic present himself as the president of the Presidency of B-H, or has he always and above all been the leader of the majority Muslim party?

[Tanaskovic] It seems utterly unrealistic today to expect any politician, especially a politician like Alija Izetbegovic, to present himself at all otherwise than as a representative of his party. That party believes that it is the legitimate representative of one entire nationality, and that nationality, again in the interpretations of Mr. Izetbegovic, has never been ethnically defined with sufficient precision, but is defined both as a religious and also as an ethnic nationality. In that sense, the SDA is not an ethnic party in the same sense as the SDS and HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community]. Mr. Izetbegovic, then, presents himself first as the president (that tendency is very pronounced in him), moreover the president of B-H as a sovereign republic-state, and then also as a Muslim, that is, as representative of what he considers to be the interests of the Muslim people, which he is inclined to equate with the interests of all the citizens of B-H. Behind all this, one can catch a hint of the basic idea: that B-H is nevertheless that state in

which the Muslims should figure as the protagonists of state sovereignty, because they do not have another state.

[Pribicevic] In the period since announcement of the Serb-Muslim agreement, the Belgrade initiative has emerged....

[Tanaskovic] The Belgrade initiative emerged at a moment when the idea of the agreement had begun to win its first points in the field, for instance, in Hercegovina, the Sanjak, and certain other regions. The initiative is obviously a very important step in the strategy being pursued by the Serbian and Montenegrin leadership. It is in that sense rational and has an indubitable political weight on both the internal and external scene, above all in order to guarantee a certain framework for the legitimacy of discussions about the preservation of Yugoslavia. However, when it comes to the direct influence of the rapid promotion of the Belgrade initiative on the Serb-Muslim agreement that was announced, I would dare to suppose that at the given moment it also had a negative impact on realization of the agreement. Perhaps it would have been better, which does not mean that it would have been possible, taking other circumstances into account, if the launching of the Belgrade initiative had been postponed and the suggested agreement given a chance to "work" a bit more in the field—among the Muslims and among the Serbs, and finally to try to convince even the Croats that it was not devised against them.

[Pribicevic] But if we are talking about the very essence of the initiative, which envisages the Serbs and Muslims living together, can the Muslims nevertheless see their interest in it?

[Tanaskovic] The greatest problem is that today essences rarely achieve expression. I really do not see for the Muslims in Yugoslavia, for Muslims who speak the Serbo-Croat language ("Bosnian") and are of Slavic origin, a better version of community life with other nationalities than some version of Yugoslavia. One of those versions, in my opinion quite rational in its essence, is the one favored by the Belgrade initiative. However, none of that is essential to the response of certain initiatives in the people, in view of the fact that a propaganda campaign, one that can be called criminal without any exaggeration, which has already been unsparingly carried out for a long time among Yugoslavs, has to such extent pushed aside all rationality and all awareness of real interests, both ethnic and human, that those who officially and politically favor those interests hardly take them into account anymore. Nor are they in a position where they can authentically take them into account.

[Pribicevic] Do you see in that propaganda campaign the roots of the Serb-Muslim disagreement?

[Tanaskovic] The unsparing media warfare and multimedia propaganda that has been systematically conducted from the broadcasting centers of certain nationalistic camps, whose main objective has been to satanize

representatives of the other nationality as perpetual and fatal enemies of one's own nationality, have to a large extent managed to disrupt relations between Serbs and Muslims. It is dangerous because that campaign is still going on with undiminished intensity in some of the news media in B-H and even outside this republic. I am specifically referring to some of the publications of the Islamic community and certain newspapers that are supposed to be independent, but are nevertheless newspapers of Muslim parties. If you continuously follow, say, what is written in the newspaper PREPOROD (and that is the most influential newspaper of the Islamic community in the Serbo-Croatian language area, and is published in Sarajevo), and then MUSLIMANSKI GLAS, which is not officially, but essentially is the organ of the SDA, or again OGLEDALO in Zagreb, you will see that a one-sided campaign is being conducted in it that is pronouncedly anti-Serb and recently has also been anti-Yugoslav and anti-Army.

[Pribicevic] What constitutional version best suits the real interests of the nationalities that live in B-H?

[Tanaskovic] The optimum solution for all citizens of B-H would be a unified republic of B-H without excessively pronounced internal political regionalization, and within the borders of a Yugoslavia that would be a federal state under international law with the necessary attributes and functions of an effective governmental organism. We must have certain reservations only when it comes to the question of the Croat nationality in B-H, in those territories where it is compact and represents almost 100 percent of the population, and that is above all western Hercegovina. It is obvious that the Croat people do not see their interest today in a federal Yugoslavia of this kind. I think that that is not smart even from the standpoint of the Croatian people, but no one can speak for someone else and define that other person's interest.

Macedonia

Delegation To Boycott Federal Assembly Session

LD2511130391 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service
in Serbo-Croatian 1146 GMT 25 Nov 91

[Text] Skopje, 25 Nov (TANJUG)—"I maintain that the question of confidence in the Federal Executive Council [FEC] and its president, Ante Markovic, 'launched' by the reduced and illegitimate SFRY Presidency including

the representatives of only two republics, is a coup-style act aiming to forcibly topple federal institutions. This is why the Macedonian delegation will not take part in the Federal Assembly session scheduled for Wednesday [27 November]," Petar Gosev, head of the Macedonian delegation to the Chamber of Republics and Provinces, has told TANJUG.

"For Macedonia any formation of a new federal government is illegitimate and will usher in two, 'twin' governments at the federal level," Petar Gosev stresses.

"To establish the future form of federal institutions and the way of assembling the republics' representatives, it is necessary to resolve two indispensable issues. First, the war and conflicts in Yugoslavia should be stopped, something we have failed to achieve 13, or perhaps, 14 times; and then the Hague agreement on resolving the Yugoslav crisis should be signed. Until then no federal organ can function normally," Petar Gosev says.

Minister Denies Territorial Claims on Neighbors

LD2511135791 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1244 GMT 25 Nov 91

[Text] Belgrade, November 25 (TANJUG)—Foreign Minister of the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Denko Malevski has said that his republic "has no territorial claims on its neighbours" and that it advocates the principle of the respect of the sovereignty of the Balkan states.

In an interview published on Monday [25 November] by the Belgrade daily BORBA, Malevski says that Macedonia "does not have any ideas about creating a large state by capturing territories of other countries."

Macedonia "calls for a Europe without frontiers," says Malevski, pointing out a need for "the Balkan states to accept the European principles" and "work for the integration of this part of the continent."

Referring to the initiative for a meeting of representatives of the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia with those of Greece and Bulgaria to discuss regional problems, Malevski asked: "How is it possible that precisely the state which is in between the three has not been called to participate."

"This gives rise to an objective fear," warns Malevski, adding that cooperation "is the best way of overcoming it."